Surrendering Consent: The Politics of Transitional Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda by Chakravarty, Anuradha
  
 
SURRENDERING CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Anuradha Chakravarty  
January 2009 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 Anuradha Chakravarty 
  
 
SURRENDERING CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA  
 
Anuradha Chakravarty, Ph. D.  
Cornell University 2009 
 
This dissertation examines the consequential role of criminal trials for the transitional 
political regime and the prospect of democratization in Rwanda. It focuses on the 
‘gacaca courts’, a customary local institution reconfigured by political elites and 
implemented on a mass scale to process thousands of cases of those accused of 
genocide crimes. It explains how individuals respond to the incentives in the gacaca 
law that reward confession when they are confronted with uncertain legal processes 
and feel threatened by political elites perceived as powerful, arbitrary and lacking 
legitimacy.     
I find that individuals accused of genocide crimes confess when enough 
information has accumulated against them such that they may not be able to separate 
false testimony from the truth and defend themselves successfully in a gacaca court. 
However, once they have confessed, they fear that they may be singled out for 
indiscriminate retribution by the state. To minimize such a risk, the confessed become 
politically quiescent and tend to support the political status quo even though they do 
not believe that ruling elites have the moral authority to govern. I call this a ‘consent-
effect’. I build on this finding and lay out some plausible inferential arguments about 
the diffusion of the ‘consent effect’ among a wider population and its implications for 
the crucial end-of-transition elections.   
  
This dissertation argues that the effects of the trials have served the interests of 
ruling elites. It has produced a compliant and quiescent citizenry dependent on ruling 
elites for benefits such as reduced punishment. It has enabled regime consolidation by 
the co-optation of gacaca judges, many of whom also occupy positions in local 
government structures. The basic premise of the trials, “genocide ideology” or the idea 
that people were willing executioners, has been used to justify repressive legislation 
and stifle dissent. Data for this dissertation are drawn from a small sample of 
confessed and non-confessed prisoners, detailed ethnography of gacaca court 
processes, trial transcripts, elite interviews, newspaper articles, reports of non-
governmental organizations and other secondary literature.  
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  PREFACE 
The Genocide in Rwanda: April-July 1994 
 
The Rwandan genocide was a state-initiated project targeted against the Tutsi and 
orchestrated with ruthless efficiency. Three quarters of the Tutsi population within 
Rwanda, that is, 800,000 Tutsi, were killed within a hundred days, making this the 
fastest recorded genocide in history.        
It was a political project: a desperate attempt by Hutu extremist elites to hold 
onto power by every possible means against the backdrop of a civil war that had been 
continuing for more than three years. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels 
composed of Tutsi refugees had initiated the war in October 1990 on the premise that 
the Hutu government had continuously vacillated on negotiating a solution to the 
refugee issue. The violence escalated as the RPF advanced. The killing of Tutsi 
civilians within the country was designed to deter the RPF from advancing as also to 
root out suspected accomplices of the rebels. All Tutsi were considered the enemy. 
The assassination of the Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana on the night of 6 April 
1994 proved to be a decisive turning point in the war. The ‘Provisional Government’ 
dominated by Hutu extremists took over and blamed the RPF for the President’s death. 
In Kigali, roadblocks and barriers went up within hours of the assassination as soldiers 
and members of the Presidential Guard fanned out to conduct house searches and kill 
Tutsi civilians. The genocide had begun. 
In the following weeks, state elites were able to pull off an extraordinary level 
of mass mobilization. Hutu militia, local administrators, the gendarmerie were 
mobilized to fight what was in their view a war of self-defense against the Tutsi 
enemy. Hutu leaders at the center and from the provinces traveled into the hinterland 
to give inflammatory speeches and urge local Hutu to “work” harder to “clear the tall 
 xv 
trees”.1 The extremist radio RTLM (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) played 
on deep-seated fears in the collective Hutu psyche about the imminent return of a 
power hungry racial minority that would purportedly subject them to subservience as 
it had done in the pre colonial and colonial years. Defeat at the hands of the RPF 
would mean the undoing of the security and political gains made by the Hutu majority 
since the Hutu social revolution2 a few years before independence. Some of the 
arguments, for instance, those relating to the non-indigenous origins and political 
threat posed by Tutsi, had been systematically popularized by Hutu elites during the 
First and Second Hutu Republics (1962-1973; 1973-1994). The propaganda assumed 
paranoid proportions fueled by the insecurities of a war the government appeared to be 
losing.   
Huge numbers of ordinary Hutu were drawn into the genocidal project. Those 
who were already actively involved in the killings at the local level offered incentives, 
applied pressure and coercion, and influenced their friends, neighbors and family to 
join the war-fighting activities by helping to root out the enemy living amongst them. 
The international community failed to act in time.  
Gitarama, the make shift capital of the interim government in the south, fell to 
the RPF in mid-June. This forced interim government leaders to flee to the northwest. 
Kigali was occupied by the RPF in early July. By mid-July, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, 
the two provinces in the northwest were also captured by the RPF. Government 
leaders and almost two million Hutu refugees (a motley crowd comprised of militia 
members, terrified peasants, government soldiers, priests, civil servants, businessmen 
                                                 
1 This reference to the ‘tall trees’ was a euphemism for targeting Tutsi who, according to a widely 
prevalent theory of racial difference, were said to be taller and thinner than Hutu. An imprecise marker 
of ethnic difference, this led to the harassment and deaths of many Hutu who matched that description.   
2 The social revolution of Hutu in 1959 led to the end of the Tutsi monarchy which had ruled Rwanda 
for four centuries. Mostly Tutsi elites but also hundreds of ordinary Tutsi were targeted for harassment 
and persecution and went into exile. The First Hutu Republic was inaugurated after independence in 
1962.  
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and children) fled across the border into the Congo. Genocide ground to a halt with the 
declaration of victory by the RPF in July 1994.3    
Here is the narrative of a seventy-four year old man who tried to explain his 
participation in the aftermath, “I regret what I did. […] I am ashamed, but what would 
you have done if you had been in my place? Either you took part in the massacre or 
else you were massacred yourself. So I took weapons and I defended the members of 
my tribe against the Tutsi.”4  Unraveling this man’s explanation, Gérard Prunier notes, 
“He acknowledges that he killed (under duress) harmless people, and yet he agrees 
with the propaganda view…by mythifying them as aggressive enemies. If the notion 
of guilt presupposes a clear understanding of what one is doing at the time of the 
crime, then there were at that time in Rwanda…a lot of ‘innocent murderers’.”5      
The RPF-dominated transitional government however emphasized the role of 
genocide ideology and suggested that people were willing executioners. It decided to 
use the criminal justice system to try all of the accused. RPF elites sometimes suggest 
that the number of perpetrators is as high as three million Hutu but this grossly 
overestimates the number of Hutu who are likely to have killed.6 It also tends to 
deflect attention from the huge numbers of Hutu who have been killed in the span of 
these tumultuous years. About 30,000 Hutu were killed by their extremist co-ethnics 
because they were opposed to or tried actively to resist genocide.7 Hundreds of cases 
                                                 
3 There is a growing literature on the Rwandan genocide. For analyses of the extremist media, see Jean-
Pierre Chretien et al. (2002); on the spatial and temporal dynamics of genocide, see Christian Davenport 
and Alan Stam (n.d) ; on the failure on the UN see Michael Barnett (2002); on micro-dynamics and 
individual participation, see Scott Straus (2006); on gender and participation in genocide, see African 
Rights (2004); for a cultural explanation, see Christopher C. Taylor (1999); for excellent overviews, see 
Gérard Prunier (1995); Alison Des Forges (1999); African Rights (1995). For accounts of ordinary Hutu 
who risked their lives to save Tutsi who sought refuge, see African Rights (2002).  
4 Gérard Prunier (1995), p247    
5 Gérard Prunier (1995), p246. He argues that sadistic killers seem to have been in a small minority. 
This observation is confirmed by Scott Straus (2006).   
6 Scott Straus (2004)  
7 Gérard Prunier (1995), p265  
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of summary executions, arbitrary killings and disappearances were reported in the 
RPF-controlled zones during the civil war.8 At a minimum 25,000- 30,000 Hutu were 
killed by the RPF between April and August 19949 but the RPF has not been fully held 
to account for these crimes.  
This dissertation focuses on the process of justice for genocide crimes that 
unfolded over a decade of transition. As we will see the reluctance of the RPF to 
account for crimes perpetrated by its soldiers will emerge as a significant concern for 
ordinary Hutu who must submit to the rigors of a criminal trials process. Despite 
reservations about RPF elites’ moral authority to rule, the criminal trials produce on 
the part of those who have confessed the need to instrumentally ‘surrender consent’. 
This is evidenced in their unwillingness to hold ruling elites accountable for their 
transgressions and a tendency to support the political status quo. This dissertation 
studies the causes of confession and its consequences for democratization and the 
transitional political regime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Amnesty International (1994, October 20)  
9 Alison Des Forges (1999)  
                                                                                                                        
 1  
CHAPTER ONE  
GENOCIDE TRIALS AND AN ILLIBERAL POLITICAL CONTRACT  
1.1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted that the pursuit of retrospective justice, particularly criminal 
justice, is an “urgent task of democratization”.1 Trials are not only a legal obligation or 
moral duty but they help to lay the groundwork for new rules of the political game in 
transitional polities by signaling that the exercise of power cannot be capricious; it 
must be perpetually accountable to the law and its might constrained by rights-
wielding citizens.   
But how successfully are trials really able to produce government that is 
constrained?  This question is often overlooked.2 This dissertation is based on the 
premise that we need to identify the consequences of trials for transitional regimes 
(defined as the relationship between ruling elites and civil society3) in formation.  
It makes two central arguments: First, trials have resulted in the production of 
political quiescence mainly through the production of increasing numbers of 
confessions. The bulk of the evidence in this dissertation shows how confessions are 
produced. I contend that the processes by which confessions are generated explain its 
consequent effect. I provide evidence for the finding that confessions produce an 
instrumental ‘consent effect’ in favor of ruling elites. This is a simulation of political 
loyalty to minimize the risk of indiscriminate retribution by the state. Second, I build 
                                                 
1 Juan E. Mendez (1997), p.1  
2 In a recent volume on the rule of law in post-conflict societies, the authors note that the question of 
whether and how accountability proceedings actually contribute to building the rule of law is under-
analyzed. See Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks (2006), p253  
3 Adam Przeworski drawing on Guillermo O’Donnell’s formulation; See Adam Przeworski (1992) , 
p123  
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on this finding to argue that the trials have served the interests of ruling elites by 
inhibiting the emergence of an active and critical citizenry. I offer inferential 
arguments about the diffusion of the consent-effect to a larger population and its uses 
for ruling elites who are widely believed to have committed gross violations of human 
rights and are perceived to possess little moral authority to govern. Ruling elites 
however are not punished for their transgressions because citizens are not willing to 
hold them accountable. The trials fail to produce government that is constrained and 
undermine a genuinely democratic transition.  
1.2 Overview of the arguments  
Individuals accused of genocide crimes fear that those who confess will be targeted for 
indiscriminate punishment by the government. However, when there is sufficient 
information available against them such that they will in all likelihood not be able to 
defend themselves at trial, it is in their best interest to produce a confession in the hope 
of a reduced sentence. Once they have confessed, these individuals are politically 
quiescent because of a need to minimize the risk that the government might defect 
from its offer of reduced sentences.4  
One in every 31 people in the adult Hutu population at the time of genocide has 
confessed.5 I infer that the production of political quiescence begins with those who 
                                                 
4 They also fear the possibility of being rearrested. They could be rearrested if they are accused of any 
further infractions (real or contrived). The law allows individuals to be tried again should ‘new facts’ 
about their genocide cases appear that were not considered at the original trial. See for example, Article 
20, Gacaca law (2007). There have been incidents where people have been re-arrested even after 
acquittal by the formal courts. See for example, documentation by Human Rights Watch (2002), p79 
“In several cases persons tried, acquitted, and released were later arrested after public protest against the 
verdicts. Eight detainees acquitted in Butare in December 2000 were never released and were to be tried 
a second time on "new facts."”  
5 Ninety five thousand and sixty six people had confessed by the end of 2005. See US State Department 
(2006)   
It is estimated that there were about 3 million adult Hutu in the population at the time of genocide. If we 
work with this figure, 95,000 implies 1 in every 31 Hutu in the adult population at the time of genocide 
has confessed. For a derivation of the figure of 3 million adult Hutu in the 1994 population, see Scott 
                                                                                                                        
 3  
have confessed and diffuses among a wider population proximate to the confessed. 
Ruling elites are not trusted and people do not rule out the possibility that those 
proximate to the confessed, such as their immediate family, may be implicated at any 
point and subjected to punishment.6 Those proximate to the confessed also do not 
want to do anything that might jeopardize the prospects of reduced punishment for 
their family member who has confessed. The genocide trials have thus cast a chilling 
effect on a vast swathe of the adult Hutu population in Rwanda.  
The trials have produced a restive and discontented population whose genuine 
grievances cannot be expressed or channeled institutionally; this is not a good sign for 
long term stability. The trials have entangled them in an illiberal political relationship 
with ruling elites in which the latter can extract compliance by wielding the threat of 
punishment. This is a population that is not likely to protest against transgressions by 
ruling elites; in fact, my data show that those who have confessed will tend to actively 
endorse the regime despite widespread cynicism about its legitimate authority to 
govern. Instead of a normative and substantive shift toward accountable government 
and active citizenship, the trials have produced compliant subjects dependent on ruling 
elites for assurances of reduced punishment.  
Moreover, as long as ruling elites in Rwanda are able to prevent the emergence of a 
viable opposition, genocide trials have become a means to ensure that a significant 
portion of the Hutu population remains interested in the perpetuation of this regime to 
                                                                                                                                            
Straus (2004), fn 4 “According to the 1991 census, Rwanda had 2,813,232 citizens between 18 and 54. 
If, according to the census, 8.4% were Tutsi, then the adult Hutu population would have consisted of 
2,576,920 persons.”  
6 A report by an international human rights organization finds that a common sentiment among 
prisoners is that “all Hutu must go to prison”.  Penal Reform International (2004, May), p12 In my field 
research, I find that this sentiment is widespread not only in prisons but in the community as well. 
People complained about the insecurity created by the trials. Almost every family has someone who has 
been accused or imprisoned. These families pin flags of the ruling party and photographs of the 
President on their walls and take great care to appear compliant.  
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ensure that the benefits of reduced punishment continue to materialize. We know from 
the literature on authoritarian regimes that one of the causes of regime maintenance is 
the lack of politically viable alternatives.7 As long as the government looks likely to 
endure and the continuation of the trials policy appears certain, I surmise that people 
remain invested in it to ensure their continued safety and survival. This has worked 
well for ruling elites during the transition period. It is imperative for ruling elites 
whose social base is limited to approximately 15% of the population to have ordinary 
Hutu (who comprise about 84% of the population) invested in the regime en masse.8  
It is through the production of confessions that trials have generated a tacit contract 
between citizens and ruling elites in which the former concede to ruling elites the 
‘right to rule’ (by refusing to hold it accountable) in return for guarantees against the 
possibility of indiscriminate punishment. I call this refusal to hold ruling elites 
accountable a ‘consent-effect’. Instead of a genuinely democratic contract in which 
government is based on the consent of people who can choose to withdraw that 
consent or exercise their rights to challenge its actions, the trials in Rwanda have 
enabled a contractual relationship in which ruling elites may punish citizens and the 
latter consent to be ruled in order to evade or minimize (the threat of) punishment. 
This is a tacit and delicate contract but I want to argue in this dissertation that it is self-
sustaining and stable given the wider repressive environment within which the trials 
take place, the absence of exogenous shocks (for example, international pressure, 
defeat in war, economic collapse) or the lack of internal shifts in the balance of power 
                                                 
7 See Adam Przeworkski (1986), p52; See also Nicolas van de Walle (2002)  
8 A report by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) states “The tragic truth, as one observer puts it, 
is that, 'The government seems caught in a vicious cycle. It is perceived by the Hutu masses as an 
occupying force maintaining power through the use of arrest and intimidation. The jails, filled with 
people who are the sons, brothers, cousins, nephews, or fathers of most Rwandan Hutu, are a persistent 
reminder of this power. But from the government's perspective, without the arrests and the consequent 
intimidation, the Hutu masses may revolt against the minority government”” OAU report (2000) cited 
by Jeremy Sarkin (2001), p149  
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at the elite level.  The bedrock assumption of the trials policy, “genocide ideology”, 
has been used as a basis for new and repressive legislation. Ruling elites have used the 
“striking power”9 of the law to discipline opposition elites, purge them from public 
life when necessary and stifle dissent in general. In addition, the co-optation of local 
Hutu into state structures at grassroots level allows RPF elites to depend on a class of 
local “allies” to politically regulate and stably govern the vast hinterland. I show how 
judges of the local trial courts are an important set of actors co-opted by the regime.  
Trials also have other long term disciplining effects. For the adult Hutu male, prison 
or the prospect of prison has become a “thoroughly normative life event”.10 Thousands 
of arrests of predominantly adult Hutu males have left female-headed households11 
struggling to survive. Those convicted and released are denied employment in public 
services.12 Research on the American criminal justice system for example 
demonstrates that there are long term effects (high unemployment, depletion of human 
capital and weaker communities) of high rates of incarceration on the African-
American population.13 The danger for Rwanda is that the trials produce in the short 
and medium run a stability born of an undemocratic contract but in the long run it 
could sow the seed for destabilization.  
Scholars have noted that there is a “complex relationship between the uses of law to 
pursue transitional justice and the founding of new democracies.”14 They warn that 
                                                 
9 Otto Kirchheimer (1961), p128  
10 I quote Bruce Western who was speaking on the topic of race, crime and incarceration in America on 
a panel on “Inequality and Criminal Justice”, May 18, 2005, Stanford University. Lisa Trei (2005, May 
25)  
11 Deaths during the civil war and genocide also account for many of the female-headed households.  
12 Article 15 Gacaca law (2007), Article 76 Gacaca law (2004)   
13 See, for example, David Garland ed. (2001) ; Bruce Western (2006)  
14 A. James McAdams (1997), p. xvi  
                                                                                                                        
 6  
trials should not be used in the event of procedural legal uncertainty,15 a situation 
created by not adhering to fair trial standards. A prominent lawyer and human rights 
activist observed, “It is painfully clear that many injustices can be committed in the 
name of accountability. For example, in some cases, such as the attempts to use 
Rwanda’s domestic jurisdiction to punish the crime of genocide, it is evident that the 
effort is bound to lead to a miscarriage of justice…The object should not be to 
discourage a state like Rwanda from prosecuting genocide altogether, but rather to 
encourage the new government to live up to its double obligation: to punish genocide 
and to do so within the bounds of due process of law.”16 
Many human rights organizations worried about this at the time the government 
began to implement gacaca courts as a policy solution.17 These courts are a state-ized 
version of a customary institution for dispute resolution. “Gacaca” (justice on the 
grass) refers to community-based hearings in which people gathered on the grass and 
members of the community respected for their integrity mediated minor disputes 
between neighbors or members of a family. The political consequences of gacaca 
courts however were harder to anticipate. This dissertation is an attempt to explore 
how individuals respond when confronted with a political class that they fear while 
they simultaneously deal with the possibility that they may not be able to prove their 
innocence at trial. Given the massive scale on which the trials are implemented, the 
number of confessions and the resulting ‘consent-effect’ is significant producing real 
and durable consequences for the regime.  
                                                 
15 Even a minimalist view of the rule of law stresses the need for procedural certainty, that is, the 
consistent application of clear rules of the game free from ad hoc influences. See Gerhard Casper 
(2004)  
16 Juan E. Mendez (1997), p19  
17 Pronounced ga-cha-cha. For critiques of the idea of gacaca courts from a legal and human rights 
perspective, see Amnesty International (2002, December 17); Amnesty International (2002, June 19); 
Human Rights Watch (2003) 
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In the immediate aftermath of genocide, the transitional government made a case for 
going ahead with the trials based on a professed “state of exception.”18 The scale, 
intensity and brutality of genocide made justice an urgent issue. The government 
argued that ordinary Hutu had participated in genocide in such vast numbers because 
previous rounds of violence against Tutsi had gone unpunished. They believed it was 
necessary to prosecute all those involved in order to deter future crimes. When 
ordinary courts could not process the cases fast enough,19 12,103 gacaca courts20 were 
introduced at community level in which ordinary people served as judges and 
witnesses. Government officials claimed that with all of the courts functioning 
simultaneously, the trials would be a temporary process lasting a few years. The 
government received support from international donors and legal organizations for a 
policy that would not have passed muster with the international community had it not 
been for the country’s exceptional situation.   
However, “states of exception” have generally launched countries onto highly 
uncertain legal terrain as it heightens executive power to deal with the unusually 
urgent situations at hand.21 Rwanda is no exception. This dissertation explains how 
                                                 
18 For an analysis of the political consequences of governments’ recourse to “states of exception” in the 
western world, see Giorgio Agamben (2005)   
19 The website of the Government of Rwanda explains: “The sheer bulk of genocide suspects and cases 
due for trial has placed severe strain on Rwanda's criminal justice system which is already crippled by 
poor infrastructure and the death of professionals during the genocide. Rwanda's prisons are heavily 
congested, and the cost of feeding and clothing prisoners is a drain on the economy. The lack of an 
adequate number of prosecutors, judges, and lawyers to try cases exacerbates the already bad situation. 
At the present rate, it would take over 200 years if Rwanda was to rely on the conventional court system 
to deliver justice”  http://www.gov.rw/government/genocidef.html   
20 The number 12, 103 includes both trial courts and appeal courts. See report by Domitilla 
Mukantaganzwa (October 2004), p9  
21 Agamben notes that “modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the 
state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political 
adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the 
political system. Since then, the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps 
not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, 
including democratic ones”. Agamben offers the present day example of the US President’s “military 
order” of November 13, 2001 which authorized “indefinite detention” and trial of non-citizens 
                                                                                                                        
 8  
Rwanda’s ruling elites managed to get from implementing the trials on a mass scale to 
consolidating power over the course of a decade of transition without creating an 
active and engaged citizenry.  
1.3 Confession: its causes and consequences  
Official discourse presents the gacaca courts to a domestic and international audience 
as an instrument that facilitates reconciliation by restoring perpetrators of genocide to 
their communities after they have confessed and served commuted prison terms. It is 
hoped that this will transform individuals from perpetrators to good citizens and 
generate truth that repairs relationships between survivors and perpetrators who must 
live together again.22 These arguments direct our attention to ‘horizontal’ exchanges 
among people.    
My dissertation shows how power is transferred from citizens to state elites along a 
‘vertical’ dimension as individuals directly ‘contract’ with the state by means of 
offering confessions while seeking guarantees that the state will not defect from its 
pledge of a reduced sentence and early release from prison. This binds the confessed 
and state elites in a tacit relationship where the former are not inclined to hold the 
latter accountable for any transgression while state elites reward them with reduced 
punishment. As long as there is no viable opposition at the elite level and current 
rulers appear solidly entrenched, these individuals are likely to actively support the 
current regime to avert the possibility of renewed arrest or further punishment.    
The argument that confessions are implicated in power relationships has a sound 
theoretical basis in the literatures on religion, criminal law and psychotherapy.23 The 
                                                                                                                                            
suspected of terrorist activities by “military commission” instead of the military tribunals that are 
provided for in the laws of war. See Giorgio Agamben (2005), pp2-3   
22 BBC interview excerpts (March 9, 2005)   
23 Saul M. Kassin and Gisli M. Gudjonsson (2004)    
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core idea is that confessions bind individuals into relationships of obedience toward a 
source of power. The Church’s power over its flock, for example, derives from the 
notion that salvation requires complete submission to Church authority and cleansing 
of one’s soul through confession.24 Recent debates within the Catholic Church have 
focused on the implications of declining confessions on peoples’ spiritual lives and 
their relationship with the Church.25       
In a genealogy of state power, Foucault shows how the notion of “pastoral power” 
percolated into Greco-Roman understandings of state conceived on the lines of a 
“pastoral-political” model “treating the vast majority of men as a flock with a few as 
shepherds. They…established between them a series of complex, continuous and 
paradoxical relationships.”26 The confessional model is arguably a political model, 
binding actors into relationships of power, between rulers and the ruled, for example, 
premised on an exchange of obedience for security and freedom.  Even confessing to a 
spouse or a friend produces complicit relationships. Confessions that expose intimate 
details about one’s darkest deeds create a sense of extreme vulnerability, placing 
confessors at risk of betrayal or blackmail and reducing the likelihood of defecting 
from that relationship.27    
One of the assumptions of this study is that individuals accused of genocide crimes 
will, as rational actors28 view confession in exchange of reduced prison terms as a 
more attractive option than the alternative of remaining in prison in the hope of some 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Amy Nelson Burnett (1991); See also Elena Brambilla (2003)   
25 Catholic Weekly News (2004, March 29); Jerry Filteau (2004, March 24); Ashley Fantz (2008, 
March 13)  
26 Michel Foucault’s Tanner Lectures (1979) and Howison lectures (1980), cited in Nancy J. Holland 
(2002-2003)    
27 Jesse M. Bering and Todd K. Shackelford (2005); S.M. Kassin (2005)   
28 Scholars have used the rational actor assumption in their study of agents placed in vulnerable 
situations. See for example, a study of prisoners’ strategies in their interactions among themselves and 
with prison authorities. Marek Kaminski (2004). For an analysis of peasants’ resistance strategies, see 
James C. Scott (1985).  
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definitive proof of innocence because this latter is not easily forthcoming. This is 
regardless of the guilt or innocence of an actor in reality.29 Even if we assume that a 
certain individual is in prison falsely accused of genocide charges, it is likely he will 
have a difficult time organizing a defense because gacaca law prohibits access to 
lawyers by the parties to a trial. Without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the trial, 
it is also very likely that this individual would remain incarcerated for a long time. 
Most prisoners have already spent a decade in prison waiting for their turn to respond 
to their accusers and be tried in court. The decision then to ‘contract’ with the state via 
confession or refrain from ‘contracting’ by means of refusal to confess is treated as 
analytically distinct from the question of innocence or guilt of the person concerned. 
 
1.3.1    Causes of confession  
The core argument about the causes of confession rests on three causal factors: (a) fear 
of indiscriminate punishment, stemming from a set of beliefs about the discriminatory 
rule by RPF elites in particular and the nature of rule by Tutsi elites in the distant past 
(b) information exposure (c) self-interest.  
Individuals do not believe that new state elites in post-genocide Rwanda are 
trustworthy or possess the moral authority to rule. They fear indiscriminate 
punishment if they were to step up and incriminate themselves.30 Therefore they ‘hold 
                                                 
29During my research, there were some among the non-confessed who readily admitted they committed 
crimes but added that they hesitated to confess because they believed the government would respond 
with indiscriminate punishment. In contrast, there were some among the confessed who were declared 
innocent at trial. Between March and October 2005, trials were held for the first time processing 4162 
cases of those who had confessed. Confessions notwithstanding, 12% of these cases ended in acquittals. 
Fondation Hirondelle (2006, January 10).      
30 A report by Penal Reform International (an NGO with a significant presence on the ground) 
corroborates this finding. The fear of indiscriminate punishment was widely prevalent. It quotes one of 
the accused who had confessed and was on provisional release: “When I was in prison with other 
prisoners, we agreed amongst ourselves not to tell the truth about what happened during the genocide 
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out’ from confessing voluntarily despite viewing the reductions in punishment as an 
attractive option in theory and despite being incarcerated for years more numerous 
than that which they would have served under a reduced sentence. The post-genocide 
government has argued that confessions are evidence of ideological reform and a new 
commitment to the unity of Rwandans It refers to those who have not confessed as a 
population that should be quarantined for its “genocide ideology”.31 I find however 
that the majority of people from among the confessed as well as the non-confessed are 
neither eliminationist ideologues nor do they deny that genocide occurred. On the 
contrary, putting hundreds of thousands of people on trial for genocide crimes is likely 
to produce political benefits for the regime that are more concrete than elusive 
personal reform.32   
I find that a decision to ‘contract’ by stepping forward with a confession is made 
when an individual knows he is over exposed (information against the accused 
accumulates by means of denunciations by those who have already confessed and 
testimony by witnesses) and the probability of his being proven innocent (regardless 
of ‘true’ innocence or guilt) is low.33 Observation of trial proceedings and community-
based ethnography show that denunciations and even witness testimony can be false. 
These manipulations are possible because of the procedural uncertainty of the gacaca 
courts and the relative autonomy of gacaca judges. The evidentiary rules in these 
courts are such that the balance of information available against the accused matters in 
                                                                                                                                            
when we were told about this possibility of benefiting from the release, since we thought it was a trick 
…to kill us”  See Penal Reform International (2007, March), p28  
31 Even those who do not attend gacaca sessions are accused of harboring ‘genocide ideology’. See for 
example, The New Times (2006, 29 September).  
32 There is much speculation about the original intentions of ruling elites. My main argument is that the 
effects of the trials are powerful and enable the consolidation of these elites. These may be most 
accurately characterized, to use a Foucauldian term, as ‘instrument-effects’ because the effects become 
instruments of power.   
33 In a research report, Penal Reform International also finds evidence of a “wait and see” attitude in 
those who participate in the gacaca process. Penal Reform International (2004, May), p7  
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determining innocence or guilt. Whether that information was generated by means of 
local manipulations is not (and often cannot be) determined. Moreover defendants 
have no access to legal counsel. As long as there are a number of people backing the 
same account against the accused and he is unable to put together a counter-coalition 
in his defense, it becomes increasingly likely that he will be found guilty. It is rational 
for that individual to confess because the penalties for being found guilty without 
having confessed are severe.  
The three empirical chapters in this dissertation focus on the following: In chapter 
four, I present data from two prisons to show how confessions are produced. In 
chapter five, I show that betrayal confessions and witness testimonies are the two main 
sources of accumulating information against those who are accused. The law requires 
that if a confession is to be treated as valid, it must include denunciations of all alleged 
accomplices. Each confession thus generates denunciations against a number of 
additional people who also assess to what extent they are exposed and respond with 
time to the betrayal with confessions and denunciations of their own. This is mainly 
how the number of accused has gone up to 760,000 people, implicating almost 1 out of 
every 4 adult Hutu in the population at the time of genocide.34  As more information 
accumulates against an accused individual, there is more pressure to confess.  
The gacaca courts’ community-based process that began in June 2002 is correlated 
with a spurt both in the numbers of those accused and in the number of confessions, 
despite incentives to plead guilty that have been written into the law since 1996.35 My 
data reveal the role of witness testimonies, accusations and counter-accusations in 
                                                 
34 UNDP (2007), p83. The number of perpetrators has been estimated by government officials 
sometimes to be as high as 3 million. Other estimates are not very specific but see Scott Straus who 
proposes a figure of 175,000- 210,000 perpetrators based on analysis of original data. Scott Straus 
(2004), p.93  
35 For instance, 65% of all confessions in 2002 were submitted after June when the gacaca pre-trial 
hearings started. Penal Reform International (2003), p5.  
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generating information on the accused. Some of this information could be true; other 
kinds of information generated in the courts are false. People form interest-based 
coalitions to weigh in for or against someone. Trial proceedings show that in the 
absence of hard evidence or expert legal counsel, truth claims are assessed by the 
number of people arrayed for or against the defendant. The more an individual is 
outnumbered by those testifying against him, the more unlikely it becomes that he can 
defend himself. This creates pressure on the accused to ‘tip over’ and confess. The 
trial data confirms the causal role of information exposure as found in the prison data.  
In chapter six, I reinterpret the conventional understanding of state structures in 
Rwanda in order to show that judges are important local actors who enjoy spaces of 
autonomy that they can use to advance their own interests, engage in power struggles, 
secure the release of friends and relations and have local rivals eliminated from the 
political arena.  State elites at the center tolerate36 local manipulations because they 
need the cooperation of these key rural actors to project power into the hinterland as 
also to ensure that the courts continue to work at local level. However, the toleration 
of such manipulations around the trials compounded by the lack of legal counsel for 
the accused creates an environment of profound uncertainty about the processes 
involved that determine the outcomes of individual cases. In such an environment, the 
accused who are over exposed but have been holding out so far can be reasonably 
certain that they will not be able to defend themselves successfully. In such a situation, 
it is a rational risk-minimizing move to confess and hope to receive a reduced sentence 
than risk the much larger sentences for those who have not confessed but are proven 
guilty at trial.  
                                                 
36 I draw on Sidney Tarrow’s notion of three modes of governmental connection with public politics: 
prohibited, tolerated, and prescribed. See Sidney Tarrow (2001)   
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1.3.2   The consequences of confession  
Once however an individual tips over and ‘contracts’ with the state expecting the state 
to follow through with the promised reductions, there occurs a instrumental 
realignment of interests of that individual with those in power, producing what I call a 
‘consent effect’. Without a third-party to enforce the ‘contract’ between the individual 
and state, there is no guarantee that the state would not defect from its side of the 
bargain. If defection by the state indeed occurs, the individual who has confessed to a 
crime of this magnitude has reason to fear that he has exposed himself to severe 
punishment determined arbitrarily by the state. If he was vulnerable after being 
accused of genocide, he becomes even more vulnerable after confessing to the crime. 
In order to ensure that the state keeps its side of the bargain, those who have confessed 
are inclined to ‘surrender consent’, unwilling to hold elites accountable, supporting 
them in their claims to power, and praising them publicly37 despite believing they are 
discriminatory and lacking in moral authority.  Chapter four presents evidence that 
confessions are correlated with the ‘consent effect’.  
Based solely upon an extrapolation from my findings about the instrumental 
production of consent on the part of those who have confessed, I make two inferential 
claims: First, the ‘consent-effect’ is also presumably found among those proximate to 
the confessed, such as immediate family members who fear for the security of their 
confessed relatives and also fear they could be implicated themselves. Political 
quiescence is thus diffused among a larger group of citizens.  Second, I suggest that 
the large scale ‘consent-effect’ could have helped the RPF, a party with an ethnic base 
comprising 15% of the population, to win the crucial end-of-transition elections with 
                                                 
37 The confessed are mobilized to advocate for the government’s unity and reconciliation agenda. In a 
series of confessional performances for which they are transported out of prison and taken to 
communities, they sing and dance in praise of the government and urge others to confess. See for 
example, Penal Reform International (2003, September), p42   
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an overwhelming majority.    Regime maintenance depends not only on political 
quiescence and everyday compliance produced by what Lisa Wedeen has called the 
politics of “as-if” (that is, citizens’ public behavior “as if” the state was based on 
consent)38 but also on validation by the popular vote at least for those regimes 
interested in managing their democratic credentials primarily for an international 
audience. The ‘consent-effect’ could be one among other reasons that citizens 
validated ruling elites in a private ballot, trading the vote in exchange of security 
guarantees in an election in which the RPF managed to thwart a viable opposition 
from forming and citizens fully expected it would win by all possible means.  
In the Presidential elections of 2003, 96.6% of registered voters turned out in an 
election that Kagame won with 95% of the valid vote. Eighty three percent of the pro-
Kagame vote was the Hutu vote.39 My research shows that Hutu do not believe RPF 
elites have the moral authority to rule. What accounts for the massive pro-Kagame 
vote? Election observers have confirmed that election fraud certainly occurred, but 
their reports do not suggest that the scale or types of election fraud were significantly 
unusual as compared to elections elsewhere that are dominated by an incumbent 
candidate.40 Not counting the Tutsi vote, the residual Hutu vote for Kagame appears 
too large to be explained by election fraud alone.   
                                                 
38 Lisa Wedeen (1999)  
39 I use a rough calculation to estimate what percentage of his victory resulted from Hutu votes.  95% of 
the vote translates into 3,544,777 votes. Assuming for a moment that every Tutsi voter supported 
Kagame (which may not have been the case in reality), I estimate that the number of votes Kagame 
received from Tutsi is 592,312 (that is, 15% of the total votes that he won).  That would mean 
2,952,465 votes were cast by Hutu, that is, 83% of the pro-Kagame vote was the Hutu vote. The Twa 
people comprise 1% of Rwanda’s total population, so this figure of 83% presumably also includes some 
Twa votes.  
40 A CNN  report (2003, August 26) notes that “despite reports of intimidation by both government 
authorities and opposition supporters, international observers said in general the election appeared to 
have gone smoothly”; A EU report (2003), p56 noted a “climate of intimidation and arrests” on election 
day, but added that “adequate measures were taken to ensure the secrecy of the vote” in 91.2% of the 
voting booths monitored by its observers; IFES-International Foundation for Election Systems (2003, 
October 4) In a Statement on Rwanda’s Legislative Elections, IFES observers compared it to the flaws 
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In an election environment in which the choice of candidates was severely limited, a 
victory for the RPF and Kagame appeared on the ground as the only likely outcome.41 
Election observers across the board noted the absence of any viable opposition to 
Kagame.   Certain about the prospect of a RPF government and with it, the 
continuation of gacaca, it is plausible that Hutu had little choice but to instrumentally 
‘surrender consent’ exchanging their vote and signaling their loyalty for the security of 
reduced punishments, provisional releases, minimizing the very real risk, in their 
minds, of indiscriminate punishment.  
At the time of the election in late 2003, 1 in every 46 Hutu in the adult population at 
the time of genocide had confessed. The electoral law mandated that those who had 
been accused could not register to vote.42 While this disenfranchised a significant 
section of the electorate, it is plausible that those who were actually registered to vote- 
Hutu with fathers, sons, brothers, mothers and sisters who had confessed- transacted 
their consent for the security of their loved ones and to avoid being persecuted 
themselves. 43  
During my field research, ordinary Hutu would privately complain that there must 
have been a tampering of the vote because the Hutu former Prime Minister would 
surely have secured a higher percentage of the vote than the 3.62% that he did. They 
never doubted that the RPF would win.     
                                                                                                                                            
of the Presidential election: “failure to consistently apply established procedures for the management of 
ballot papers, the voting list, and voting room forms, left room for doubt as to the validity of the final 
tally”   
41 James Astill (2003, August 23) Of four Presidential candidates, one withdrew her name from the 
ballot before the election and another barely campaigned. The third candidate was the former Prime 
Minister in the transition government, a moderate Hutu, who had returned from exile to contest the 
elections. His campaign staff was arrested, he was mocked and threatened, his movements restricted, 
and media time limited; See also Adrian Blomfield (2003, 25 August)  
42 United States Department of State (2008)   
43 The gacaca law revised in 2007 mandates that the confessed will be deprived of their civil and 
political rights only for the duration of their sentence.  
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In the sections that follow, I undertake a brief survey of the transition period to 
show that despite swift economic recovery and a considerable emphasis on justice and 
rebuilding the rule of law, Rwanda has not made real headway in the direction of 
democratization.  I argue that the reason for this is the undemocratic contract forged 
by the trials. I end this chapter with a review of the central arguments and a guide to 
the chapters that constitute the rest of this dissertation.  
1.4 The rule of law in an uneven transition: 1994-2003    
Rwanda has made rapid but uneven progress towards recovery from the devastation of 
the civil war that began in October 1990 and culminated in genocide between April 
and July 1994. The aftermath of genocide and military victory is often described as 
leaving Rwandans an “inheritance without a will”44 but having defeated an army three 
times its size45 that was also supported by French munitions, money and strategic 
advice,46 the RPF was able to proceed quickly to form a Government of National 
Unity cobbling together the remnants of Hutu moderate factions under the banner of 
the RPF Declaration.47  On October 1, 1994, the RPF organized a “triumphalist 
celebration” to commemorate the fourth anniversary of their attack on Rwanda which 
they perceived as the initial phase of the liberation of Rwanda.48  With characteristic 
bluntness, Paul Kagame, military chief of the RPF, staked a powerful moral claim to 
legitimacy for his side, arguing they had put up a fight and stopped genocide while the 
international community had “stood around with its hands in its pockets.”49  
                                                 
44 Alice Karekezi Urusaro (2003)  
45 See Rene Lemarchand (1995), p8  
46 See, for example, Andrew Wallis (2006)  
47Filip Reyntjens (1996) 
48 Catharine Newbury and David Newbury (1999), p293 
49 Philip Gourevitch quoting Kagame. See Philip Gourevitch (1998), p163 
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The RPF-dominated transition government focused on economic recovery, justice 
for genocide crimes and national security as priority goals. A long term vision for 
development “vision 2020” was formulated and foreign investment flows increased 
leading to a great thrust in infrastructure reconstruction, health and education sectors. 
For a whole year, representatives of various social sectors and political parties met 
each Saturday at the President’s Office to develop policy solutions to various 
problems of governance and economic stabilization. These meetings produced, among 
other things, a program on fiscal and administrative decentralization and a policy on 
justice for genocide crimes.50   
Two kinds of data convey a sense of the uneven progress: Since the end of transition 
in 2003, GDP growth rates averaged 5.6%.51 In 2006, it required about 16 days to start 
a business in Rwanda. This was the same as the OECD average and much lower than 
the regional average of 62 days.52 Against this record of achievement in the economic 
sphere, the 2007 Freedom House longitudinal survey on political rights and civil 
liberties reports that Rwanda has remained in the “Not Free” category over the entire 
duration of the transition. There was a gradual improvement in the civil liberties score 
(from 7 to 6 and then 5) within the “Not Free” range up until 2006. The score for 
political rights remained static till the end-of-transition Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections were organized in 2003 when it moved from 7 to 6 and remained there until 
2006.53   
                                                 
50 Village Urugwiro discussions, see Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Noel Twagiramungu and Christopher 
Kayumba (2004, December), pp14-15  
51 UNDP (2007),  p5  
52 UNDP (2007),p78  
53 Freedom House’s Longitudinal Score 1972-2007: 1-7 range with 1= maximum freedom and 7= least 
freedom. The survey shows that Rwanda has been categorized as “Not Free” for every year since 1972.  
See Freedom House (2007)  
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Recent literatures on institutions emphasize the central role of the “rule of law” in 
promoting both economic growth and democracy. Rwanda has invested heavily in 
rebuilding its judiciary, updating laws, training various levels of judicial personnel, 
and improving access to legal services. On the “rule of law” indicator of the World 
Bank Institute’s governance indicators, Rwanda has improved by 31% since 1996.54  
How has the “rule of law” in Rwanda produced a strong economic performance but 
has failed to create a significant democratic opening? The following section dissects 
the ambiguous “rule of law” concept and sets up an analytical framework within 
which to examine the linkages between law and (absence of) democratization in 
Rwanda. This is necessary because the rule of law is not just a “congeries of legal 
rules.”55 We need to know which of its constituent components has the most 
immediate consequences for democratization in order to understand the specific 
distortion in the case of Rwanda.  
1.5 Rule of law and democracy building: The ‘predator ruler’ problem 
In a typology of “rule of law” reforms, Thomas Carothers distinguishes between 
rewriting the laws (Type 1), capacity building and rationalization of procedures (Type 
2) and increasing government subservience to the law (Type 3).56 He suggests that 
new laws, technical changes or capacity building promote economic growth but are 
not sufficient conditions for ensuring government that is subject to checks from both 
citizens and organs of state. The literature on law and economics shows that the “rule 
of law” logic most relevant for economic growth is the enforcement capacity of the 
state, that is, how well it is able to protect property rights, enforce contracts, regulate 
                                                 
54 UNDP (2007), p80 
55 Guillermo O’Donnell (2007), p123  
56 Thomas Carothers (1998, March-April)  
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the market, lower information and transaction costs by means of promoting public 
knowledge of a clear set of rules. 57   
The democracy building problem however is more appropriately conceptualized as 
the “predator ruler problem”58 which asks how a ruler who has the power to enforce 
contracts and guarantee public order may become subject to limitations on its power. 
This is the idea that those who rule must be constrained in their exercise of power by 
means of institutional checks and balances and guarantees of rights to citizens such 
that the latter may be able to protest or punish ruling elites in the event of abuse of 
power.59  Barry Weingast uses the example of 17th century England to demonstrate 
how limits on government emerged. The King enforced contracts, regulated public 
order and provided for security. The King was not restrained in his ability to extract 
rents to finance his wars until the Glorious Revolution when he became subservient to 
political limits enforced by peoples’ representatives in Parliament. In this example, 
constrained government is the product of an elite pact or a stable domestic political 
contract at elite level.  
A survey of the literature on democratization shows that the bulk of explanations for 
the emergence of restrained and accountable government relies on factors such as 
domestic “power shifts”- resulting from external pressures to changes in domestic 
political coalitions, control of resources in various institutional configurations-types of 
                                                 
57 For a good summary of this literature, see Kenneth W. Dam (2006)  
58 See Barry Weingast (1997)  
59 Marc F. Plattner (1999) Plattner argues that in the history of consolidated democracies, the story of 
economic development and democracy building is one of simultaneous development and mutual 
reinforcement, not sequential development with one leading to the other. Establishing a causal story 
about development and democracy therefore is likely to be difficult. 
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party systems, Presidential versus Parliamentary systems, neo-patrimonial systems 
etc.60  
It is consent theory however that powerfully frames the ‘predator ruler’ problem in 
terms of the power dynamics between citizens and state. With intellectual roots in the 
arguments of contract theorists as Hobbes and Locke, scholars from diverse 
intellectual traditions as Hannah Pitkin, Don Herzog and Margaret Levi61 have used 
varieties of consent theory to probe the nature of political authority which is then used 
to explain both the state’s expectation of obedience from its citizens and the 
willingness of citizens to comply with the law. The basic argument of consent theory 
is that individuals need the state to provide public goods such as order, security and 
enforcement of contracts; therefore they consent to be ruled by the state. By giving the 
state authority to govern, they agree to obey its laws but retain for themselves civil and 
political rights to hold the state accountable to their interests.   
Rawls referred to the Hobbesian and Lockeian versions of consent theory as 
political, not metaphysical theories.62 The idea of the contract was used as a heuristic 
device for developing a liberal notion of the bases of legitimate government. It 
distinguishes between authoritative states and non-authoritative states and claims that 
consent is a necessary condition for authoritative government.63 Consent theory thus 
provides a metaphor for thinking about the bases of legitimate rule as also the limits to 
that rule. Voluntarily giving and withdrawing consent is one of the ways that the limits 
                                                 
60 See for instance, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997); Stephen Haggard and Robert R. 
Kaufman (1995); Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. (1992); 
Kidane Mengisteab and Cyril Daddieh, eds. (1999); Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter, and 
Laurence Whitehead, eds. (1986); Jennifer A Widner ed. (1994)  
61 See for example, the political philosophy of Hannah Pitkin (1965); the historical approach of Don 
Herzog (1989); and the rational choice theory-based analytical narratives approach of Margaret Levi 
(1997)  
62 Cited in Deborah Baumgold (2005, September)  
63 Harry Beran (1997) 
                                                                                                                        
 22  
on state become ‘self-enforcing’ such that when the ruler indulges in ‘fundamental 
transgressions’, citizens solve their ‘coordination problems’ by exercising rights to 
free speech and association and penalize the ruler appropriately.64  
This dissertation argues that the process of ‘surrendering consent’ facilitated by the 
justice process leads to a situation in which ordinary citizens question the moral 
authority of state elites to rule, yet are compelled to agree, in their own interest, to 
being ruled. They are therefore not willing to enforce limits on state elites. The 
confessed are not likely to protest or make claims on the state. Their survival depends 
on the discretion of state elites who may continue to extend to them or withdraw from 
them the benefit of reduced punishments. It is to ensure a continuous flow of such 
benefits that they retreat from holding ruling elites’ accountable despite believing that 
the latter have committed serious abuses that they have yet to account for. For each 
individual who has confessed, there are others who are closely related to that person 
who are also compliant for fear of being accused themselves and out of concern for the 
vulnerable situation of their relative. It is because limits on the sovereign through 
citizens’ ability to protest or punish are ‘surrendered’ away by means of an illiberal 
contract instead of being ‘democratically contracted’, that they are not ‘self-
enforcing’, making a democratic transition difficult to materialize.  
Consent theory has been critiqued because there were no historical moments of 
“reified” consent that brought states into existence and formalized an authoritative 
relationship between citizens and state. In fact, the histories of West European state 
formation show that states were built not on consent, but on “force and fraud, capital 
and coercion.”65 I argue however that there are historical moments when the idea of 
                                                 
64 Barry Weingast (1997); Similar arguments by James Fearon in a talk titled “Self-enforcing 
democracy”, Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame. August 29, 2007   
65 See for instance, Charles Tilly (1990) 
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the “contract” at the heart of consent theory is a useful diagnostic for assessing 
emergent power relationships between citizens and state elites. 
Relevant examples are transitions after massive violence or regime collapse. Real 
world events in the last decade of the twentieth century have spawned a vast literature 
on state collapse, dysfunctional institutions, political transitions and state building.66 
The formation of a transition government or the making of a Constitution are key 
processes involving processes of ‘contract-consent’ where political elites who claim to 
represent various sections of the citizenry negotiate on the new rules of the political 
game that would both regulate political competition and limit the exercise of power by 
state elites by guarantees of political rights and civil liberties to citizens.  
In the case of Rwanda, the ‘contract-consent’ elements in the elite pact that shaped 
the transition process were ambiguous. The RPF had secured power through military 
victory in July 1994, so the transition may be considered a non-negotiated one.67 After 
its victory, however, it implemented the Arusha power-sharing agreement that had 
been negotiated in 1992-3 with the now-defeated government but many key provisions 
of Arusha were modified in practice by the RPF Declaration that preceded the Arusha 
accords in order of importance.68 Also, the RPF-dominated government soon began to 
lose the support of Hutu moderates. A trend of attrition of prominent Hutu elites 
emerged five years into the transition. The Prime Minister, the Justice and Interior 
Ministers resigned from office in 1995. In this “first wave”, diplomats, army leaders, 
senior civil servants and journalists went into exile; in a “second wave”, the President 
and new Prime Minister both resigned in 2000. High-ranking officers, journalists once 
close to the RPF and even prominent genocide survivors went into exile. Certain 
                                                 
66 See for instance, Stephanie Lawson (1993); Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar (1995); I. William 
Zartman ed. (1995); Valerie Sperling ed (2000)  
67 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997), p257  
68 See Filip Reyntjens (1996) 
                                                                                                                        
 24  
leaders of the RPF apparatus abroad also chose to resign.69 Meanwhile, the rate of 
arrests within the country was as high as 1500 people per week in 199570 and 800 
arrests per week in 1997.71  
While the RPF has used a variety of repressive laws to stifle dissent, prevent elites 
from political claims-making on the basis of ethnicity, sometimes explicitly using 
genocide charges to discipline Hutu politicians, the gacaca trials have served them 
well in disciplining and extracting compliance from a vast section of the population. A 
democratic contract in which people can withdraw consent if elites are not accountable 
to them has been replaced by an illiberal tacit contract in which people do not want to 
hold elites accountable and give away the ‘right to rule’ in return for security benefits. 
When no political alternative is available, people actively invest in validating the 
regime to keep the security benefits flowing. 
1.6 The politics of transitional justice: Surrendering consent 
A Weberian conceptualization of the relationships between power and compliance 
helps to clarify the dynamics underlying the phenomenon of ‘surrendering consent’ 
identified in this dissertation. The following schema outlines Weber’s three routes to 
power: (1) legitimate or “voluntary normative compliance, usually due to consensus 
on values or outcome”; (2) “utilitarian compliance…benefiting the individual or 
group”; and (3) “coercive compliance, based on compulsion by force, violence, and 
terror or the threat of them.”72   
Legitimacy need not be a necessary condition for stable domination.73 Indeed Weber 
had suggested that not “every case of submissiveness to persons in positions of power 
                                                 
69 Filip Reyntjens (2004)   
70 Human Rights Watch/International Federation for Human Rights (1995, April 18)   
71 Rene Lemarchand (1998), p44 
72 A representative taxonomy by Thomas M. Callaghy. See Lisa Wedeen (1999), p144  
73 Adam Przeworski (1986), p51  
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is primarily (or even at all) oriented to this belief. Loyalty may be hypocritically 
simulated by individuals or by whole groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or 
carried out in practice for reasons of material self-interest….People may submit from 
individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative.”74     
In Rwanda, the data suggest that ruling elites do not enjoy voluntary normative 
compliance from ordinary Hutu who believe that the RPF is responsible for numerous 
atrocities that have not been addressed. In their minds, the RPF represents the return of 
elite Tutsi rule along the lines of the pre-colonial and colonial periods; a time when 
ordinary Hutu and elite Tutsi had been bound together in dense patron-client 
relationships (involving cattle and land) from which both derived certain benefits but 
which were premised on material and ideational structures of inequality and 
subjugation of Hutu.75 It is perhaps not accidental that the RPF retained over the 
transition period its Kinyarwanda name Inkotanyi (“tough warriors” or “those who do 
not give up until the goal is reached”) which it had used during the civil war.  It is a 
constant reminder of the victory of the RPF and signals the futility of resistance to its 
directives.76 It is not surprising then that RPF elites are perceived as tough and 
discriminatory, a source of power that is arbitrary, yet on which they are dependant for 
their welfare and survival.  
The phenomenon of ‘surrendering consent’ has parallels with the long standing 
tradition of clientship in Rwanda. The patron-client relationship now is tacit and 
political rather than social or economic although it could have long term material 
consequences for the client population. It is mutually beneficial involving the 
                                                 
74 Max Weber, quoted by Adam Przeworski (1986), p51  
75 For an account of the social dynamics and consequences of patron-client relationships in Rwandan 
history, see Catharine Newbury (1993)  
76 Jean Hatzfeld’s research corroborates this argument. With reference to the accused, a Hutu woman 
tells him that they carry with them “the burden of the vanquished”. See Jean Hatzfeld (2005), p147  
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transaction of consent for reduced punishments, and within a wider repressive 
environment this relationship tends to be stable and self-regulating.  
The primary vehicles for the production of consent are confessions which can be 
explained by a combination of two factors: individual opportunism and information 
exposure (through denunciations and witness testimony- true or false). People confess 
when they have been exposed. A confession therefore is an opportunistic move to 
secure the advantages of reduced punishment. In the gacaca courts however, if 
someone who has not confessed is found guilty at trial, it would mean incurring severe 
punishment under the terms of the gacaca law. Given the possible penalties involved, 
it is a risk minimizing strategy to confess in expectation of a reduced sentence.      
In a second opportunistic move, those who have confessed find it in their interest to 
‘surrender consent’ because of a fear of indiscriminate punishment arising from a set 
of prior beliefs about the nature of Tutsi rule and the discriminatory nature of RPF rule 
in particular. Conceding consent and becoming politically quiescent is a second-stage 
risk minimization strategy. Fear of arbitrary punishment and self-interest produce the 
‘consent-effect’ after a decision is made to confess. With this move, the confessed 
become complicit in an illiberal compact with ruling elites. As the trials process 
continues and more information is generated by means of denunciations and betrayal 
confessions, more people are likely to ‘tip over’ and confess.77  
1.7 Chapter organization 
The next chapter provides a brief descriptive overview of the transition process to 
frame the analyses of the later chapters.  It shows how ruling elites’ emphasized the 
need for trials by drawing on a particular interpretation of the causes of genocide that 
                                                 
77 Confessions have increased from 15000 in 1999 to 33000 in 2002 and 95066 in 2006. See for 
instance, fn 162.  
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is colored by their experiences of exile and persecution in recent history. The 
consolidation of power at elite level by various means allowed the RPF to translate 
their preferences for trials into policy. The chapter shows how the notion of “genocide 
ideology” has been used to justify the implementation of the trials, eliminate 
opposition from the political arena and to initiate repressive legislation to stifle 
dissent.  
In chapter three, I describe the research design, sampling criteria, field methods, 
sites of data collection and the varieties of data that were collected over 18 months of 
field work that hewed closely to the evolution of the trials process.  I show how the 
research process developed by means of both inductive and deductive engagement 
with field data.   
Chapter four presents data from a sample of confessed and non-confessed prisoners 
in two prisons. After testing a number of hypotheses that could explain why some 
accused confess while others do not, I conclude that the accused tend to hold out from 
confessing until they feel they will not be able to defend themselves given the 
denunciations and testimonies that have accumulated against them. It is at this point 
that a decision is made to confess. I also find that despite the fact that both confessed 
and non-confessed fear ruling elites and believe the latter are illegitimate and 
discriminatory, the confessed do not want to hold Tutsi elites accountable for 
problems either in the distant or more immediate past. I call this a ‘consent-effect’: 
that is, conceding to ruling elites the right to rule by refusing to hold them to account.  
Chapter five draws on data from six trials of those who have confessed. It makes 
two central points: first, it confirms the finding in the prisons that exposure and self-
interest are major factors in the decision to confess. I show that betrayal confessions 
and witness testimonies are two main sources of information against an accused 
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individual. Second, I show that information exposure matters because it is the central 
mechanism by which guilt is determined in gacaca court processes that are otherwise 
fundamentally uncertain.  
In chapter six, I show how state elites at the center depend on local “allies” to 
project power into the hinterland and politically regulate the population at the 
grassroots. I show that many of the judges in powerful positions on the gacaca panels 
are Hutu, members of the RPF and are drawn from among rural elites who occupy 
positions in local government structures. This suggests a process of co-optation at 
work that allows a regime dominated by Tutsi elites to stably govern the majority of 
the population who are Hutu living in rural areas. As long as these local elites comply 
in general with directives from above, state elites are willing to ‘tolerate’ spaces of 
relative autonomy at local level. I show how this allows judges to implicate local 
rivals in the genocide or secure the release of friends and family. These local 
manipulations around the gacaca courts create fundamental uncertainty in trial 
processes.  
Chapter seven reviews the arguments of the dissertation and concludes with some 
theoretical and practical implications of this research project.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ELITE PREFERENCES, POLICY AND POWER  
2.1. Introduction  
It is generally accepted that state elites in Rwanda are able to extract compliance from 
citizens because state structures are extensive, designed for mobilization and leaders 
are able to identify and punish those who disobey orders. Following this logic, it has 
been argued that individuals comply (in this case, decide to confess) because they 
have been ordered to do so by their leaders and there are few options available except 
obedience.78 This formulation suggests that people are like marionettes who complied 
with orders to kill and are now complying with orders to confess.79  I argue however 
that the accused are rational actors, assessing their options and making difficult 
choices within the constraints of an uncertain legal environment and an increasingly 
certain political system.  
This dissertation emphasizes the idea of ‘instrument-effects’, that is, the effects of 
confession serve the instruments of power. But this approach (as well as that which 
emphasizes the causal role of state orders and popular compliance) begs the question 
of what the aims of the ruling elites were when they introduced the trials. Much of 
what has been written on the intentions of ruling elites in Rwanda is speculation in the 
media and over the internet. But we can ask the following questions: What were the 
arguments they made in favor of the trials? How did they introduce gacaca as a policy 
                                                 
78 Samantha Power (2003, January 16)   
79 On the apparently popular response to the unity and reconciliation initiatives, Philip Gourevitch 
observed, “The speed with which doctrines of genocide had been displaced by the order to live together 
was exhilarating, but it also served as an eerie reminder that Rwanda’s old balance of authority and 
compliance remained perfectly intact. The system was useful for the overwhelming demands of the 
moment; you put in a new message, and—presto!—revolutionary change. But wasn’t it only a change 
of complexion?” See Philip Gourevitch (1998), p318  
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solution when it had been rejected earlier in 1996?   How were RPF elites able to 
steadily expand the scope and scale of the trials process?  
These questions are not central to my inquiry but they are important in order to 
frame the analyses in the following chapters. In this chapter, therefore, I trace the 
evolution of a policy on justice for genocide crimes in broad brush strokes. After a 
brief background on the origins of the RPF, I describe how party elites’ emphasis on 
trials draws on an interpretation of Rwandan history and their experiences of exile and 
persecution. I trace how the RPF consolidated power at elite level and how the debates 
on justice became less contentious as the party grew increasingly dominant. I show 
that the notion of “genocide ideology” has not been critically examined since the early 
years of the transition and is being used to demobilize opposition groups and suppress 
dissent. I use government reports, interviews with RPF elites and draw on available 
secondary literature. I conclude by suggesting that if we assume at a minimum that the 
goal of the RPF is to stay in power, it has been well served by the consequences of 
implementing the trials on a mass scale. It is difficult however to impute preferences 
to elites from the consequences of the trials, particularly when the evolution of the 
process was initially uncertain and its eventual outcomes would have been hard to 
predict at the outset.   
2.2 Origins of the RPF  
In 1959, the social revolution of Hutu had resulted in the exile of 40-70% of Rwanda’s 
Tutsi population80 and put an end to four centuries of Tutsi domination. Close to two 
million Tutsi lived in exile and were refused the right to return. Attempts by groups of 
Tutsi insurgents to fight their way back resulted in periodic massacres of Tutsi who 
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still remained within the country.81 A preliminary political formation of the Tutsi 
refugees, RANU,82 was formed in 1979 in Kenya. It was renamed the RPF at its 
seventh congress in Uganda in 1987 where it emerged more focused on the issue of 
repatriation.   
The party’s operations were conducted clandestinely because of the rising 
persecution of Rwandan refugees in Uganda.83 In 1982, thousands of Tutsi refugees 
had been pushed out of Uganda towards the border with Rwanda. The Hutu Republic 
in Rwanda refused to accept them, trapping almost 30,000 Tutsi refugees in a swampy 
strip of land where hundreds died of disease and starvation. This event has an 
important place in the collective memory of Tutsi refugees whose “consciousness was 
formed in exile.” 84An RPF cadre recalled the elegiac songs they used to sing, reliving 
that traumatic event, convinced there would be no escape from persecution unless they 
returned to the homeland.85 Hundreds of Tutsi refugees volunteered to join 
Museveni’s bush war in Uganda to topple the existing regime. They played an 
important role in Museveni’s ultimate victory in Uganda and were rewarded with high 
positions in government. In due course of time however, rising nativist sentiment, 
continued persecution in Uganda, Museveni’s refusal to extend citizenship rights to 
the refugees and the Rwandan government’s vacillation on repatriation negotiations 
pushed the RPF to contemplate a return by force.86   
                                                 
81 Those stealth attacks led to what Bertrand Russell had called “the most horrible and systematic 
human massacre we have had occasion to witness since the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis”. 
Cited in Linda Melvern (2000).     
82 Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU) For a brief survey of the debates and coalitions within 
RANU, see Colin Waugh (2004)  
83 Colin Waugh (2004)   
84 Gourevitch quoting Tito Rutaremara, senior RPF statesman and presently Ombudsman; see 
Gourevitch (1998), p212  
85 RPF cadre, personal communication, Kigali July 2004  
86 Gourevitch quotes Kagame: “…the Ugandans were very suspicious of us. They didn’t even 
appreciate our contribution, the sacrifices we had made. We were just Rwandans—and really this 
served us very well. It gave us a push, and it helped some weak people in Uganda feel that they had 
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The RPF strategy was to define itself as an inclusive nationalist party working 
toward the overthrow of the one-party dictatorship in Rwanda. The party had a well 
worked out political ideology well before the violence began unlike other rebel groups 
who worked out a political agenda in the course of fighting.87 It attracted prominent 
Hutu dissidents of the regime in Rwanda who went into exile to join the party.    RPF 
soldiers, cadres and top officials were disciplined, highly committed to the core goals 
of the party. RPF elites justified the invasion of Rwanda in October 1990 arguing that 
Tutsi refugees who wanted to return had been obstructed in their attempts to negotiate 
the issue of repatriation with the government of Rwanda88; they also suggested that 
theirs was a struggle for the ‘liberation’ of every Rwandan from the corrupt and 
dictatorial regime in power.89   
2.3 Historical interpretation, causes of genocide and adequate correctives   
RPF discourse suggests that of all the events that defined the party, the ‘social 
revolution’ occupies the most prominent place. Their analysis of the causes of 
                                                                                                                                            
solved a problem when we left” ; “…deep in our hearts and minds we knew that we belonged in 
Rwanda, and if they didn’t want to resolve the problem politically, armed struggle would be the 
alternative.” Philip Gourevitch (1998), pp214-216  
87 Colin Waugh quoting Tito Rutaremana, an elder statesman of the RPF and presently Ombudsman: 
see Colin  Waugh (2004)  
88 In fact, the RPF initiated the civil war one month before phased repatriations were to begin. This is 
used by critics to argue that the RPF did not want to return as refugees but as political actors with a 
share of power. See Wm. Cyrus Reed (1996).   Others have argued that as scapegoating of Rwandan 
refugees intensified in Uganda, RPF elites felt that there was perhaps no choice left but to return to 
Rwanda and if they failed to capitalize on the political weakness of Habyariamana, they would lose out 
on the opportunity presented to them by that historical moment. See Ogenga Otunnu (1999). RPF elites 
point to Habyarimana’s questionable intentions and political doublespeak. In the early 90s, 
Habyariamana negotiated with the RPF and predicted that the “glass will spillover” if the refugees were 
to return.  As early as 1980, he had argued it was difficult for over populated Rwanda to support the 
return of Tutsi refugees. See interview with the President in ORINFOR and the Office of the President 
(1980), p224. At the Arusha negotiations during the civil war, Habyariamana negotiated with the RPF 
on the one hand and dismissed the treaty document as a ‘piece of paper’ on the other.  
89 Post-victory, the RPF instituted a national holiday known as “Liberation Day”, a day of speeches 
telecast over national television and radio, grand spectacles of festivities and parades and remembering 
heroes of the liberation struggle. This is separate from the commemoration of genocide in April of each 
year.  
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genocide draws on their interpretation of the effects of the ‘social revolution’ in 1959. 
Many top party leaders were young adults at that time. It turned out to be the 
beginning of a long history that would normalize institutionalized racism, anti-Tutsi 
propaganda and periodic massacres. In the RPF worldview, this was the starting point 
of processes that unfolded slowly but surely, preparing Hutu psychologically for the 
final denouement that was April 1994.90  Party elites sometimes allude to 1959 as the 
beginning of genocide.   
In RPF elites’ speeches and government reports on genocide and its causes, there is 
great explanatory weight attached to the following: The first, ‘genocide ideology’ has 
never been specifically defined. It has been applied to a variety of situations in recent 
years: from sanctioning derogatory behavior against survivors91, to suppressing 
political claims-making on the basis of ethnicity92, critiques of gacaca93, independent 
journalism94, NGO activities95 and opposition to government programs in general.96 A 
senior member of the RPF explained, “Genocide ideology begins with divisionism. 
                                                 
90 “Genocide started a long time ago in 1959..from that time there was a culture of impunity”; “The 
genocide in Rwanda started in 1959, and continued in 1963, 1964, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 
came to an end in 1994” Office of the President of the Republic (1999, August), p58, p82    
 
91  Daniel Sabiiti (2006, August 8); Stevenson Mugisha (2007, April 7); Eleneus Akanga (2006, April 9)   
92 A popular party, MDR, was banned from contesting the 2003 transitional elections based on 
accusations of harboring “genocide ideology”. See Human Rights Watch (2003a)  
93 Willy Mugenzi (2007, February 4)   
94 Lars Waldorf (2007); Reporters Sans Frontières (2006, August 3)   
95 Five NGOs, including a prominent Rwandan human rights organization LIPRODHOR (La Ligue 
Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme) were accused of divisionism and 
forced to suspend its activities. Amnesty International (2005,January 10)  
 
96 Human Rights Watch reports on the findings of a Parliamentary Commission set up to investigate the 
prevalence of “genocide ideology” in the country: “The parliamentary commission, established 
following the late 2003 killing of several survivors of the 1994 genocide, gathered information from 
local officials and others in about three-quarters of the country. It concluded that a “genocide ideology” 
was widespread, found in six of the Rwanda’s 12 provinces, at the national university, in a number of 
secondary schools and in many churches …. The commission interpreted “genocidal ideas,” prohibited 
by law in Rwanda, so broadly as to include even dissent from government plans for consolidating land 
holdings” See Human Rights Watch (2004, July 2) ; See also report of the Parliamentary Commission 
of the Government of Rwanda (2004, June)   
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The word ‘amacakubiri’ describes it better than any word in the English language. It 
describes a situation where a well-integrated whole splits into two, and one part turns 
against the other. From here it is a dangerous slippery slope.”97 It was the first time 
that ordinary Hutu participated in attacks against Tutsi civilians.  They stood in fields 
holding up banners demanding the transfer of power to Hutu.98 Some survivors of 
1959 recall their homes torched by people they knew. Anti-Tutsi propaganda began to 
be taught in schools and insinuated itself into development discourse.99  
A related argument suggests that since the events of 1959, Hutu grew accustomed to 
a ‘culture of impunity’ because no punitive or deterrent action was taken against 
perpetrators of periodic massacres of Tutsi civilians. The RPF narrative thus interprets 
the genocide as the result of a specific mindset (divisionist at best, eliminationist at 
worst) that is widely shared by ordinary Hutu, who willingly participated because they 
believed that they could kill with impunity.100 Within months of assuming power, the 
RPF began to make the case that the only adequate corrective was a criminal trials 
process for all those accused.    
The process had to be designed to be both punitive and reformatory to transform 
those individuals from criminals to good citizens. If the accused stepped forward to 
confess their crimes, they would be educated in the duties of good citizenship, 
rewarded with reduced sentences and allowed to reintegrate into their community. 
Kagame noted, “People are not inherently bad…but they can be made bad. And they 
can be taught to be good. I think you can’t give up on that—on such a person. They 
                                                 
97 Interview with Tito Rutaremara, Ombudsman and senior statesman of the RPF Kigali, 2005  
98 David Newbury and Catharine Newbury (2000)  
99 Philip Verwimp (1999)  
100 For an interesting view on this, see Scott Straus (forthcoming) “The logical response to a “criminal 
population” is continued insecurity, which in turn justifies tight state security measures and restricted 
public discourse. By contrast, a view of the violence that stresses situational factors and enforcement 
mechanisms lessens the immediate danger”  
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can learn. I’m sure that every individual, somewhere in his plans, wants some peace, 
wants to progress in some way, even if he is an ordinary peasant. So if we can present 
the past to them and say, ‘This was the past that caused all these problems for you, and 
this is the way to avoid that,’ I think it changes their minds quite a bit. And I think 
some people can even benefit from being forgiven, being given another chance.”101 
The RPF presented the trials as more of a reformatory quasi-religious process than 
judicial or political.102 Its goals- to punish, reform and reconcile- were not presented as 
repressive “but above all pedagogic.”103  
2.4 Power and policy  
The ability of the RPF to secure legislative sanction for a policy that would hold 
thousands of people104 criminally liable was contingent on its dominant position in the 
transition government. It secured this dominance in the transitional legislature and 
executive within months of assuming power by means of various subtle manipulations 
of the laws that were supposed to govern the transition.  
                                                 
101 Philip Gourevitch (1998), p224, p313  
102 Jacques Fierens quoting an official press release on Domitille Mukantaganzwa, Executive Secretary 
at the National Service for Gacaca Jurisdictions who is reported to have stated “Gacaca is a more 
religious than political programme, as it aims at confession, pardon and reconciliation among 
Rwandans” See Jacques Fierens (2005), fn 77 
  
103 Francois Soudain (2005, February 20-26) (my translation from French)   
 
104 In the estimate of government leaders, the number of perpetrators possibly ranges between 1 and 3 
million people. Gourevitch writes, “I once heard Kagame say that he suspected as many as a million 
people had participated directly or indirectly in the genocide….His advisor, Claude Dusaidi, put the 
number at 3 million, which amounted to proclaiming every other Rwandan Hutu guilty. Such claims-
impossible to prove or disprove-struck many Rwandans and foreign observers as acts of intimidation, 
carefully calculated to place all Hutus under a cloud of suspicion, and this perception was hardened 
when a UN-sponsored effort to honor those Hutus, like Rusesabagina, was scuttled by infighting among 
cabinet ministers. Dusaidi insisted that Rwanda’s outrageously packed prisons did not reflect the 
outrageousness of the crime that had been visited on the country. He said, “Pick any single film of the 
genocide, and just watch how they kill people. You’ll find a group killing a person. So there are many 
more killers still walking the streets than we have in prison. The number in prison is a dot”” See Philip 
Gourevitch (1998), pp244-245.  
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Signaling that it would act in good faith, RPF elites implemented the Arusha power-
sharing agreement that had been negotiated before the genocide with Habyarimana’s 
ruling MRND and opposition parties within Rwanda. This appeared to obviate the 
need for a fresh round of political negotiations.  But in a series of legal maneuvers, 
that have been likened to a ‘creeping coup’105 the RPF was able to achieve an outcome 
early on that would not be possible had there been open elections organized just after 
the civil war and genocide. The RPF was after all very much the party of Tutsi exiles 
that had toppled the government.    
Three months after its victory, seven political parties106 and the RPF signed a 
Protocol of Agreement in anticipation of setting up a transitional legislature. The 
Protocol committed these parties to adhere to the RPF declaration of July 1994. A 
‘fundamental law’ passed by the transitional legislature a few months later placed the 
RPF declaration at the summit of a constitutional hierarchy that comprised the 
Constitution of 1991,107 the Arusha Accords of 1993 and the RPF Declaration. For all 
practical purposes, then, it was the RPF Declaration that guided the transition 
process.108  
The provisions of this document altered the terms agreed under the Arusha Accords. 
The largely ceremonial role of the President now assumed an executive form and was 
allocated to the RPF. Under the RPF Declaration, the office of Vice-President was 
created and combined with a ministerial portfolio. The functions of the Vice-President 
were not specified and the office was allocated to the RPF to be occupied by Kagame.  
The Declaration also allowed the RPF to allocate ministerial seats to itself that had 
                                                 
105 Filip Reyntjens (1996), p8   
106 These parties were the remnants of the internal opposition to Habyarimana.  
107 Multi-party politics and formal separation of powers had been introduced under this Constitution 
after international and domestic pressures prevailed on Habyarimana.  
108 Filip Reyntjens (1996)  
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been reserved for the erstwhile ruling party MRND. These moves at constitutional 
engineering as well as the alliances it forged with smaller parties eager to bandwagon 
with the RPF for a share of power allowed the party to dominate both the executive 
and the legislative branches of government during the transition period.109   
RPF elites have thus demonstrated a keen awareness of the political uses of law. 
They were able to quickly dominate the political arena which helped them push the 
trials as policy. They were not entirely unencumbered at this early stage however. 
They encountered a vigorous debate in the transitional legislature. There were other 
constraints, for instance, the need to ask for support from doubtful donor governments 
and critical international legal organizations. Yet the shape of the law reflects that 
although concessions were made by the government none of them were damaging to 
the core proposals of the RPF.  In fact, by 1998 the RPF was more secure in its grip on 
power and this was reflected in the debates on the introduction of gacaca courts which 
were not particularly contentious.      
2.5 Debates on the confession and guilty plea law (1996) 
Two key points emerge from an evaluation of the debates that have been described as 
‘lengthy’110 and sometimes ‘combative’.111 First, the RPF was already in a politically 
dominant position in the transitional legislature. The government was able to prevail in 
the face of criticism and questions on most counts. Majority opinion did stack up 
against the government position on some issues in which case the government 
response was to incorporate the proposals into the law without developing them 
substantially. Second, the emotionally charged context in the aftermath of genocide 
produced some proposals compared to which the views of the RPF appeared rather 
                                                 
109 Filip Reyntjens (1996)    
110 Stef Vandeginste (1999), p9  
111 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003)   
                                                                                                                        
 38  
moderate and restrained. The net result was that RPF elites were able to push through 
legislation that translated their preferences into policy.  
The government was forced to address the issue of incorporating political massacres 
of Hutu moderates (itsembatsemba) alongside the mention of genocide 
(itsembabwoko) in the law.112 The draft law tabled in the lower chamber of Parliament 
mentioned only genocide. At that time, it was a significant achievement, forcing the 
government to formally concede that genocide was one of multiple crimes that had 
been committed in Rwanda during that time.113 Only 1 deputy proposed that the law 
also address crimes of war perpetrated during the four-year civil war.114 Perhaps it was 
too sensitive a ground to tread given the RPF’s involvement and it was not brought up 
again.   
There was a lot of discussion on the issue of temporal jurisdiction (1 October 1990- 
31 December 1994). Some legislators argued that the law should cover the crimes of 
1959 that they insisted constituted ‘genocide’; others countered that the law should be 
extended beyond 1994 to include crimes committed after that date.115  The RPF’s 
arguments probably did not convince its critics but the government position that any 
crimes perpetrated after 31 December 1994 could be adjudicated under the penal 
code116 eventually carried the day.117 This removed from the table the contentious 
                                                 
112 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), p55  
113 If RPF wants the primacy of genocide acknowledged at the expense of war crimes or massacres of 
Hutu- there are, on the other side, arguments about a double genocide or even the denial of genocide. 
The defense lawyer for Georges Rutanganda, the vice president of the Interahamwe militia argued 
before the ICTR that: “[i]t is not the Hutu who are guilty of this so-called genocide.  We are convinced 
there was no genocide. It was a situation of mass killings in a state of war where everyone was killing 
their enemies…. There are a million people dead, but who are they? They are 800,000 Hutu and 
200,000 Tutsi. Everyone was killing but the real victims are the Hutu.  So, they have got this so-called 
genocide all wrong” quoted in Jeremy Sarkin (1999), p783, fn 114.   
114 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), p54  
115 This was a clear proposal to include the crimes committed by the RPF after assuming power.  
116 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), p59  
117 The RPF has continued to proffer the same argument over the years. Interview with Foreign Minister 
and senior RPF politician, Charles Murigande, Kigali 2005  
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question of accountability for massacres committed by RPF soldiers after their 
assumption of power. 
Some legislators expressed discomfort with the government’s insistence on 
community service (TIG- Travaux d’intérêts Générales118) as part of the proposed 
sentence reductions because Rwanda had a long history of forced labor imposed 
mostly on Hutu during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. The government dropped 
the TIG provision for the time being. TIG would resurface with a consent clause in the 
law on gacaca tribunals in 2001. At that time, however, it showed that the RPF-
dominated government could be made to adjust and accommodate.119 Another 
concession by the government was the inclusion of a provision on reparation for 
survivors, despite its initial argument that reparations could be arranged on an 
informal basis. The substance of reparations was not entered into in any detail.120  
Sometimes there were no convincing arguments to allay legislators’ concerns, who 
worried that incentives for confession would induce false admissions of guilt. They 
asked how the courts would make an accurate determination of guilt in the absence of 
a confession. This impasse was left unresolved and the debate moved on to other 
issues leaving the substance of the confession and guilty plea proposals intact.121    
A few critiques of the law were so extreme that they made the government’s 
arguments look reasonable in contrast. In a debate over terminology, certain legislators 
wanted to use the word “killers” or “genocidaires” for those in pre-trial detention 
instead of the word “accused”. Some deputies argued that all Hutu should be punished, 
others pushed for the death penalty for all those proven guilty. The government 
                                                 
118 There is a separate law governing the rules and procedures for TIG. For a report on TIG, see Penal 
Reform International (2007, March)    
119 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), p62  
120 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), p54  
121 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), p59   
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response was to outline the idea of individual responsibility and argued that it would 
not be realistic to put a million people to death. The government fended off 
accusations that the law was tantamount to amnesty and found itself on the defensive 
explaining the rationale for reconciliation.  
The discussion on categorization of crimes showed how the fundamental 
assumptions that underpinned the trials were not questioned. Some legislators disputed 
the need for detailed distinctions between severities of crimes. The government found 
itself defending the need to deal with perpetrators differently: a distinction was made 
between leaders who had incited ordinary people to commit crimes and ordinary Hutu 
who had been pushed to kill.122   This did not lead to a re-examination of the 
fundamental premise of the trials that had been posited by the RPF: that there were 
ideologized, willing perpetrators who needed to be punished.123  
2.6 Power, Predicament, and Gacaca as policy solution  
The RPF had strengthened its grip on power by the end of 1996. 15 of 22 cabinet 
directors, 16 of 19 director generals, 6 of the 11 prefects, 80% of burgomasters and 
95% of all soldiers, gendarmes and police officers were Tutsi.124 There were several 
assassinations of prominent Hutu followed by an exodus of Hutu politicians from the 
country. The RPF demonstrated its military prowess by crushing the insurgency 
                                                 
122 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003),p57 
123 A different argument has sometimes been used to justify punishing ordinary perpetrators that has 
little to do with “genocide ideology”. An official report states, “The genocide and massacres is the 
government’s offence because it is government which taught people the ideology used to get to those 
genocide and massacres….But on the other hand, the genocide and massacres have been the culprit’s 
offence; because there is hatred between a citizen whose family member was killed by a neighbor and 
that neighbor. That citizen cannot logically think that it is government which is more responsible for 
what happened to him. Therefore, this proves that it would not be enough to punish such a crime at a 
high level”… Office of the President of the Republic (1999, August), pp5-6  
 
124 Gerard Prunier cited in Stef Vandeginste (1999), fn 55  
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mounted by Hutu rebels in the northwest and toppling the regime in neighboring 
Congo. 
The RPF also began to prepare for the national elections that were still five years 
away. At a party congress in February 1998, there was a change of guard. Kagame, 
who had led the guerrilla war and was then Vice President, assumed Chairmanship of 
the party. The new mandate was to organize with the objective of winning the crucial 
end-of-transition national elections.125 At a time when political parties were not 
allowed to organize at the local level, the RPF organized its cadres for “politics and 
mass mobilization”. They were now assigned to all levels of the administrative 
hierarchy and focused on setting up party structures at cell level to identify pro-RPF 
candidates for the upcoming local elections.126   
Justice continued to be a major concern: First, estimates suggested it would take 200 
years to try all the accused. The Ministry of Justice was spending two thirds of its 
budget on food for the prison population.127 Under the supervision of international 
legal associations, there were a series of legal reforms, including the establishment of 
a Bar Association, laws to regularize dossiers of thousands of Hutu in pre-trial 
detention128 and the training of judicial defenders.129 But this was not enough.  By the 
end of 1999, there were almost 120,000 accused in prison.  
A solution was needed to fast-track the process if the government was to be able to 
continue with the trials. The RPF turned to develop policy solutions on a variety of 
                                                 
125 International Crisis Group (2001), fn 27  
126 International Crisis Group (2001), p7   
127 Jacques Fierens (2005), fn 13.  “According to the former department of ‘gacaca courts’, within the 
Supreme Court, the state spent 2,000,000,000 Frw of its budget for 1998 solely on purchasing food for 
the detainees. This amount, even though it took up two-thirds of the budget of the Ministry of Justice, 
still had to be supplemented by a substantial contribution from the ICRC. In 1999, 1,500,000,000 Frw 
was spent on food, i.e. half the Ministry's budget of 3,800,000,000 Frw.”  
128 Stef Vandeginste (1999), p10  
129 Those without a university law degree but entitled to assist and defend in courts.  
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issues. How the trials would continue was one of the main topics on which discussions 
were held every Saturday for a full year (May 1998-May 1999) at the President’s 
home at Village Urugwiro. Proposals to try the gacaca experiment had been rejected in 
policy discussions as early as 1995.130 The idea to implement gacaca tribunals 
resurfaced once again.   
2.7 The discussions on gacaca    
‘Genocide ideology’ and the ‘culture of impunity’ had become bedrock assumptions 
by this time. A truth commission had been ruled out in the early debates of 1995-6. A 
criminal trials process has been chosen as the best means to move toward truth, justice 
and reconciliation and a move away from this path was not on the agenda. The official 
report on the discussions on gacaca at Village Urugwiro presented the reasoning: 
“Usually, when you are punishing a crime, it is because you want people to be afraid 
of committing it. But in this case…it is not enough: the bad ideology which has been 
favored must be changed.”131  The report dismissed the arguments of those who were 
opposed to gacaca: “Some participants in the meeting, especially those who are 
specialized in law, found it difficult to welcome the idea of searching for other means 
through which the problems of justice resulting from the genocide and massacres 
could be solved because those means were different from those they were taught and 
using. Some were saying that the existing means (ordinary courts) could be used, so 
that trials for genocide and massacres could have been completed after three years, but 
they could not explain when they were requested to do so. They were adding that 
using other means to solve those problems was to minimize the genocide and 
                                                 
130 Workshop on « La lutte contre I’impunite: dialogue pour une reconciliation nationale » held in 
Kigali. 31 October- 3 November 1995.  Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), 77   
131 Office of the President of the Republic (1999, August), p6   
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massacres because those who committed such a severe crime could not be tried by 
people who have not been taught law. The meeting found out that such ideas were 
resulting from the fact of wanting to protect the lawyers’ profession and work and not 
being able to dissociate from what they have learnt and worked in so as to believe in 
other ideas.”132 
Discussions focused on the effectiveness of an informal traditional system, 
evaluating its shortcomings and debating ways of modifying it to meet some of the 
requirements of a criminal trials process.  In a series of ‘passionate’133 donor debates, 
Belgium, supported by the European Commission, the Dutch and Swiss governments 
agreed to support the process despite their reservations. Ministry of Justice officials 
met with ambassadors, NGO workers and consulted legal scholars. With their inherent 
distrust of traditional mechanisms that strayed from international fair trial standards, 
international legal associations were able to exert significant pressure on the Rwandan 
government to ensure that gacaca trials approximated an adversarial, evidence-based 
and formal rules-oriented process as much as possible.134 Ironically, this reinforced the 
harsher, punitive aspects of justice as compared to the softer, negotiable, informal 
aspects of traditional gacaca.135   
Finally, the proposal to introduce a law on gacaca was tabled in a plenary session of 
Parliament. The questions were clarificatory rather than combative. Some deputies 
proposed that only genocide (itsembabwoko) be mentioned in the law and the 
reference to political massacres (itsembatsemba) be dropped. A majority of legislators 
were opposed to this and the government retained both terms. There were clarification 
questions on confession procedures (the new law proposed giving the accused an 
                                                 
132 Office of the President of the Republic (1999, August), p61  
133 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), p78  
134 Mark Drumbl (2003)   
135 Mark Drumbl (2003), p129   
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opportunity to confess up until the point of trial), on the use of the word ‘rape’ in place 
of ‘sexual torture’, etc. Once again, there were more extreme proposals, such as 
holding parents co-responsible for atrocities perpetrated by minors.136 The 
government’s arguments against this made it appear reasonable and moderate.   
The gacaca model was introduced in prisons in 1999 where it was used as a forum 
to encourage confessions, educate the accused about the law and allow the confessed 
to testify and denounce their accomplices. The organic law on gacaca took another 
two years to prepare, finally coming into effect in 2001.   
2.8 Conclusion 
The RPF has made a number of different arguments to justify the trials at different 
times that are not always consistent. Genocide ideology, willing executioners and the 
need for personal reform; culture of impunity and need for deterrence; survivors’ 
demand for punitive justice are all arguments that can be contrasted with the 
government’s concomitant position that ordinary perpetrators’ were victims of 
coercion and misled by the propaganda of genocidal elites. Yet it has from the outset 
privileged punishment over reconciliation. The trials policy of 1996 was 
fundamentally punitive and did not mention reconciliation as one of its goals. The 
gacaca courts that followed were also significantly punitive but were presented as 
drawing on Rwandan tradition, capable of facilitating reconciliation, collective 
healing, justice, unity and even economic development.137 The harsher aspects of the 
gacaca courts were apparent soon enough. Rwanda has turned into what Foucault 
would perhaps call the great “carceral archipelago,”138 transferring thousands of 
                                                 
136 Francois Digneffe, Jacques Fierens et al. (2003), 79-84  
137 Luc Huyse and Marc Salter eds. (2008), p54 
138 Michel Foucault (1995 [1975]), pp.297-298 Foucault refers here to the “whole range of punitive and 
disciplining institutions”… “the whole complex of the penal system that diffuses disciplinary 
techniques throughout the entire social body” 
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people between prisons, courtrooms and camps for community service while building 
state capacity to oversee and manage the entire process. Punishment or the threat of 
punishment saves the regime from using costly inducements or brutal repression to 
extract compliance. The underlying rationale for the trials, namely ‘genocide 
ideology’, has been useful in more ways than one. It has been used to justify new and 
more repressive laws.139 It has also been used to delegitimize non-compliant Hutu 
elites and quarantine them from public life at the national level. It has been used to 
justify arrests of non-compliant local elites.  
But the political problem for any party dominated by elites of the ethnic 
minority is the “permanently defined majority.”140 The core arguments of this 
dissertation suggest that once implemented, the trials have in turn produced power for 
ruling elites by keeping a vast swathe of the population quiescent and dependent on 
elites for reduced sentences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 For example, the law against sectarianism and divisionism in 2001 and the restrictive press law of 
2002. The terms of both laws are broad and ill defined, allowing officials to pursue its critics with 
criminal sanctions. Amnesty International notes that the government has used the law to silence critical 
journalists by accusing them of fomenting ethnic hatred or genocidal propaganda. See Amnesty 
International (2008) ; Reporters Sans Frontières (2003)  
140 Mahmood Mamdani (1996), p17.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND FIELD METHODS 
3.1. Introduction 
By October of 2002, 765 courts out of 12,103141 had launched pre-trial hearings. 
These courts were into the trial phase by March 2005. The remaining courts followed 
in two subsequent phases.     
The gacaca courts continued a judicial process that had begun earlier in 1996 when 
the RPF dominated transition government put in place the law on ‘confessions and 
guilty plea’.142 It offered incentives designed to encourage confessions from the 
accused and threatened severe penalties for those who insisted on their innocence but 
were later proven guilty. Painfully slow progress in the ordinary courts prompted the 
government to propose gacaca courts as a way to fast-track the cases of the 120,000 
accused in prison. The argument was that these cases could be processed at a faster 
rate by twelve thousand community-based courts functioning simultaneously across 
the country. The gacaca law was introduced in 2001. It was revised in 2004 and again 
in 2007 but it has continued to use as its “cornerstone”143 the incentives and sanctions 
introduced by its predecessor, the ‘confessions and guilty plea’ law.    
                                                 
141 See report by Domitilla Mukantaganzwa (2004, October), p9; All twelve thousand courts were 
functional by 2005 even though the courts that began their work in later phases did not enter the trial 
phase until 2007.   
142 The Organic Law of 30 August 1996 on the Organization of the Prosecution of Offences 
Constituting the crime on Genocide or Crimes against Humanity. For a commentary on the law, see 
Daniel de Beer et al. (1997)   
 
143 For a commentary on the use of  incentive-based confessions as the “cornerstone” of justice, see 
Penal Reform International (2003)  
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Using gacaca courts to try genocide crimes however represented an important 
rupture from the way the ‘confession and guilty plea’ law was implemented. A 
criminal trial process hitherto operated by legal professionals and contained within 
courtrooms in Kigali and provincial capitals now spilled over into the domain of local 
actors, exposed to the distortion of community-based processes. The gacaca law 
entitled these community-based courts to judicial independence, so the role of the state 
formally shifted to the margins. The National Service for Gacaca Jurisdictions (SNJG) 
was to be mostly concerned with infrastructural support, judges’ training, and regular 
oversight. The certainties of the 1996 law carried over to gacaca, but introduced new 
actors and new uncertainties about how the community process would play out and 
whether lay judges would prove competent stewards of the criminal justice process.  
Field research for this dissertation was conducted over a total of eighteen months 
between 2002 and 2005. I traced closely the organic evolution of the trials process 
over time. First, that helped to reveal how closely the political consolidation process 
and the trial process have evolved. Second, I examined the internal logic of the trials 
process. I collected data from relevant actors (accused, witnesses, judges, political 
elites) at each of the sites central to the operation of the gacaca process (prisons, 
community, gacaca trial court, government offices) and I traced the connective flows 
of power and resources between actors within and across those sites. This is important 
not only to understand how the process works and the structures within which the 
process unfolds, but also to understand how it produces outcomes that enable regime 
consolidation.  
I describe my field research in more detail in the sections below.  In order to provide 
some context to the gacaca process, I start with a description of the trajectory through 
which a typical case proceeds. 
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3.2 From accusation to verdict: a stylized sketch     
I interviewed Alphonse144 after he was sentenced in the gacaca court of Masaka sector 
in 2005. The timeline and details of his transition from accusation to arrest and verdict 
were similar to the others whose trials I observed in Masaka sector. The details were 
also similar to the accused whom I interviewed in prison. They had not faced a trial at 
the time of interview but the events they had experienced from the time they were 
accused up until their incarceration were the same. The trajectory from incarceration 
to trial and verdict is pre-determined by gacaca law and modified occasionally by 
Presidential decrees. 145 
Alphonse was accused in 1997. His neighbors had accused him of being part of a 
mob that killed a Tutsi child hiding in their home. The case against Alphonse was 
registered at the district police post. After being arrested and detained at the cachot for 
a couple of weeks, he was transferred to the main prison at province headquarters.   
Contrary to what we might expect of a highly controlled prison context, Alphonse 
found himself in an environment saturated with various kinds of information. There 
were people from his community who had been arrested before him. Some of them 
had confessed and denounced others as was required under gacaca law. One of his cell 
mates possessed a radio. Alphonse reported that he listened closely to the news, 
particularly foreign news channels like the BBC and VOA from which he got the “real 
news” that he believed was not reported on the government owned Radio Rwanda. He 
listened when prison authorities routinely tried to familiarize the accused about the 
law and the incentives rewarding confession. Ministry of Justice officials also visited 
                                                 
144 The names of people and places have been changed to ensure anonymity.  
145 The gacaca law did not have a provision for the temporary release of prisoners who had confessed. 
The Presidential decree of January 2003 made provisional releases possible. While this eased prison 
overcrowding to some extent, the releases ahead of the landmark transition elections raised questions 
about political opportunism. The projected release for 2003 was 49,376 prisoners. See Amnesty 
International (2003, April 29)    
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them to talk about the government’s unity and reconciliation agenda. According to 
Alphonse, there was much discussion among prisoners about what the lectures meant. 
Prisoners scrutinized the words for possible codes and hidden meanings as they tried 
to assess what the government intended to do with them.146   
He had some contact with the world outside of the prison. He went with his work 
group to fetch water, to construct the outer wall of the prison and his wife came to 
meet him once every three or four months. She brought him news of home and of the 
new accusations against him and others that had emerged at the gacaca hearings in 
their community.147   
Alphonse confessed to category 2 crimes148 in 2002. His options were clear under 
the law: If he did not confess but was found guilty, the sentence could range between 
25-30 years. If he did not confess but was found innocent, he could be acquitted and 
released immediately. If he confessed and admitted guilt, the reduced sentence would 
range between 7-15 years149 and there was an additional incentive in that the sentence 
could be commuted to public service (TIG).  Alphonse was provisionally released in 
2003. He was tried by a gacaca court in March 2005, found guilty and sentenced to 12 
years. Under the law, he was required to spend only half of that time in prison (6 
years).  Since he had already spent 7 years in pre-trial detention, he did not return to 
prison. He had to serve out the remaining 5 years working on TIG.      
                                                 
146 This was also reported during my interviews with the accused who were still in prison.  
147 These were the pre-trial hearings where judges collected information from the community, recorded 
testimonies for and against each of the accused and sorted their dossiers according to the appropriate 
category of crime.    
 
148 Under the 2004 gacaca law, category 1 included those accused of organizing, planning, incitement to 
genocide and rape; category 2 included those accused of murder; category 3 included those who 
committed theft or arson.  
149 This is for category 2 crimes only under the 2004 version of the gacaca law.  
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There are minor variations in specific cases. For instance, there are those who are 
accused during the pre-trial gacaca hearings or even during the gacaca trial phase. In 
these cases, the time lag between accusation and trial can be less than for those 
arrested in the pre-gacaca years. In fact, many of those who are being accused at these 
later stages of the process may not be arrested because Rwandan prisons are heavily 
congested.150 Besides, the government has gradually learnt that relentless arrests tend 
to create panic within communities. The accused nevertheless face the certainty of a 
prison term if found guilty at trial.   Figure 3.1 below maps the trajectories through 
which cases may proceed.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 1: Trajectories from accusation to trial 
Overall, there is a continuous movement of people between communities and prison. 
The confessed are provisionally released; others have been recently accused and some 
among them arrested; still others return to prison after trial to serve out their sentences, 
while many are released for TIG.   
                                                 
150 Human Rights Watch (2000)  
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3.3 Research design  
3.3.1 Inductive beginnings  
This project began as an inductive investigation into how the gacaca courts were 
working. My first visit was in the summer of 2002. Two hundred and fifty thousand 
lay judges had already been elected by their communities. There were heated debates 
among observers. Some human rights organizations believed the process was worth 
supporting given the urgency of delivering justice in Rwanda,151 others dismissed 
gacaca as some sort of kangaroo court.152 Some scholars hoped that would help to 
build democracy from the bottom up.153 Yet others debated the possibility of healing 
and reconciliation in Rwanda.154 Gacaca was cast as a novel grassroots experiment 
whose rules had been written into the law but the nature of its unfolding and outcomes 
were unknown.   
I had some broad preliminary questions I wanted to pursue: What kinds of local 
dynamics played into the participatory nature of the trials process? How did the ruling 
elites control a process that was unfolding within communities? What were some of 
the social and political effects of the trials?   
I conducted preliminary interviews with SNJG (National Service of Gacaca 
Jurisdictions) officials who had just settled into a small office in Kigali. Created as the 
sixth chamber of the Supreme Court, SNJG is the institution charged with setting up 
and implementing the gacaca tribunals on the ground. Many SNJG officials were 
members of the RPF and appeared genuinely committed to its vision of national unity 
and reconciliation. They explained that genocide was in their view the product of a 
                                                 
151 RCN-Citizens’ Network (2002, February) ; Fergus Kerrigan (2000).   
152 Amnesty International (2002, June 19)   
153 Peter Uvin (2003, April)  
154 Kenneth Roth and Alison Des Forges (2002, July)  
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particular political history. They argued that justice for genocide crimes would be a 
reformative and reconciliatory experience as perpetrators asked for forgiveness and 
were given a second chance at life. It was hoped that people would become 
participants in a new kind of non-partisan politics.   
SNJG personnel had launched a large scale sensitization campaign at the local level 
to prepare people for the introduction of the tribunals. I observed these processes in 
two provinces. How did officials from Kigali interact with local communities? What 
was being said? How did ordinary people seem to respond? I spoke with some of the 
newly elected judges. Did they believe this would work?   I took notes and collected 
the literature officials were using to “sensitize” the population about the gacaca 
courts.155   
When I returned in early 2004, the pre-trial phase was in full swing in parts of the 
country. It was close to completion in some places. In Kigali, there were moves to 
introduce a revised version of the gacaca law and plan for the re-election of gacaca 
judges countrywide. The general feeling among people was that once political elites 
arrived at a decision, things would move fast at ground level.  Fully functional SNJG 
offices had been set up in each of the provinces and in every district. A larger building 
had been built in Kigali to house SNJG operations at the centre. Operations had been 
streamlined and new infrastructure was in place.156   
I tried to learn how various actors evaluated the gacaca courts in the pre-trial 
hearings phase. Privately, SNJG officials worried about places where people were 
                                                 
155 These were small booklets with color pictures and simply worded explanations; posters with slogans 
on justice and reconciliation, songs and cartoon strips.  
156 The SNJG building now housed offices for directors in charge of various portfolios. There were 
copiers, phones, a small library, conference room, a team for translation of SNJG documents from 
Kinyarwanda into English and French, a number of secretaries, support staff and vehicles.  
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indifferent to or actively obstructing the work of the court. Sometimes people refused 
to testify or the panel of judges did not work well together but overall, SNJG officials 
presented a positive picture of communities working to build unity and reconciliation. 
In contrast, members of human rights NGOs presented anecdotal evidence about fines 
for non-participation and the involvement of grassroots government officials in 
compiling information on the accused where the community was not forthcoming with 
testimonies. 
Were these stories indicative of a general trend of non-participation and growing 
fear within communities? I needed data for the duration of the process (2002-2004) 
which was not readily available at that time. There were however weekly and monthly 
reports drawn up by SNJG officials at the local level. These reports were available at 
SNJG offices at province level and in the districts.   
I selected 20 cells (lowest administrative unit) spread across four sectors. Each 
sector was in a different province in the centre, west, south and north of the country. I 
chose the four provinces because it gave me a wide geographic spread across which I 
could track if there were significant similarities or differences. I selected these cells 
because they were all in the pre-trial hearings stage.  I spent a month in each province, 
where I collected three types of data for each cell:  
a. From these (mostly handwritten) reports, I compiled data on the number of 
sessions missed since the courts began working; reasons for missed sessions, 
including lack of quorum among judges as well as among the general 
population; figures for attendance over time.    
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b. I interviewed judges with the five most important positions on the bench and at 
least one other judge.157 I asked them about the composition of the judges’ 
panel to find out how many panels were inter-ethnic, what sort of issues 
created problems between judges, what sort of a relationship they shared 
outside of gacaca work, their economic position and social standing in their 
communities.   
c. If there were survivors living in the selected cells, I would interview at least 
two of them depending on who was available and willing to respond to a 
request for an interview. I asked for their impression of the judges’ work, to 
tell me if there had been incidents of intimidation or violence since gacaca 
started.   
 
Putting the numbers from the SNJG reports on attendance and sessions held together 
with the qualitative information generated from these interviews, I found that things 
were not going well. Gacaca sessions were frequently cancelled.158  The most 
commonly cited reason was festivals and burials, followed by lack of quorum, other 
community meetings, and finally inclement weather. Attendance was poor and falling 
over time.159 Judges did not report problems among themselves along ethnic lines. 
Perhaps that was because most panels were dominated by Hutu.160 The token Tutsi 
                                                 
157 The five positions are those of the President of the court, two Vice-Presidents, and two Secretaries. 
They are called the coordinating committee of the bench. In each cell, I also interviewed one permanent 
judge who was not on the coordinating committee. There were originally 19 judges for every court but 
the gacaca law of 2004 reduced the total number of permanent judges to 9. There are also 5 non-
permanent judges who fill in for a permanent judge who is not available on a given day. The gacaca law 
of 2007 further reduced the number of permanent judges per tribunal to 7.   
158 For example, in the five cells of Masaka sector, 34%, 55%, 41%, 47% and 34% of all scheduled 
sessions were missed.  
159 In the five cells of Masaka sector, the attendance for each of the cells for the first week and last week 
was : cell 1= 178 and 78; cell 2=120 and 60; cell 3=193 and 30; cell 4=210 and 60; cell 5=270 and 120   
160 In the five cells of Masaka sector, for example, all the judges on the coordinating committee were 
Hutu.  
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survivor among the judges often ended up with a non-permanent post. In a few places, 
Tutsi who had returned from exile after the genocide had important positions on the 
panels, such as president or secretary. In general, judges were eager to present a 
picture of their hard work and progress. Survivors, even those elected judges, hinted at 
local conspiracies, spoke of coalitions pitted against one another to implicate some and 
release others from prison. They felt they were closer to the truth about genocide than 
they were before gacaca started, but they also felt threatened and dispirited.161  Going 
by survivors’ accounts, there seemed to be a lot of maneuvering around the trials 
occurring within communities that SNJG officials, political elites, and the law 
enforcement apparatus seemed either unable to control or were unwilling to contain. In 
a rare case, even an SNJG local official appeared to be involved in the subterfuge 
around gacaca. He was in the police books for allegedly holding clandestine meetings 
at night to discourage Hutu from testifying. I observed that the entry in the police 
register was several months old but he was still carrying on with his job.  
3.3.2 Moving towards the deductive stage  
The gacaca machine was operating at very low cost given the scale of the project 
(judges worked without remuneration), generating huge numbers of accused (from 
120,000 in 2000 to 760,000 in 2006), and producing a spurt in the number of 
                                                 
161 In the cells in the northern part of the country, for example, one survivor who had testified against 
numerous people had asked local government officials to help him relocate to a different place under a 
different name. He feared there were local conspiracies underway to kill him. Another survivor reported 
she had served on the bench as a non-permanent member but was removed from her position after she 
was accused (falsely, she claimed) of having willing handed over her children to be killed by a mob 
during the genocide. Yet another survivor who was a non-permanent judge claimed she was too afraid 
to speak her mind. She even claimed she had been elected against her will in order to have a token 
presence of a survivor on the bench. In general, the accounts of survivors everywhere reflected their 
fear and anxiety surrounding gacaca. In 2003, the year before I conducted these interviews, four 
survivors had been killed in a single incident in the south. The case had been widely reported on the 
radio and the government was reprimanded for neglecting the needs of witnesses and survivors. Four 
years down the road, survivors continued to question what the government was doing to protect them. 
See for instance, Felly Kimenyi (2007, February 7)   
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confessions (33,000 in 2002 to 95,000 in 2005).162 The accused largely tended to 
confess before they were brought to trial but there were also many accused who chose 
to confess during the trial.163   I considered the following hypothesis: Confessions 
produced politically compliant individuals because those who had confessed counted 
heavily on the state to respond with the promised sentence reductions.     
What sort of political relationships then are confessors implicated in with regard to 
the state? Do confessions produce a durable political effect?  Was there a theoretically 
sound reason to expect more confessions as the gacaca process continued? The data 
certainly showed a rise in confessions over time. To answer these questions, I needed 
to know what caused people to confess in the first place.  
I now had a set of specific research questions:  
a. Why did many among the accused choose to confess?   
b. What sort of politically consequential effect did confessions produce?  
c. Was there a theoretically sound reason to expect more confessions as the trials 
continued?    
 
Figure 3.2 below presents a conceptual map of the research questions.  
 
 
                                                 
162 On the numbers of accused in 2000, see Stef Vandeginste who cites these figures from a report by 
the Ministry of Justice and compares them with a slightly higher figure of 123,000 accused which he 
derived from a report by Avocats Sans Frontières.  Stef Vandeginste (1999), p12, fn 43. On the numbers 
of accused in 2006, see report by UNDP (2007), p77. On the figures for those who have confessed as of 
2002, see Penal Reform International (2004, May), p11. On the figures of those confessed by the end of 
2005, see US Department of State (2006)   
163 Data on the courts in the pilot phase show that 6145 people had confessed before they faced trial 
while 1921 had confessed at the moment of their own trial. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions 
(2007)   
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Figure 3.2: Mapping the research questions 
 
3.4 Generating theory 
3.4.1 Causes of confession: Survey among prisoners  
Why do the accused, who have so far maintained they are innocent, decide to confess? 
I chose to conduct interviews with accused individuals who had confessed and also 
those who had not confessed. This would allow me variation on the outcomes 
(confession and non-confession) to test some theories that could account for the 
variation. I chose prisons as a site to control for an environment within which all the 
respondents had to make choices about confession. It would also allow me access to a 
finite population from among whom I could select a sample of both confessed and 
non-confessed individuals.  
Causes of  Confession?
      Confessed    Non-confessed
Political effects?
  Accused of genocide
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The research design in the prisons and the sampling methods are explained in detail 
in the next section of this chapter. In chapter four, I explain the theories I tested to 
account for confessions and then present my findings.    
I state my findings briefly here: The accused are inclined to hold out from 
confessing as long as they possibly can. Although aware of the incentives rewarding 
confession, they do not trust the government. They fear that should they respond to the 
inducements and confess, they may be subjected to indiscriminate punishment instead 
of being rewarded with reduced sentences. However, they also know that they have 
been denounced by their co-accused and are aware that information has been building 
up steadily such that they are likely not to be able to defend themselves successfully at 
trial. The calculus now changes given that the law contains very high penalties for 
those judged guilty without having confessed. Confession suddenly begins to look like 
a better option than holding out and pleading innocence. It is at this point that the 
accused ‘tip over’ and surrender their confession. However, the same fear of 
indiscriminate punishment that prevented them from responding to the inducements in 
the first place continues to plague them. They believe they are even more vulnerable 
now that they have incriminated themselves. The ‘consent effect’ is a rational response 
by vulnerable individuals who need to transact their professed political loyalty in the 
hope that the promised sentence reductions will materialize. Figure 3.3 summarizes 
the findings below.  
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Figure 3.3: Mapping the findings 
 
 
3.4.2 Testing the theory by means of causal process observation  
I adopted a process tracing method in order to better specify the causal pathways 
suggested by the above theory and to generate expectations about additional relevant 
observable implications that should exist if the theory is to withstand scrutiny.164   
                                                 
164 This is a positivist model of causal explanation and a way of subjecting the theory to standards of 
falsifiability. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005)  
Accused of genocide crimes
                       Fear indiscriminate punishment if Confess
                  Hold out: Non-Confessed
Information exposure No information exposure: 
Non-confessed 
    Cost-benefit analysis 
    In light of knowledge of law 
Tip over & Confess
Cost-benefit analysis 
In light of lack of trust in Government & 
Heightened vulnerability 
  Surrendering Consent
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A central finding upon which the causal argument rests is the role of information 
exposure. It does not matter whether this information is ‘really’ true or false, but 
simply that enough of it is out there such that the accused may not be able to defend 
himself successfully at trial. This information is generated by means of denunciations 
by friends and acquaintances from his community who have confessed. The law does 
not treat a confession as valid unless it contains denunciations of alleged accomplices. 
If the accused individual fears over-exposure, he responds with a confession of his 
own, betraying those who have denounced him in the process. This is a process of 
cascading “betrayal confessions”165 generated by people known to each other.     
I wanted to test if there was evidence of betrayal confessions among the accused 
who had confessed and had been provisionally released. This would allow me to 
double check the role of information exposure and the processes central to information 
exposure among a different sample of accused individuals at a location outside of the 
prison.   
I used trial transcripts that I generated in the course of observing 6 gacaca trials in 
one community.166 The transcripts include a total of 46 hours of trial testimony. The 
defendants at all of these trials had confessed. The data show that the testimony 
against the defendants is derived from those who had already confessed to committing 
crimes in addition to testimony by eye witnesses. If the defendant’s confession was 
incomplete, for example, testimony from those who had confessed would prod the 
defendant into enlarging the scope of the confession he had proffered minutes earlier. 
Information produced in a confession could be linked to already existing information 
produced by way of somebody else’s betrayal confession. I also interviewed some of 
the accused who had confessed and were provisionally released. They expressed 
                                                 
165 I borrow a term used by Leigh Payne (2008)  
166 I call this Masaka sector. The gacaca trial court here had a caseload of 283 cases. (July 2005)  
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bitterness toward those who had denounced them. Some of them spoke openly about 
how the ‘game was up’ but that it had lifted a burden from their hearts.   
But why should denunciations and increasing exposure (true or false) necessarily 
mean that the ‘game was up’? For a theory about the calculus-changing role of 
information exposure to hold, there should be supporting evidence that the accused, 
once exposed, may not be able to mount a successful defense.  Observation of trial 
proceedings show that in the absence of forensic, photographic or other kinds of 
concrete evidence, the availability of information against the accused from different 
sources was taken into account in making judgments about innocence or guilt. 
Information exposure mattered because at that point the outcome for an accused 
begins to look more certain. It reduced the inherent uncertainties of a process where 
judges are relatively autonomous, various kinds of local manipulations were possible, 
the accused did not have access to defense counsel and no other concrete evidence was 
available.  
3.5 Data collection- sites and methods   
3.5.1 Community:  
Theoretically grounded ethnography served as an external validation of the causal 
processes that produce confessions.  Ethnography is used in this dissertation not 
simply to contextualize the trials or to describe events that happened. The analytic 
goal is to specify more sharply the relevant structures and causal processes that the 
prison data suggested were relevant. Also, the answers to the questions I was 
interested in (how information was generated on the accused, how uncertainty was 
produced at the local level) could be found only by a long and deep immersion in 
everyday life within communities.   
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From my experience during the pre-trial hearings phase in 2004, it was clear that 
any fieldwork strategy that relied on brief forays into the community for interviews 
was not going to work. Respondents were guarded. They censored their speech and 
tended to repeat government slogans on unity and reconciliation. It was difficult to 
identify key players at the grassroots, distinguish the accused from the rest of the 
population, or understand the forces at play maneuvering around the trials. In an 
environment where people could not trust one another and feared being denounced, 
discussions happened in back rooms of bars, confined to small groups of trusted 
people, if at all.167 Conflicts and power struggles could not be interpreted accurately 
without understanding the local relationships in which they were implicated. 
Fieldwork would involve living with people, living like them, on their home ground, 
and interacting with them over time.168  
I returned to one of the communities in southern Rwanda that I had visited the year 
before. For purposes of anonymity, I will call it Masaka sector. I knew I would not be 
arriving as a complete stranger even though it would take time before people settled 
down with stable perceptions about me. That I was an Indian woman studying in 
America and conducting research in Rwanda caused some confusion and a great deal 
of interest, giving me many opportunities to introduce myself, make small talk, and 
absorb informal gossip and information about local residents. Each encounter was an 
                                                 
167 I could not directly participate in these hushed discussions among close friends but I observed that 
they took place. I could participate in numerous informal discussions. These happened commonly in the 
local bars. People relaxed with their drinks and there were moments where people spoke freely to me 
and then retreated if they had said too much. Sometimes, they would argue among themselves without 
involving me directly and my interpreter would fill in the details when we were alone. After a few 
months, my host family began to relax around my presence. Discussions would flow freely on 
intermittent occasions around the dinner table. These were insightful moments but would not last long. 
On one occasion, I was informed gently by my interpreter that the family felt they had said too much 
and I should be careful because they had spoken trustingly.  
168 John Van Maanen (1988)   
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occasion to share a few drinks as is customary and field questions while my 
interpreter169 and I were studied at close quarters.  
My host was a Hutu man whose brother had been accused of genocide, arrested and 
later died in prison. We ate our meals with the family,170 went to market days and 
were invited to baptisms. From relationships initially mediated by my host, I began to 
develop independent relationships with a variety of local actors- gacaca judges, 
members of locally dominant families, those who held leadership positions at the 
grassroots. All conversations and interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda as the 
rural population was not conversant with French. Every encounter was a three-way 
dialog with my interpreter translating simultaneously between me and the person we 
were talking to. I spent a month preparing my interpreter for the community-based 
research. It was crucial to develop a mutual understanding of our individual 
expectations and behaviors in the field. 
I began to attend the weekly trials in the gacaca court (with official permission from 
the SNJG) discussing the cases with survivors and members of the audience during 
breaks. I lingered after the sessions to talk with the judges. These conversations 
usually ended up in the local bars and people debated back and forth. Sometimes, the 
façade of normalcy would give way to opinions and emotions expressed in unguarded 
moments, but these windows were quickly shut as people realized perhaps they had 
said too much.171 But it was information that was useful and I recorded the details of 
                                                 
169 Hutu, male, recently graduated from college 
170 My host had two spare rooms where he would store bags of coffee during harvest season. He rented 
the rooms out to me and my interpreter for the duration of our stay.  
171 When a discussion (at which I was present but in which I was not directly involved) became intense 
and heated, I would initially ask my interpreter for feedback on the spot. I realized soon that this tended 
to disturb the flow of conversation. It was as if people suddenly realized that I was present and the 
conversation would slow down. After that, I began to simply absorb what was happening and pick up 
the general thrust of the arguments. I had enough of a basic vocabulary to be able to do that. I later 
asked my interpreter to explain what had transpired and who said what exactly. However, in discussions 
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the conversations and the day’s events in my notebook. It gave me questions to pursue 
later as I verified pieces of data from different local sources.   
Gacaca had created a situation in which there was a high premium on every piece of 
information. Information (true or false) could be used to have someone arrested, 
ensure someone was released, remove a judge from his post, delegitimize a witness 
and manipulate the contents of a dossier.  My relationship to local actors was key to 
getting access to various kinds of information; my understanding of relationships 
between relevant actors was critical in being able to distinguish between information 
and (sometimes deliberate) misinformation, revealing the contours of local coalitions 
and their power struggles. Self-consciousness about my ‘positionality’ with respect to 
specific actors was critical and prevented me from making serious mistakes in the 
field. During a particularly contentious power struggle between judges in the trial 
court, for example, there was an attempt by one of the parties to instrumentalize my 
presence towards their own ends by specifically inviting me into a closed gathering 
(which was highly unusual) and passing on rumors and misinformation about a judge 
that (I believed) they hoped I would unwittingly transmit as I asked questions and 
spoke to others. In order to be effective in the field, I needed to build ‘trustful’ 
relationships but I also realized that I needed to always interrogate why particular 
respondents chose to speak to me and why they said the things they said.   
At trials and in the course of my own field work, it was evident that whole truths 
could not be known. Testimonies and counter-testimonies often provided multiple 
alternate accounts of events during trial proceedings. Like the judges who did their 
best to string together the most plausible account of what likely happened as they sat 
                                                                                                                                            
in which I participated actively, I used my interpreter to translate simultaneously between me and 
whoever I was speaking to.  
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in judgment over a case, my ethnography yielded “partial truths”172 by means of 
logical reconstructions of multiple narratives, cross-checking vital links and moving 
towards the most stable, consistent explanation possible.  
I did not use a tape recorder for the interviews or trial proceedings because that 
would have detracted from the informality and embeddedness of my presence in the 
community. My interpreter noted the responses by hand as he simultaneously 
mediated between me and the respondent in English and Kinyarwanda. Trial 
proceedings were also transcribed by hand in Kinyarwanda and later translated into 
English to generate trial transcripts. Recording the testimonies word for word was not 
difficult. The proceedings were painstakingly slow as the secretary of the trial court 
noted down the testimonies in the court register and the witnesses and others spoke 
haltingly to allow him to write. This gave my interpreter ample time to record those 
simultaneously.  
Experiencing the ebb and flow of events over time- both routine and accidental- was 
in itself revelatory.  Accidents (such as a sudden public dispute between survivors and 
judges during the election of judges) exposed deeper conflicts not normally visible 
through thick layers of an apparent everyday normality. These occasions allowed 
(generally well disguised) emotions to rise to the surface. Emotions contained within 
them a causal logic: anger for example, was underpinned by a ‘reason’, it was directed 
towards a (usually powerful) ‘object’, and recalled events that occurred in which some 
had lost and others had gained. It linked events of the present with events that had 
occurred earlier helping the researcher to develop a sense of structures of power and 
social processes at work. For example, why did people react the way they did when 
soldiers in plain clothes arrived during the judges’ elections, stood at a distance of 
                                                 
172 James Clifford and George E. Marcus eds. (1986), p24  
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several feet from people who had gathered to vote, while a district official nullified the 
re-election of a judge accused of genocide crimes? Why did other judges sit stiff and 
poker faced in public appearing almost nonchalant as this happened, while a couple of 
other judges erupted into barely suppressed outrage in private?     
Participating in the routines of local life also helped me to discover how ordinary 
people related and responded to government. Like many others who walked an hour to 
get to the district office with their petitions and problems, I too walked to secure 
permission to continue with my research at regular intervals. I observed how often 
district elites summoned local leaders for meetings, what kinds of incidents 
occasioned a visit from the district authorities, the structures through which the district 
projected power into the hinterland and the spaces for autonomy and control at the 
local level.  Finally, an immersion into life at the local level allowed me to understand 
experientially the meanings of membership in that society, particularly how life is 
lived and survived as the trials atomize local society, disintegrate families and 
friendships, induce powerlessness and desperation among people.      
3.5.2 Prisons  
I was able to secure the required permits from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry 
of Internal Security to conduct interviews at 4 prisons which I selected because it 
would be logistically convenient to travel to and live in those areas in which the 
prisons were located.  I decided to start with the prisons PCK and K in Kigali.   
I had to find a way around three sampling problems at this point: First, the names in 
the registers were not tagged with the category of crime each prisoner was accused of 
committing. I was interested in sampling only from category 2, that is, individuals 
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accused of killing or accused of being accessories to killing because those in category 
2 comprised the bulk (61.6%) of the accused.173 
Second, I was interested in the causes of confession, so I wanted my sample of 
confessed and non-confessed prisoners to include only those who not yet faced a trial. 
This would ensure that their responses would not be distorted by the legal 
consequences (verdict) of the choice (confession) that some had made and others had 
not.174 Finally, prison registers contained the names of all the accused without noting 
whether the said person had confessed or not. I had to find a way of stratifying the 
prison population into the sub-populations I was interested in studying.  
I sampled by means of a random multi-stage process using the same logic at each 
prison: At prison PCK, for example, the prison population of those accused of 
genocide crimes was 3400. I randomly sampled 300 names by choosing every 10th 
name from the prison registers. From this sample of 300, I needed to know which 
prisoners were in category 2. From within the sample of category 2 accused, I needed 
information based on which I could first, identify all those who had not been tried and 
second, stratify the sample between those who had confessed and not those had not 
confessed. 
                                                 
173 National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (2006)   
 
174 This should also account for those who ultimately confess at the trial because these confessions are 
typically produced in the course of the testimonies generated during the trial and before the judges retire 
to deliberate on the verdict. The gacaca law does not reward confessions after the verdict is announced. 
In the trials that I observed, judges would begin by listing the accusations against the defendant and 
then give the latter the opportunity to contest or accept the charges. This could be an opportunity for 
those who have been holding out to ‘give in’ and confess. During the trial there are other windows of 
opportunity for the accused to confess. For example, in one of the trials that I observed, the accused 
started out with an incomplete confession and made a fuller and more detailed admission only as the 
trial progressed and new information came to light. Incomplete confessions run the risk of being 
rejected and the accused are then treated as if they have not confessed. The penalties are significantly 
higher in this case. The accused therefore have every incentive to confess before the testimonies come 
to a close and the judges come back with a verdict.  
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Based on secondary information, I knew that almost two thirds of those accused 
were in category 2, so I expected to end up with a sample of 200 individuals in 
category 2. I also knew from aggregate prison data at the time of this research, that 1 
in every 3 accused had confessed at prison PCK. I expected therefore, that my sample 
of 200 category 2 accused should give me a list of confessed (approximately 1/3 * 
200) and non-confessed (approximately 2/3 * 200).   
I handed my original sample of 300 names to the leader of gacaca for prisoners. 
This individual (who had confessed) led prison sessions regularly organized for those 
who decided to confess in prison and wanted their testimonies recorded. He had 
worked in this capacity for a few years and I believed he would know or could find out 
more accurately than anyone else which of the individuals in my sample had confessed 
or not, been sentenced or not. He could help me generate the sample I needed. Much 
as I had expected in terms of proportions, I ended up with a sample of 60 confessed 
and 120 non-confessed prisoners.175    
To randomize further from these stratified lists, I selected every third name from the 
list of confessed and every sixth name from the list of con-confessed to generate a 
reduced sample of 20 confessed and 20 non-confessed prisoners. I used this list from 
which to interview respondents. In order to double-check the accuracy of the 
information provided by the prison leader, I requested respondents to confirm their 
status (category of crime, confessed or not, waiting for trial) with me before 
proceeding with the interview. I followed the same procedures in prison K.  
                                                 
175 120 names were eliminated from the original sample of 300 because they were in categories 1 or 3, 
had been sentenced already or could not be identified or located by the prison leader.  
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I conducted 38 interviews before I was forced to terminate this part of the research 
because of interference by prison authorities.176 I had interviewed 18 confessed and 20 
non-confessed prisoners. There were 22 respondents from prison PCK and 16 
respondents from prison K. Only 5 respondents out of a total of 38 were female and 
they were all from prison PCK. There were no female inmates at prison K. The 
average age for both the confessed and the non-confessed was 40 years.  
Despite the limited data, I have confidence in my findings. The sample was 
representative of the distribution of confessed and non-confessed within the prison 
population. The sample was randomized to avoid bias as far as possible.177 The 
questionnaire was designed to double-check responses.178 It was translated from 
                                                 
176 I had moved on to the third prison outside of Kigali to continue the interviews. The prison director 
there wanted a copy of my questionnaire and insisted they would have a policeman sit in on the 
interviews. Until that point, I had not been asked for my questionnaire either when I applied for the 
permits or in the two prisons where I had just completed the interviews. At prisons PCK and K, the 
interviews had been held in a private room in a corner of the courtyard outside of the main prison 
complex. In this third prison however, I told the director that I would give him a document that 
conveyed the set of broad themes that I was interested in pursuing such as gacaca and reconciliation etc. 
He read it and told me bluntly not to return to the prison. I was informed that the week prior to my 
arrival, another researcher had been arrested for asking inappropriate questions. Hence, the interviews 
with prisoners were terminated.   
177 First, the sample reflects a regional bias in that it is populated by respondents from Kigali and its 
environs. I try to counteract that by testing the findings (role of information and self-interest) on the 
causes of confession among a different sample of accused individuals during my trial observations in a 
different province. Second, the sample is also dominated by male respondents. This makes it 
representative of the prison population at large. However there could be attitudinal and other differences 
along the lines of gender but I am not certain what they might be. Finally, I interviewed only those 
people who could be located by the leader of prison gacaca from my original list. Given that this 
original list was generated randomly from the prison registers, and in addition, I selected my final 
respondents randomly from the list of identified prisoners handed to me by the leader of prison gacaca, 
I do not think that the unavoidable intervention of the prison gacaca leader made a significant difference 
in sample selection.  
178 For instance, on the issue of crimes committed by the RPF, I asked respondents if they believed that 
the RPF had attempted to kill all Hutu. I did not use the word “genocide” in this question. The 
responses were registered on a scale that ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree and I always 
asked the respondents to explain why they agreed or disagreed. I followed up with a second question: 
“In your opinion, who committed genocide?”  The possible answers were (a) Interahamwe/Hutu militia 
(b) RPF (c) both Interahamwe and RPF (d) none of them (e) other?  
If a respondent said that the RPF had killed many Hutu but disagreed that the RPF attempted to kill 
everyone who was Hutu and then said in response to the follow up question that the RPF had committed 
genocide, I would ask for a clarification. I found that some of the respondents did not always 
understand the exact meaning of the word “genocide” (or “jenoside” in Kinyarwanda). They confused it 
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English into Kinyarwanda and translated back into English to check if the original 
questions were rendered accurately into the local language.179 I spent a month with my 
interpreter explaining the questions to him, working on the nuances of the local 
language to fine-tune the questionnaire and clarifying how I wanted the interviews to 
be conducted. We used a conversational free-flowing style with my respondents. The 
interview was guided by the semi-structured questionnaire and generated a lot of 
narrative material through the use of open-ended questions to help me understand the 
argumentative logic of the yes/no responses to other questions. The interview was 
conducted in Kinyarwanda. The process involved a three-way conversation to ensure I 
was involved closely and able to follow what was happening during the interview. My 
interpreter explained the responses to me and noted the contradictions (if any). I 
generally asked for more clarification or raised a new question depending on what was 
being said. I did not ask personal questions about their role in genocide which reduced 
their incentive to lie.180  
                                                                                                                                            
with large scale killings of Hutu. Therefore, on a question that simply asked if the RPF had committed 
genocide, many of them would respond in the affirmative. It was by asking another question that got at 
the meaning of the word “genocide” that showed me that respondents were able to distinguish between 
large scale killings with intent to eliminate an entire group versus large scale killings that did not 
attempt to eliminate a group. Also, the narratives that accompanied these responses went a long way in 
ensuring that I understood my respondents accurately.  
Allowing my respondents to speak in a relaxed way without hurrying them along, asking follow up 
questions and searching for clarifications is the main reason why progress was slow. The interviews 
were long each taking approximately 4 hours.   
179 As a second- stage check, I also had the questionnaire verified for accuracy of translation by a 
Rwandan field researcher working for an international human rights organization based in Kigali.  
180 I found that respondents were generally willing to talk. They seemed inclined to believe that 
foreigners would be sympathetic to the plight of prisoners. I explained I was a student, that I was there 
to learn and had no connections to any political group. I did not carry a tape recorder into the interviews 
so that the respondents would not be uneasy. Before beginning the interview, we would spend some 
time on small talk. I would ask if they had any questions for me and they usually did. They asked me 
where I came from, why I was studying in America, why I was interviewing them. I would explain that 
their names came up by using a random method and that the interviews were anonymous. I often had to 
demonstrate what the random method meant by putting small slips of paper into a bowl and picking a 
few out blindly. I discovered after a few minutes they would relax and indicate we had their approval to 
begin with the interview. I did not begin the interview unless the respondent said he was willing to help 
us by answering our questions and indicated we could start. If they were hesitant to answer a question, 
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3.6 Note on data sources    
I use a variety of data drawn from different sources in this dissertation. Table 3.1 
below shows what kinds of data I use for each of the empirical chapters that follow. 
 
Table 3.1: Data sources for each chapter 
 
For each question I raised, I have used a method (survey, ethnography, trial 
observation) that I judged was best suited to probe for answers. I also mined other 
sources of data: RPF elite interviews, government reports, NGO reports and 
newspaper articles. Most of these reports were in English (official translations from 
Kinyarwanda) and some in French. News paper articles from the Rwandan press are 
drawn from the only English daily newspaper.   
                                                                                                                                            
the usually response was “don’t know”. I generally moved onto other things and then tried to return to 
that question later to see if I could get an answer. Sometimes that strategy worked.  
Chapter Contents Data used 
4 Prisoners -Survey data 
5 Information exposure 
-Trial transcripts 
-Observation of trial proceedings 
-Interviews with local actors 
6 Judges’ autonomy 
-Interviews with judges 
-Ethnographic data 
-Secondary resources 
-Government documents 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SURRENDERING CONSENT: EVIDENCE FROM TWO PRISONS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The core argument of this dissertation is that confessions produce political quiescence. 
Individuals ‘surrender consent’ after they confess, that is to say, they are not willing to 
enforce limits on state elites by holding them accountable despite questioning their 
moral authority to rule. Those who have not confessed also doubt that ruling elites 
possess moral authority, but in contrast to the confessed, they talk about the need for 
fresh political negotiations at the highest levels and regime change.  
This chapter is based on the premise that we cannot understand the effects of 
confession unless we know what induces people to confess in the first place. Using 
procedures for randomization, I generate a small sample of accused individuals from 
two prisons.181 The sample is divided into those who have confessed and those who 
have not confessed. I do not assume that individuals believe ruling elites lack the 
moral authority to rule. It is one among other hypotheses that I use to check if there 
are systematic differences that might explain why some confess and others refrain 
from confessing. The arguments are based on the distribution of responses that are 
presented in tabular form. I draw on respondents’ narratives to substantiate the 
findings.   
I use T-tests of significance for small samples. I use difference of means tests that 
take all the responses into account except for those who responded “don’t know” to 
particular questions. For responses to most questions, I use a five point Likert scale 
                                                 
181 Please refer to chapter 3 of this dissertation  
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with responses ranging from “strongly agree” (coded 5) to “strongly disagree” (coded 
1). I also add a “don’t know” response option for each question in the survey. For 
survey questions on which I do not use the five point Likert scale, I indicate how I 
coded the responses in the text of this chapter where I present the relevant data. In the 
tables, I use an asterisk to denote significant difference182 wherever applicable. I use a 
10% threshold as a measure of significance. This means that the results presented as 
significant can be replicated 90% of the time.   
4.2 Main findings from prison interviews  
I present below my main findings from these interviews. First, for both confessed and 
non-confessed, the RPF government is seen as powerful and discriminatory; a 
predatory power to be feared. In their view, the long history of the country can be 
summed up as a violent struggle for power between Hutu and Tutsi elites with power 
alternating between them for finite durations of time. The military victory of the RPF 
is perceived by them to mean the return of rule by Tutsi elites. The RPF government is 
likened to Tutsi-dominated regimes of the past in which Hutu were unequal and 
oppressed. From these beliefs about the nature of Tutsi rule in general, there is a 
pervasive fear that the government wants to induce confessions so that it may target 
those individuals for indiscriminate punishment.   
Second, for both confessed and non-confessed there is a belief that RPF elites have 
committed serious crimes against Hutu during the civil war and after, for which they 
have not been held to account. A direct result of this is that they believe that RPF 
elites do not have the moral authority to rule because they are guilty of rights 
violations.  
                                                 
182 A p value of 0.09 or less represents a significant difference in the means of the groups being 
compared.  
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Indirectly this feeds into pre-existing negative stereotypes183 they hold about Tutsi 
elites, specifically that Tutsi elites are manipulative and ruthless in their pursuit of 
power. This brings me to my third finding. I do not find evidence of eliminationist 
sentiments, genocide denial or lack of remorse although there do exist for both 
confessed and non-confessed mental maps about negative stereotypes of Tutsi. There 
was one individual in my entire sample who displayed an intense anger and bitterness 
toward Tutsi as a group.184 But on the whole, my respondents were careful to 
distinguish between ordinary Tutsi and Tutsi elites. The former, they argued, had 
suffered enormously as a consequence of genocide and needed support to help them 
rebuild their lives. Some respondents ventured that as many as “eighty percent” of 
their Tutsi victims had been innocent instead of being collaborators of the RPF as they 
had been told during the civil war. They frequently repeated that there had been “no 
problem” between ordinary Hutu and Tutsi before the war and genocide.185 There is 
                                                 
183 The Bahutu Manifesto penned by a nascent Hutu elite in 1959 is a good example of the perceptions 
about Tutsi rule in general. The Manifesto spoke about “immutable historical differences” between 
Hutu and Tutsi, painting in broad brush strokes the characteristics of Tutsi as an ethnic group and 
making the case for overthrow of the Tutsi-dominated monarchy. For the full text, see F. 
Nkundabagenzi (1961), pp20-29. A more contemporary document that discusses inter-ethnic relations 
(among other things) is a report on an in-house symposium organized by the Catholic Church after the 
genocide.  There was a session on the long standing stereotypes about essentialized collective ethnic 
characteristics of the ‘other’ held by Hutu and Tutsi alike. See Sinode igeze he mu madiyosezi yose 
[How Far Is the Synod in All Dioceses?] (1999, April 12-15), pp21-24  
184 “If I steal a dog from a Tutsi, I will not return it. I will hide the dog, or kill it… and throw it down a 
toilet- but I will not return it and I will never confess to taking the dog”; “The relation between Hutu 
and Tutsi is eternal, like the relation between a cat and a mouse. Wherever a cat finds a mouse- in a 
corner, on the wall, in the ceiling- it will kill it. Do you imagine we don’t all know that? We all know it 
is so”. After a while, he retreats from these statements by saying, “But it is not necessary that this has to 
be so…After all, Hutu are the ones who accused me. There were no Tutsi to tell what I did”     
185 In his analysis of the causes of the Rwandan genocide, Scott Straus shows that there was “strong 
evidence of interethnic cooperation before the genocide”….He continues, “Yet something 
changed…perpetrators substituted the Tutsi category for the individuals they were attacking….This 
idea of “Tutsi=enemy” is impossible without some preexisting, society-wide, and resonant notion of 
ethnic categories. The categories matter” See Scott Straus (2006), p9. That ethnic attitudes matter is 
supported by the findings of other researchers. Omar Mc Doom argues that mass mobilization “required 
a mindset – the internalization of a set of historical and ideological beliefs – within the Hutu population. 
These were predominantly beliefs in a historical Hutu oppression at the hands of Tutsi and in an 
ideological definition of the ongoing civil war as an ethnic one, a Tutsi attempt to reinstate this 
historical order.” See Omar Mc Doom (2005). My data show that the ethnic generalizations continue 
but are projected onto Tutsi elites for the most part.    
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however a tendency to present survivors as beneficiaries of the RPF government.186 
Competing claims are made for compensation to Hutu victims.    
My fourth finding is that those individuals confess who have more information 
exposed against them. This suggests that the decision to confess is made after taking 
an exogenous factor (information exposure) into account. In support of this 
interpretation, I find that the majority of the confessed have held out for numerous 
years before they stepped forward with a confession. It indicates a tendency to wait it 
out and assess the situation before proceeding with a confession. This explanation 
makes sense also in light of the responses to earlier questions. The accused fear that 
their confessions might be used to single them out for retribution by the government. I 
heard repeatedly that gacaca was a “trick” or a “Tutsi trick” to pressure people to 
confess in anticipation of reductions that would not materialize. “It (the government) 
entices us to confess because of its future plans…It (confessing) would be a serious 
mistake”. 187  
They were not likely to confess unless pressured by an exogenous factor, in this 
case, exposure caused by accumulated information against them. It was common to 
hear from those who had confessed that “many people had testified against me 
already”188 or “I was openly accused”.189 One confessed prisoner said that although he 
                                                 
186 Ordinary Tutsi may not be immune from the dangers of collective ethnic categorization especially in 
times of insecurity and fear. Ordinary Tutsi were perceived as the natural beneficiaries in historical 
periods when Tutsi elites have been dominant. In the Hutu Revolution of 1959 that overthrew Tutsi elite 
rule, ordinary Tutsi were not spared from persecution. During genocide, ordinary Tutsi were believed to 
be accomplices of the RPF rebels who were led by the progeny of exiled Tutsi elites. In his analysis of 
original data, McDoom argues that “Overwhelmingly Hutu respondents believed that Tutsi were treated 
more favourably under monarchic rule by the mwami [king] (75%), and also under colonial rule by the 
Belgians (68%) Similarly the quasi-feudal relationship of ubuhake prevalent during the reign of the 
Tutsi monarchy was remembered as an oppression forced upon the Hutu (85%). Tutsi were generally 
remembered as being at the top of the social hierarchy, usually the shebuja (patron or master), while the 
Hutu was the mugaragu (vassal or servant) (85%). It is widely believed that Hutu received unjustified 
and cruel punishment from the Tutsi in the form of the ingoyi, the whip.” Omar Mc Doom (2005), p18.  
187 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 52 years old, prison K. 9 September 2004  
188 Confessed prisoner, male, 49 years old, prison K. 14 September 2004  
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had been accused of killing five people, he had confessed to stealing only some iron 
sheets but “as more witnesses give evidence in gacaca, (I) could become even 
category one”.190 When I asked a prisoner who had not confessed why more people 
had not confessed, he replied, “You confess when there are testimonies against 
you”.191 Another said he would confess when there were “at least three witnesses” 
against him.192 Yet another respondent said, “Non confession is not a solution for 
those who are guilty because the truth can be known from testimony in gacaca even if 
they (prisoners) reach a deal among themselves to remain silent.”193 Witness 
testimony in gaccaca and betrayal confessions among the accused are the two main 
mechanisms by which information on the accused is generated.194 It is hard to judge a 
priori which pieces of information that emerge by means of betrayal confessions and 
witness testimony in gacaca are true and which are false but the main point here is that 
the more information is generated against an accused individual, the more likely he 
will be to confess.  
My fifth finding shows that both the confessed and the non-confessed were aware of 
the sentence reductions and able to reason through its basic provisions on penalties. 
They knew that if they were to be found guilty without having confessed, the penalties 
would be severe. It is a rational move for those who sense they have been sufficiently 
exposed to confess in order to hope for advantages of lower sentences.  
Despite the rationality of a confession at this point, the confessed are still fearful of 
being targeted with retribution. “This government is like a leopard waiting to pounce 
                                                                                                                                            
189 Confessed prisoner, male, 38 years old, prison PCK, 20 August 2004  
190 Confessed prisoner, male, 42 years old, prison K. 7 September 2004   
191 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 38 years old, prison K, 6 September 2004  
192 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 42 years old, prison K, 2 September 2004 
193 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 30 years old, prison PCK. 30 August 2004  
194 The following chapters show how this information that is generated may not always be true.   
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on its prey”, said a confessed prisoner explaining how vulnerable he felt.195  A report 
by the organization Penal Reform International describes the fear experienced by the 
confessed who had been taken to a solidarity camp196 (ingando) after which they were 
supposed to be provisionally released. The report quotes one of the confessed whose 
views, according to the report’s authors, were typical of others who had confessed and 
were transiting through the solidarity camps in anticipation of release. “The ingando 
was to have lasted two months, but due to the commemorations of the genocide, which 
were to be held in April 2003, another month was added, which disappointed many 
participants. It was during this additional month of April that some of the prisoners 
were sent back to prison, explaining that a mistake had been made about their cases. 
This caused general panic! When the Prosecution’s car was seen, some people would 
hide. It was in this state of tension that the participants lived until the closure of the 
ingando in May 2003. At their release, some received their identity cards but others 
did not. The latter were taken back to prison after spending another night in the 
camp.”197  
                                                 
195 Confessed prisoner, male, 42 years old, prison K. 7 September 2004   
196 Ingando are camps where specific groups of people (confessed prisoners transiting through the 
camps before being provisionally released, pre-college students, and demobilized soldiers of the 
previous government returning from exile) are lectured on RPF doctrine on patriotism, history, the 
ethnic question, defects of genocidal regime and national unity. Regarding Ingando for ex-combatants, 
one scholar argues that “the proclaimed government “loyalty” of ex-combatants recently returned from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo…may be a tradeoff for peaceful repatriation.” Chi MgBako (2005), 
p203 
See also a list of topics taught at the solidarity camps. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission: 
(2000, January 20). The topics include: Philosophy (origin of life, man and consciousness; law of 
dialectics; process of cognition); political economy; political science (liberation movements; RPF 
struggle, patriotism and nationalism, Pan-Africanism); history (case study of Rwanda; human rights and 
justice in Rwanda; gacaca courts); leadership optics (democracy and good governance, law, structure 
and functions of government; corruption); mobilization and topical issues (mass mobilization and cadre 
ship; role of people in national security; who is our enemy and who is our ally?; peace unity and 
reconciliation in Rwanda; role of youth in development; revolutionary discipline and methods of work).  
  
197 Penal Reform International (2004, May), p21   
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How do the confessed respond to this wrenching fear? This brings me to my sixth 
and final finding: the confessed demonstrate their loyalty by shifting responsibility 
onto other actors for crimes committed during the periods that Tutsi elites were in 
power or fighting for power.  I find significant and systematic differences between the 
confessed and non-confessed in allocating responsibility for crimes perpetrated in the 
recent past as well as the historic problems handed down from the more distant past. 
The confessed exonerate Tutsi elites while the non-confessed choose to exonerate 
Hutu elites blaming instead the RPF for genocide and blaming the Tutsi regimes of the 
past for other historic problems. The non-confessed go even further emphasizing the 
role of ordinary Hutu in the genocide (that is, people like themselves) at the expense 
of holding Hutu elites accountable. The non-confessed use the legitimacy conferred 
upon Hutu elites to demand political negotiations at elite level.  
While the responses of the non-confessed on allocation of responsibility are not 
surprising in light of the findings above, the responses of those who have confessed 
are puzzling. They have, like the non-confessed, already stated that RPF elites are 
discriminatory and oppressive much like the periods of Tutsi rule that predated 
colonialism. They believed, along with the non-confessed, that Tutsi elites were 
manipulative and could not be trusted. Like the non-confessed, they too believed that 
the RPF was guilty of war crimes that it had not accounted for; therefore they did not 
have the moral authority to rule. Yet they praised RPF elites for being “wise” and for 
its “good rule”. The confessed refused to hold RPF elites responsible for the troubles 
of the recent past. Sixty three percent of the confessed had said self defense against the 
RPF invasion was an important cause of genocide, but only 28% said it was the 
primary cause. They also declined to hold Tutsi elites in prior periods responsible for 
the troubled historical legacy. Ninety three percent of the confessed believed that a 
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power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites was responsible for the historical legacy 
of violence, but on a specific question on the origins of that power struggle, 64% 
deflected responsibility onto colonial powers or Hutu elites.  
The most plausible interpretation is to see this as an outcome of the act of 
confession. While my sample is too small to conclusively determine cause and effect, 
this interpretation makes sense in light of what we already know about the fears 
surrounding confession and the finding that the accused are likely to confess under the 
pressure of exposure. The ‘consent-effect’ is a rational strategy of vulnerable people 
who have confessed hesitantly to present themselves as compliant and loyal to reduce 
the risk of being targeted for excessive punishment.   
Here is an example of a volte-face from one of the confessed: 198 
On the pre-colonial past:  
“There were Hutu-Tutsi problems in the past…The problem was that greedy leaders 
(Tutsi elites) wanted to rule forever…” 
Versus 
On responsibility for the source of historic problems:  
“Colonialists left Rwanda with divisions that they (colonialists) had created leaving us 
in perpetual conflict”  
On the RPF and genocide:  
“Yes, Interahamwe199 committed genocide….but genocide happened because Tutsi 
soldiers had attacked the country. There is no other reason why they (Tutsi victims) 
were killed… Also, the RPF killed a young man I knew”   
                                                 
198 Confessed prisoner, male, 39 years old, prison PCK, 16 August 2004  
199 The leading Hutu militia during genocide; it means “those who attack together”  
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Versus  
On the present situation:  
“There are no problems between Hutu and Tutsi now…The government teaches 
reconciliation…Whoever has merits and ability should rule”  
Here is another example200: 
On the pre-colonial past: 
“There was discrimination against Hutu. Client ship relations exploited Hutu. It 
existed before colonialism” 
Versus 
On responsibility for the source of historic problems: 
“Bad relations between Hutu and Tutsi has historical roots…Colonialism exploited 
Hutu and oriented Hutu anger toward all Tutsi” 
On the RPF and genocide: 
“They (RPF) did not target all Hutu but there were massacres…Today in Rwanda we 
have bad leadership…There should be a day of remembrance for Hutu who 
died…They (RPF) tell lies…It is bad leadership that is responsible for genocide, so 
the events of 1994 may occur again” 
Versus  
On the present: 
“If this political program continues, the country will develop…the government’s goal 
is not to punish but to reconcile…” He continues tongue-in-cheek, “Even the one who 
                                                 
200 Confessed prisoner, male, 48 years old, prison PCK. 24 August 2004  
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committed genocide is welcomed back and his property is returned to him before he is 
arrested.”  
The report by Penal Reform International is full of quotes from the confessed that 
were on the verge of provisional release and participating in the solidarity camps. It is 
striking how similar the confessed are to the responses I have detailed above. A 
confessed individual said to a Rwandan researcher working for the organization, 
“They (RPF) spoke of the way the colonizers handled the issue of ethnicity. But we do 
not agree with that…One of us asked if it was true. But he was looked at 
disapprovingly….In my opinion, the separation (between ethnic groups) did exist. I 
cannot deny that they existed, and I would not say that it was the bazungu (white 
men/foreigners), the colonizers, who brought this. It is what is said today, it is what is 
taught to children nowadays, it is what is taught in the reconciliation camps, etc. I 
shall never agree that the situation was only created when white men arrived. The 
situation already existed…. Serfdom existed before the White Man arrived … But it 
was aggravated by the politics imposed by the White Man….Those who should be 
condemned are the colonizers and the old regime. But first and foremost the 
colonizers…”201  
They don’t believe that colonial power was primarily responsible but end with 
affirming the primary role of the colonizer, sidestepping the role of Tutsi elites. The 
confessed thus tend to dissemble and are eager to appease those in power.202 This is 
                                                 
201 Penal Reform International (2004, May), p22  
202 The authors of the report worry that “the courses (rewriting history to underpin that Tutsi elites are 
unaccountable) will have a direct impact on the beliefs, attitudes and behavior of the people who attend 
them” (p23, p38) I would argue that these courses   meant only for the confessed are not embraced 
uncritically and do not substantively change their pre-existing views. But there is a tendency to voice 
whatever version is politically expedient. The narratives above show that this is voiced despite 
disbelief. Further, this tendency is displayed among the confessed in my sample, none of whom had 
been exposed to Ingando before. This shows that fear and self-interest after a confession are sufficient 
conditions to produce the ‘consent-effect’.  
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evinced by a refusal to hold the RPF specifically and Tutsi elites more generally 
accountable. In addition, there is a tendency to praise the regime and speak in 
celebratory terms even though they do not believe ruling elites have the moral 
authority to rule. 
4.3  Testing explanations  
I generate hypotheses from a number of distinct literatures and I test those to examine 
why the accused decide to confess or to refrain from confessing.  
A considerable literature has emerged since the 1990s on accountability for human 
rights violations committed in times of war and peace. There are a few core arguments 
at the heart of this body of work. There is an emphasis on “truth” to distinguish a new 
regime as morally authoritative and set it apart from the old. “Truth” as a human right 
is intrinsically valuable203 as also required to identify perpetrators and neutralize their 
influence on public life.204 These arguments are bolstered by the literature on “blame 
attribution” in political psychology, key arguments of which have been tested by 
socio-legal scholars and more recently by political scientists.205 Peoples’ perceptions 
of the “truth”, their assessments about the motives of relevant political actors and their 
judgments about allocation of responsibility matter because it affects peoples’ 
evaluation of and response to those actors’ claims to political power. Without a full 
accounting of the past, people are likely to resist the new order of things because it is 
perceived as less than legitimate.  
                                                 
203 “Right to truth” upheld by Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, drawing on key articles of 
the American Convention on Human Rights and first applied to key cases in the late 90s, related to 
Chile, El Salvador, Ecuador and Guatemala. It is used more and more as a yardstick against which to 
assess the transitional justice mechanisms being adopted. See for instance, a report on the impunity 
measures being considered by the Colombian legislature. Colombian Commission of Jurists,(2005, June 
14)    
204 Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena eds. (2006), p3  
205 See for example, James L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws (1999, September)    
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The accusations against the RPF have been muted within Rwanda. The ruling elites’ 
response for many years was to deny that atrocities and war crimes had occurred; it 
later acknowledged that these happened but argued these were inevitable given that 
they had been fighting the forces of genocide. The occurrence of these atrocities, their 
scale and intent remain shrouded in secrecy. External observers have commented that 
recent Rwandan history is not one of good guys or bad guys; they were all bad guys.206 
Some of this debate has played out in circles hostile to the RPF who claim that the 
latter are guilty and do not enjoy credibility. I wanted to see if those who had 
confessed thought that the RPF had not committed atrocities against Hutu civilians 
and were therefore morally authoritative. They are then more likely to respond to the 
law cooperatively.207 In contrast, perhaps those who resisted confession believed 
ruling elites were guilty of abuses and therefore illegitimate.  
Hypothesis one:  
Individuals confessed because they thought that ruling elites had not committed war 
crimes or other rights violations against unarmed Hutu and are therefore legitimate.  
Narratives of history can shape how discourses of grievance, victimization and 
entitlement emerge. These are stable and available for mobilization by political 
entrepreneurs.208 In academic and non-academic writing on Rwanda, the most 
commonly used frame of analysis has been in terms of a ‘Hutu-Tutsi conflict’ 
embedded within narratives of mutual oppression over several distinct time periods in 
history.209 This is pertinent because narratives about the distant past have been used by 
                                                 
206 Stephen Smith (1996, February 22) ; James C. McKinley Jr. (1997, December 21); Jonathan Curiel 
(2005, May 15) ; Abdul Joshua Ruzibiza (2005); Robin Philpot (2006, June)    
207 Tom Tyler and Jen Huo (2002) Their central argument is that “willingness to comply critically 
depends upon a strong sense that legal authorities are legitimate”.   
208 See for example, Jeffrey K. Olick (1998); A. James. McAdams (2001); Andrei S. Markovits and 
Simon Reich (1997); Marshall S. Clough (1998)   
209 For a recent academic work in this vein, see Mahmood Mamdani (2001)  
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ruling elites at different times in Rwanda to delegitimize political opponents and 
cement their claims to power.  
For Hutu elites in the First and Second Republics, the “ethnic temptation” was 
irresistible. The fact that 85% of the population was Hutu presented them with a low 
cost, almost automatic route to power.210 Ethnic politics guaranteed Hutu elites an 
electoral majority, so they invested politically in institutionalizing an ideology of 
racial difference, couched in a narrative about the historic oppressions suffered by 
Hutu under Tutsi elites that predated colonial rule. In contrast, RPF elites have 
presented the pre-colonial past as a time of unity and peaceful co-existence under the 
King’s rule, a period of calm that was rudely disrupted by the colonial powers that 
played a politics of divide-and-rule, introduced the race-based census and extracted 
burdensome taxes from Hutu.   
How did the accused assess earlier periods of rule? In particular, did they believe 
earlier periods of rule by Tutsi elites were just?   
Hypothesis two:  
Individuals confessed because they believed that the pre-colonial past was a period of 
benign rule by Tutsi elites, and were therefore more likely to trust the regime.  
I test two broad sets of arguments about identity and its relationship to conflict.211 A 
primordialist approach emphasizes that identities are fixed and biologically 
determined; in this view, the conflict cleavage is pre-determined and non-negotiable. 
A different approach is constructivist of which there are many variants but the core 
argument is that identities are more fluid than biologically fixed, shaped over time and 
not necessarily exclusive. The RPF project of national unity and reconciliation is 
                                                 
210 On the “ethnic temptation” of 85% population being Hutu, see Jean Pierre Chretien (1997)  
211 For a nice overview, see Kanchan Chandra, (Winter 2001)  
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underpinned by claims about the class- based origins and fluidity of Hutu-Tutsi 
identities which allowed both groups to live together in peace until the advent of the 
colonial power.212 These ideas about occupational difference as the basis for identity 
have existed for a long time. The RPF has sought to use these ideas to make a case for 
the historic unity between Hutu and Tutsi. There are also traditional myths about the 
common origins of Hutu and Tutsi as there is also a long standing narrative about 
biological difference as the basis of group identity. This narrative about racial 
difference was instrumentalized by the Hutu regimes to make a case for the inevitable 
conflict between Hutu and Tutsi.  
Hypothesis three:  
Individuals who confessed were more likely to perceive ethnic identities as non-
antagonistic, and therefore more likely to believe that the RPF regime dominated by 
Tutsi was not hostile.   
The literature on genocide explains what drove ordinary people to violence and 
although it is not the purpose of this research to explain why ordinary Hutu 
participated in killing, the project does attempt to understand the causes behind 
individual choices to participate or refrain from participating in the trials process.  It 
may be that among the reasons that drove them to violence, there are a few that 
motivate the decision to refrain from confessing. RPF elites certainly place a great 
deal of weight on “genocide ideology” Similar cultural or attitudinal explanations, 
such as German eliminationist anti-Semitism, have been proposed to explain the 
Holocaust.213 A watered-down version of this may be ‘simply’ ethnic hatred. Research 
findings in Rwanda and other contexts however have shown that perpetrators were not 
                                                 
212 Report by Government of Rwanda (1999, August)   
213 For instance, see Daniel Goldhagen (1996) 
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culturally inclined towards eliminationism or animated by a virulent hatred of the 
ethnic ‘other’.   
Hypothesis four: 
Those who have confessed are less likely to demonstrate strong anti-Tutsi attitudes, 
and are therefore more likely to be favorable toward the regime.    
Sociological explanations for popular participation in the genocide in Rwanda 
center on the role of social networks that enabled perpetrators to mobilize their 
friends, neighbors and family members.214 Is there evidence that the same social 
networks might be responsible for producing confessions? The law required that those 
who confessed must denounce their accomplices. Perhaps an individual was more 
likely to confess if many network members had also confessed generating 
denunciations against him in the process.  Here, the number of network members who 
have confessed is used as a proxy for information exposure.  
Hypothesis five: 
Individuals were more likely to confess if they had higher numbers of friends and 
acquaintances from their community in prison who had confessed. 
There are vast literatures on crime, deterrence and contracts which suggest that an 
actor is more likely to comply with an agreement if it believes that the other party both 
intends to and will be able to keep its side of the bargain.215  This question of assessing 
the intentions of ruling elites (whether they can be trusted, whether they are likely to 
                                                 
214 Lee Ann Fujii (2006); see also Charles Mironko (2005). p189. His research on Hutu death squads 
(ibitero) shows also that Hutu moved about in groups of people many of whom known to one another; 
Jean Hatzfeld (2005). Hatzfeld interviewed a group of prisoners who had confessed who had been 
friends before the genocide and remained on good terms after confessing.  
215 For a good overview, see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (1993, Spring); David F. 
Luckenbill (1982, March), p821  
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be hostile etc) underlies hypotheses 2-5 above. Nevertheless, I frame this as a separate 
hypothesis here to reinforce the findings from the above.  
Hypothesis six: 
Individuals confessed because they were more likely to assess that the government 
intended reconciliation and was powerful enough to keep its side of the guilty plea 
bargain.   
 
4.4 Overview of the sample of respondents:  
 
Table 4.1: Sample of respondents 
 
N=18 N=20 
TABLE 4.1 
C (in %) NC (in %) 
peasants 50 45 
govt clerk 5.5 10 
manual jobs 33.3 25 
NGO 5.5 5 
education 5.5 10 
artistic 0 0 
Occupation 
commerce 0 5 
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Table 4.1 continued 
 
N=18 N=20 
 
C (in %) NC (in %) 
Adventist 27.7 10 
Pentecostal 16.6 5 
Protestant(Other) 5.5 10 
Muslim 11.1 5 
Religion* 
Catholic 38.8 70 
Illiterate 50 25 
Primary 5.5 10 
Middle 22.2 25 
Secondary 16.6 25 
Sr. Secondary 0 15 
College 5.5 0 
Education 
Other 0 0 
MRND (ruling party) 16.6 30 
MDR (opposition party) 5.5 15 
CDR (Hutu extremist party) 5.5 0 
Political party 
(1994) 
None 72.2 55 
 
The majority of non-confessed are Catholic (70%) while for the confessed, the 
number of those who belong to Protestant Churches (49.8%) is slightly higher those 
who belong to the Catholic Church (38.8%). The difference is statistically significant 
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[T test (p=.07)].216 I do not systematically investigate the effect of religious beliefs on 
the decision to confess or not to confess but I discuss some possible implications in 
the following paragraphs.   
All the Churches in Rwanda had been supportive of Habyarimana’s MRND 
government and the Catholic Church more deeply so as the Archbishop was close to 
the President’s inner circle and a member of the MRND central committee.217 The 
Catholic Church had also supported the Hutu revolution of 1959218 and stands accused 
by the RPF regime of being complicit in the genocide.219 The tense relations between 
the Catholic Church leadership and the RPF regime are reported to be gradually 
improving.220 Nevertheless, representatives of the Catholic Church were notably 
absent at an inter-faith meeting on reconciliation that was held between Rwandan 
religious leaders and a visiting delegation of the South African Council of Churches. 
The latter reported that their meeting with Rwandan faith communities was the “least 
satisfying” part of their visit. The report noted the divisions between the various 
Christian Churches and mentioned that a courtesy visit to a leader of the Catholic 
Church in Rwanda was brief and no mention was made of the genocide or of the 
Church’s role in it.221  
                                                 
216 Coding: Catholic=0; Protestant=1; Muslim=2  
217 Phillip Cantrell (2007), p336  
218 Phillip Cantrell (2007), p335   
219 Several prominent Catholic leaders, lower ranked priests and nuns of the Catholic Church have been 
accused. Some have been tried and found guilty in Belgium, at the International Criminal Tribunal at 
Arusha and in the gacaca courts. The Catholic Church however has maintained that individual priests, 
not the institution of the Church as a whole, can be held responsible. See for example, Stephanie 
Nieuwoudt (2006, December). In fact, the RPF government has recently accused the Vatican funded 
radio station of broadcasting only 2 news items on the commemoration of the Rwandan genocide 
(which lasts a week) despite the fact that the station broadcasts 24 hours. See Rwanda News Agency 
(2008, April 15).  
220 US Department of State(2005)  
221 South African Council of Churches (2005)  
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However, the Catholic Church has formally extended general support for the gacaca 
process. It was not the Catholic Church but the Protestant Pentecostal Church that was 
targeted for criticism by a Parliamentary Commission report for preaching genocide 
ideology and divisionism.222   
Against this background, a few points are important to note: First, religion has not 
historically been a politically salient cleavage in Rwanda. Regionalism and ethnicity 
have been more politically consequential.  Second, it may be hypothesized that Church 
affiliation influences political attitudes. In this project, however, I examine a wide 
array of political attitudes on which I find that the confessed and non-confessed do not 
differ in a statistically significant manner on core political values. Finally, 69% of the 
confessed and 84% of the non-confessed believed that their religion was an important 
factor that convinced them reconciliation and forgiveness was necessary. Despite 
variation in religious affiliation, it appears that for the majority of both the confessed 
and the non-confessed, their assessment of the demands of their religious beliefs 
seems to be largely the same.    
None of the arguments above are conclusive. It is likely that the impact of religious 
beliefs on confession is not direct or straightforward and would require a deeper 
investigation. My findings from the study suggest that the accused feel guilty 
(regardless of whether they have confessed or not confessed) but they hesitate 
nevertheless to step forward with a confession because of the fear of indiscriminate 
punishment by ruling elites. The ‘consent-effect’ on which the confessed and the non-
confessed differ significantly is produced not by differences in core political attitudes 
but by the need of those who have confessed to  signal their loyalty to reduce the 
                                                 
222 Amnesty International (2004, July 6)  
                                                                                                                        
 91  
likelihood that ruling elites may not follow through with the promised sentence 
reductions.  
In terms of education, half the confessed in my sample are illiterate as compared to 
a quarter of the non-confessed, but overall the difference between the confessed and 
the non-confessed in terms of education is not statistically significant [T-test (p= 
.12)].223 They are also similar in terms of occupation [T-test (p=.77)].224  
I asked a series of four questions in order of increasing difficulty to check if there 
were differences in their knowledge of the law or understanding of its provisions.225 
For each response, the difference between the confessed and non-confessed is not 
statistically significant (table 4.2).226 I find that a majority of prisoners were able to 
broadly and accurately compare reductions and think through the basic logic of the 
law.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
223 Coding: Illiterate= 0; Literate=1. If we do not reduce the various levels of education to the 
literacy/illiteracy dichotomous variable, then the p value is still statistically insignificant at p= .15  
224 Coding: Manual labor= 1; peasants=2; other (jobs that require formal education)= 3  
225 Questions #1 and #2 were straightforward, presenting respondents with the number of years an 
accused could expect in sentence reductions if he confessed. I asked them to verify if the reductions just 
read out to them were accurate as per the law. Predominant majorities for both confessed and non-
confessed prisoners responded correctly. Questions #3 and #4 were more complicated. For instance, 
question #3 asked them to verify sentence reductions for those who had killed without intending to 
cause death and #4 asked respondents to compare sentence reductions across categories. The responses 
for #3 show that for both confessed and non-confessed prisoners, less than one third of respondents 
answer correctly when probed about minute details on reductions for mitigating circumstances.  
226 Coding: Correct response= 1; Incorrect response=2  
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Table 4.2:  Responses on knowledge of the law 
 
The reasons for this are the following: Prisoners are lectured on the law and its 
incentives for confession rather than handed the legal document to study on their own. 
In these overcrowded prisons where the inmates are not housed separately by the 
category of crime they are accused of, prisoners with various educational backgrounds 
mingle and discuss the law among themselves exchanging information and learning 
from one another. This point was confirmed by an independent researcher working 
with prisoners in Rwanda. As most prisoners have spent a number of years in prison, 
there are opportunities to develop a better understanding of the law over time by 
means of cumulative discussions among themselves and repeated “sensitization” 
sessions organized by Ministry of Justice officials and prison authorities. It is likely 
that formal schooling or lack of it does not have a significant impact on their 
understanding of the logic and substance of the rewards and penalties regarding 
confession.   
Law Qs #1 Law Qs #2 Law Qs # 3 Law Qs # 4 
N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 
TABLE 4.2: 
Knowledge of 
incentives C (%) NC (%) C (%) NC (%) C (%) NC (%) C (%) NC (%) 
Correct answer 87.5 80 81.25 90 25 15 68.75 65 
Incorrect answer 6.25 0 12.5 0 43.75 55 12.5 5 
Said “Don’t know” 6.25 20 6.25 10 31.25 30 18.75 30 
T-test p= .33 p= .16 p = .44 p= .52 
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New research on education supports these arguments. The assumption that a basic 
level of schooling is required for all further learning is being questioned. It finds that 
“adults learn through doing, not in preparation for doing”.227 Difficult words, concepts 
and techniques can be learnt by adults without necessarily beginning with simple and 
standardized learning as long as those difficult words and concepts are meaningful in 
the context of some immediately relevant activity or occupation. Words and concepts 
are not difficult in themselves and adult learners can cope with them so long as they 
fall within the realm of their usable experience. In India, for example, a group of 
women without formal education worked their way through a hand pump manual 
without needing to refer to a literacy primer.228 In a project in the Dominican 
Republic, children who did not have access to formal schooling learnt roughly the 
same content in 1 hour of radio instruction that their counterparts in formal schools 
learnt in 3-4 hours of instruction by following up on the radio lesson with stories and 
open-ended discussions.229 New understandings of the difference between formal 
schooling and literacy (understanding, reasoning and application specific to an 
occupation or life situation) are being applied in a variety of projects around the 
developing world by governments in partnership with UNESCO.  
Turning to political affiliation, I find that the bulk of the confessed (72%) claimed 
not to have been affiliated with any political party at the time of genocide as compared 
to 55% of the non-confessed. This is not a statistically significant difference [T-test 
(p=.37)]. 230  
 
                                                 
227 Alan Rogers (2005)  
228 Alan Rogers (2005)  
229 Literacy Projects, RADECO, Dominican Republic.  
230 Coding: No party= 0; MRND=1; other parties=2 
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Existing research shows that there were regional specificities in the way genocide 
unfolded not only across provinces but also within the same district of a given 
province.231 The sample offsets to a small extent the danger of a regional bias even 
though the two prisons are situated in Kigali. The respondents originate in different 
provinces, and even when they are from the same province, they come from different 
districts and sectors.   
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of respondents by province 
TABLE 4.3 N=18 N=20 N= 38 
Provinces C (in %) NC (in %) Total (in %) 
Kigali 55.5 60 57.8 
Kigali Rurale 22.2 25 23.6 
Umutara 5.5 0 2.6 
Kibungo 11.1 10 10.5 
Ruhengeri 5.5 5 5.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
231 See Timothy Longman (1995). He explains how genocide unfolded differently in neighboring 
districts in Kibuye prefecture.   
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Table 4.4: District-wise distribution of respondents from Kigali 
 
TABLE 4.4 N=10 N=12 N=22 
Districts of respondents from Kigali C (in %) NC (in %) Total (in %) 
Nyarugenge 50 50 50 
Nyamirambo 30 0 13.6 
Gikondo 10 8.3 9.1 
Kanombe 10 0 4.5 
Kicukiro 0 16.6 9.1 
Kacyiru 0 8.3 4.5 
Gisozi 0 8.3 4.5 
Butamwa 0 8.3 4.5 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Sector-wise distribution of respondents from one district in Kigali 
 
TABLE 4.5 N=5 N=6 N=11 
Sector-wise distribution of respondents from 
Nyarugenge district, Kigali 
C (in %) NC (in %) Total (in %) 
Cyahafi 40 0 18.2 
Nyamirambo 40 16.7 27.2 
Kimisagara 20 16.7 18.2 
Biryogo 0 33.3 18.2 
Gasyata 0 16.7 9.1 
Nybanda 0 16.6 9.1 
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4.5 The findings   
4.5.1 Guilt and moral authority      
I find that the majority of both confessed and non-confessed agreed that the RPF had 
committed war crimes against Hutu even though they admitted that RPF soldiers had 
not intended to kill all Hutu or even kill all those in the Hutu militia (interahamwe) 
that was most active in perpetrating genocide (Table 4.6). One confessed prisoner put 
it this way, “RPF does not accept its role…yet it wants to punish us and then tell us we 
are reconciled…We are not fooled…”232 They agreed that war crimes against Hutu  
 
Table 4.6: Perceptions on the occurrence of and responsibility for war crimes and 
genocide 
                                                 
232 Interview with confessed prisoner, male, 63 years old, prison PCK, 23 August 2004.  
Interahamwe 
targeted all Tutsi 
for death 
Interahamwe 
targeted 
moderate Hutu 
for death 
RPF targeted all 
Interahamwe for 
death 
RPF targeted all 
Hutu for death 
N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 
TABLE 4.6:  
In your 
understanding, what 
really happened in 
1994? 
C % NC % C % NC % C % NC % C % NC % 
Yes 75 60 100 85 18.75 25 18.75 5 
Perhaps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No 12.5 25 0 15 75 55 81.25 80 
Don’t know 12.5 15 0 0 6.25 20 0 15 
T-test p= .13 p= .15 p= .52 p = .20 
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had occurred without denying that genocide against Tutsi had also occurred. “If I was 
a judge, I would punish both sides but this government denies the deaths of Hutu…An 
official from the Parquet came and some prisoners asked him what would happen to 
the bones of Hutu who died. He (the official) said, “When you come to power, then 
you can look for those bones but now we will only look for the bones of Tutsi to bury 
them””233; “RPF soldiers killed Hutu in revenge…but they did not target all Hutu. 
That is why it was not genocide...At least 100,000 Hutu died in revenge killings, so 
Hutu also need help”234; “Inkotanyi (RPF) killed those who had committed genocide 
or those who were falsely accused of committing genocide…It was a quick way of 
punishing perpetrators.”235  
It is noteworthy that the majority of the confessed and non-confessed were able to 
agree on the historical occurrence of both genocide and war crimes.236 The “war of the 
bullets” and the “war of the machetes” are linked in their experience of how the events 
had unfolded237 even as they are able to distinguish between the intent and 
consequences of both “wars”.  The majority of confessed as well as non-confessed 
also felt that genocide had been a response to the invasion by the RPF (table 4.7).  
The differences between the confessed and non-confessed are not significant as 
shown by the p values in the tables. Both believe that ruling elites do not possess 
moral authority because of abuses perpetrated against Hutu that have not been 
accounted for.   
                                                 
233 Interview with confessed prisoner, male, 50 years old, prison K, 1 September 2004  
234 Confessed prisoner, male, 38 years old, prison PCK, 24 August 2004  
235 Non-confessed prisoner, female, 49 years old, prison PCK. 20 August 2004  
236 Particularly when Tutsi elites deny war crimes, and n some quarters, Hutu elites still deny that 
genocide against Tutsi happened.  
237 Scholars are beginning to make a case for understanding genocide as the product of the strategic 
interaction of actors engaged in war. See Alan J. Kuperman (2004)  
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Table 4.7 Perceptions of genocide as an act of self-defense against RPF aggression 
 
4.5.2 Ideology                                                                                                                        
There was also no evidence to suggest that those who had not confessed were 
animated by some sort of anti-Tutsi hatred or eliminationist intent, or that prisoners 
who had confessed were more positively inclined towards reconciliation.    
Fifty six percent of the confessed and fifty three percent of the non-confessed 
believed that land should be shared by Hutu families with Tutsi who had returned 
from exile. Among the minority who believed there was no a priori obligation to share 
the land, most argued that some land had belonged originally to these Tutsi families 
who had fled the country in 1959, therefore the latter needed to decide whether they 
wanted to share with Hutu or not.  
A majority of both confessed (63%) and non-confessed prisoners (53%) also 
sympathized with the situation of genocide survivors, agreeing that the latter needed 
special support for rehabilitation and recovery. They argued that the manner in which  
Killing of Tutsi as self-defense  against RPF attack 
TABLE 4.7 
C% NC% 
Very important 63% 55% 
Important 0% 0 
Not at all 37% 25% 
Don’t know 0% 20% 
T-test p = .53 
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Tutsi had been systematically targeted had left survivors with nothing and so entitled 
them to special support. Those who disagreed argued that although genocide survivors 
need special support, Hutu victims of atrocities committed by the RPF should get 
equal consideration because their situation was sometimes as desperate as Tutsi 
genocide survivors. The rest maintained that government support should be need-
based without regard for the identity of the victim. Thus, those who disagreed that 
survivors required special support did so not in order to deny survivors what they 
needed but to emphasize that Hutu victims needed aid as well.    
Both confessed (94%) and non-confessed prisoners (74%) said it was important to 
remember genocide. They added that it was important to remember moderate Hutu 
who died in the genocide as well as Hutu killed by the RPF. Those who disagreed 
about the need to commemorate genocide argued that they felt insecure and threatened 
by the manner in which commemoration stirred feelings of anger and grief among 
Tutsi.  
I was surprised to find that half of the sample, from both confessed and non-
confessed agreed that the guilty should be punished, although the bulk of those who 
agreed to punishment wanted greater sentence reductions.238 (Table 4.8)  
 
 
 
                                                 
238 Coding: Punish=1; Amnesty= 0. The acceptance of punishment could have something to do with 
Rwandan tradition in which the usual response to murder has been retaliation in kind. Only the King 
could waive such a punishment. See Francoise Digneffe and Jacques Fierens et al. (2003). Sometimes, 
survivors cite tradition when they express indignation at the reduction of sentences for perpetrators of 
genocide. Ironically, perpetrators too cite tradition to argue that the reduction of sentences must be an 
RPF trick, how else would anyone forgive individuals who murdered so many innocents? See Penal 
Reform International (2007, March),  p28   
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Table 4.8: Perceptions about amnesty and punishment 
TABLE 4.8 N=18 N=20 
In your view, should perpetrators be punished or forgiven? C % NC % 
Punishment as hard lesson 11.11 10 
Further lower punishment 38.89 40 
Amnesty 50 50 
T-test p = 1 
                               
Although all the respondents (100%) expressed a desire for reconciliation, they were 
more pessimistic about the possibility of achieving that outcome. The arguments 
pointed to the impossibility of forgiveness for the kind of crimes that had been 
committed against Tutsi: “They hate us for what we did”239, “I cannot bear to face the 
relatives of those I killed”240 or blamed the government for standing in the way of 
inter-personal reconciliation: “Why can’t the government release prisoners so they can 
meet the victims of their actions and ask for pardon?”241 72% of the confessed and 
79% among the non-confessed believed that reconciliation was possible. They spoke 
of the need for greater personal security, a better livelihood and appeared anxious to 
move on with their lives.   
Respondents, both confessed and non-confessed, expressed negative sentiments 
towards Tutsi who were perceived as powerful. The main target of their anger was 
IBUKA, the umbrella genocide survivors’ organization. A confessed prisoner asked 
rhetorically, “Who rules Kagame? It is IBUKA”.242 Other confessed prisoners 
                                                 
239 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 26 years old, prison K. 3 September 2004  
240 Confessed prisoner, male, 49 years old, prison PCK 20 August 2004  
241 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 42 years old, prison K 2 September 2004  
242 Confessed prisoner, male, 50 years old, prison K, 1 September 2004  
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expressed distrust: “It is all tricks. IBUKA stopped the release of confessed prisoners. 
Its leaders should be put in prison”243; “There is not much effort by the government to 
release those who have confessed. Perhaps this is due to IBUKA. The government 
listens to IBUKA”.244 These sentiments often veer into negative stereotypes of Tutsi in 
general in which Tutsi are portrayed as adept in the art of subtle manipulation: “The 
discrimination against Hutu is there but it is not done openly. There are many 
tricks”245; “I am in prison because I am Hutu…They (government) want to 
use…hundred Tutsi tricks to eliminate innocent people.”246  
In sum, there is little basis on which to conclude that those who have not confessed 
do so because of a generalized hatred of Tutsi or that those who have confessed do so 
because they are more positively inclined towards reconciliation. There are negative 
stereotypes of Tutsi shared by both the confessed and the non-confessed but these are 
projected for the most part onto powerful Tutsi with influence over political life and 
the fate of the accused rather than individual genocide survivors. In fact, the confessed 
are not dissimilar from the non-confessed in their attitudes towards survivors. There is 
guilt and sympathy as also resentment at their perceived entitlements.  
4.5.3 Identity, history and power struggles    
I asked a set of four questions to probe respondents’ perceptions of the basis of the 
group identities. Each question was framed as a short narrative. The first three 
questions asked if Hutu-Tutsi identities were originally based on occupational 
differentiation (Tutsi as cattle keepers and Hutu as peasants), if there had been social 
mobility between the groups and if they believed that both groups descended from the 
                                                 
243 Confessed prisoner, male, 63 years old, prison PCK. 23 August 2004  
244 Confessed prisoner, male, 34 years old, prison PCK, 26 August 2004  
245 Confessed prisoner, male, 34 years old, prison PCK, 26 August 2004  
246 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 49 years old, prison PCK, 10 September 2004  
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same mythical ancestor. I asked if they believed that the colonial regime was to be 
blamed for introducing the idea of racial difference. The fourth question asked if Hutu 
and Tutsi were separate races even before the advent of colonialism.  
Did the confessed view Hutu-Tutsi identities as malleable and non-conflictual while 
the non-confessed believed their identities were premised on immutable differences 
between races?     
In general, the bulk of both confessed and non-confessed prisoners agreed that these 
identities were originally based on occupational specialization. Second, they agreed 
that some degree of social mobility had been present. If a Hutu gained a certain 
number of cows, he could rise in social status and become Tutsi-fied but in their view 
this had not been a very frequent occurrence.  Finally, they believed that the economic 
power of Tutsi had translated into political dominance even before the colonialists 
arrived which had allowed them to exploit Hutu with unpaid labor and 
discrimination.247 The differences between the confessed and the non-confessed on 
identity are not significant (p values in table 4.9). The data and the narratives 
accompanying prisoners’ responses suggest that for ordinary Hutu, both confessed and 
non-confessed, group identities did not necessarily have to be understood as race-
based to be perceived as conflictual and enduring.    
 
                                                 
247 The main contours of the story that emerged from the narratives are the following: Hutu and Tutsi 
share the same mythical father Kanyarwanda, therefore they are brothers and are related by blood. 
However, the brothers became estranged. One brother reared cattle while the other brother tilled the 
earth. Gradually, Tutsi established economic superiority over Hutu because his herd of cows grew in 
size. The growth in wealth led to the emergence of the dominance of Tutsi over Hutu. This economic 
dominance then translated into political dominance. There was limited mobility of individuals between 
the two statuses. There was a relationship of mutual benefit between Hutu and Tutsi before the 
colonialists arrived. Hutu received gifts of livestock from Tutsi and they gave their labor in return. 
Tutsi, who were tricky and wanted dominance, began to exploit the Hutu with unpaid labor, beatings 
and discrimination. The colonialists however introduced the theory of separate origins without a blood 
connection.  
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Table 4.9 Responses on beliefs about identity 
 
Respondents demonstrated some uncertainty and even a great deal of reluctance to 
answer whether Hutu and Tutsi are different races. The non-response rates are high for 
both the confessed and the non-confessed. Even if we assume that they are holding 
back from expressing their ‘real’ opinions, there is enough of an indication from the 
other responses on the issue of identity to suggest that at a minimum, they are both 
agreed that the identities were conflictual and historically evolved as such before the 
colonial period.248 
                                                 
248 The responses are congruent with pre-existing myths about the common origins but different 
statuses, essential natures and skill sets of the three ethnic groups designated for them by the mythical 
founder of the country: prestige and political leadership for Tutsi; a life of labor for Hutu; for Twa, the 
status of inferior protégé of the other groups.. Josias Semujanga (2003), pp. 22-23  
Hutu and Tutsi 
indicated 
occupational 
difference 
There was 
mobility between 
groups 
Hutu and Tutsi 
originated from 
same ancestor 
Hutu and Tutsi 
have always been 
separate races- 
even before 
colonialism 
N=16 N=19 N=16 N=19 N=15 N=19 N=16 N=19 
TABLE 4.9 
C% NC% C% NC% C% NC% C% NC% 
Yes 68.75 63.15 50 42.2 73.33 47.36 18.75 10.52 
No 6.25 5.28 25 15.6 26.67 15.78 43.75 31.57 
Don’t know 25 31.57 25 42.2 0 36.86 37.5 57.91 
T-test p = .95 p= .76 p = .93 p = .83 
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This finding was corroborated by 56% of the confessed and 58% of the non-
confessed who believed that pre-colonial rule was unfair (table 4.10).  “I heard from 
my grand father that Tutsi colonized Hutu and made them their subjects. They forced 
them to work without pay… History tells us that under the King there were injustices 
against Hutu”249; “There was no forced labor until colonial powers arrived but Tutsi 
despised Hutu and treated them like slaves”250; “Tutsi rule was unjust on Hutu. It has 
been hatred and revenge since then”.251 Some respondents exonerated the King saying 
he had been sympathetic to Hutu but blamed Tutsi chiefs for the exploitation of Hutu: 
“The King favored Hutu…He (later) abolished unfair practices252…His administrators 
were bad. The King was not Tutsi in character.”253 
 
 Table 4.10: Perceptions of early Tutsi rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
249 Confessed prisoner, female, 42 years old, prison PCK, 19 August 2004  
250 Non-confessed, male, 49 years old, prison PCK, 27 August 2004  
251 Non-confessed, female, 49 years old, prison PCK, 20 August 2004  
252 Between 1952 and 1954 the Tutsi King Mutara Rudahigwa abolished the ubukonde system of land 
tenure and required all abakonde (ubukonde owners) to share their land with the clients exploiting it. At 
the same time, the king abolished the ubuhake system of cattle clientship, but other forms of land tenure 
and clientship remained more or less intact.  Jennie E. Burnet and the Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable 
Development (n. d)  
253 Confessed prisoner, male, 30 years old, prison PCK. 16 August 2004  
TABLE 4.10 N=16 N=20 
Nature of pre-colonial rule: Was it unfair toward Hutu? C% NC% 
Yes 56.25 57.89 
Perhaps 0 10.54 
No 12.5 5.26 
Don’t know 31.25 26.31 
T-test p = .63 
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To probe further, I asked them what they thought could be the main reason for the 
Hutu-Tutsi conflict of the past. Ninety three percent of the confessed and eighty 
percent of the non-confessed talked about a “power struggle”. Their argument was that 
the central issue was a power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites. They believed 
this struggle for power between competing elites had long historical roots ultimately 
becoming the natural logic of politics in the country. Each episode of alternation of 
power between ruling elites had been accompanied by violence directed from above, 
forcing ordinary people who had no problems254 to turn against each other. “Political 
leaders always have a hidden agenda…The conflict (between Hutu and Tutsi) is 
political…Leaders manipulate people until those who loved each other betray their 
friends and kill them”255; “All people are children of God…they live in peace until the 
government comes and brings conflict”256; “Hutu leaders and Tutsi leaders are thirsty 
for political power and for property…each group wanted to rule…but these things 
come and go…We are brothers”257; “Hutu-Tutsi problems… were caused by greedy 
leaders who wanted to rule forever.”258  
I asked them if they believed that a conflict persisted at the present time. A majority 
of both confessed (56%) and non-confessed (60%) agreed. At the end of the interview, 
I asked them if they believed another round of violence was possible. They did not 
think it likely unless the current government was toppled or faced with the prospect of 
                                                 
254 Most respondents, both confessed and non-confessed prisoners, believed that ordinary people have 
much in common, and that everyday relationships at the level of ordinary people were rarely the source 
of conflict. The most common response was that ordinary Hutu and ordinary Tutsi shared the same 
country, followed closely by the argument that they were neighbors, carried the sick to hospital 
together, shared drinks, and gave their daughters to one another in marriage.  
255 Confessed, male, 38 years old, prison PCK 24 August 2004  
256 Confessed, male, 50 years old, prison K, 1 September 2004  
257 Confessed, male, 30 years old, prison PCK 17 August 2004  
258 Non-confessed, male, 38 years old, prison K 6 September 2004  
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losing power. Most respondents believed that this was unlikely to happen because 
there were few challenges to its rule. It was not uncommon to hear statements like 
“Kagame gave an order to start killing if he was not elected in 2003”259 or “In 1994, 
the RPF killed those who simply tried to resist whereas even if you killed a thousand 
people, RPF only put you in prison. If you tried to fight against it, you would get 
killed.”260  
In summary, this section tells us the following: First, to be Hutu meant to be 
dominated by Tutsi even before the colonialists arrived in Rwanda. The source of the 
conflict is traced to a distant period of rule by Tutsi elites. Second, Rwanda’s political 
history is interpreted as a power struggle between elites that necessitated the 
oppression of the ethnic ‘other’. This struggle is believed to persist at the present time. 
Third, respondents believed that the regime of Tutsi elites is here to stay. “The day I 
came here, a guard told me, ‘Welcome to prison. We ruled you for four hundred years 
and now we are going to rule you for eight hundred”’261 The differences between the 
confessed and the non-confessed are not significant. Beliefs about identity or 
perceptions about the politics of the distant past do not explain why some people 
confess and others do not. It is clear however these beliefs about the nature of Tutsi 
rule predispose the accused towards fear and apprehension about the intentions of the 
current ruling elites.  
4.5.4  Government as contracting party: Assessing capability and intent    
In the minds of most respondents, the government seemed to be both immensely 
powerful and predatory. They saw the regime as powerful, discriminatory and fully 
able to achieve its goals (table 4.11).   
                                                 
259 Confessed prisoner, male, 50 years old; prison K. September 1, 2004.  
260 Confessed prisoner, male, 30 years old; prison PCK. 23 August 2004.  
261 Confessed prisoner, male, 42 years old, prison K. 7 September 2004.  
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Table 4.11: Perceptions of power and intent of government 
Does this government 
discriminate against Hutu? 
Can this government defeat 
its enemies? 
N=16 N=19 N=16 N=19 
TABLE 4.11 
C% NC% C% NC% 
Yes 50 52.63 93.75 78.95 
Perhaps 0 0 0 0 
No 43.75 26.32 0 0 
Don’t know 6.25 21.05 6.25 21.05 
T-test p = .37 p= .7 
                                
They however did not believe that the RPF intended a genuine reconciliation. A 
repetitive theme in prisoners’ narratives was the notion of ‘gratitude’, a feeling that the 
government had demonstrated remarkable restraint in not doing to them what they had 
done to their ethnic kin. Respondents said that this showed the government, though 
powerful and discriminatory, could be benevolent. The widespread understanding was 
that as long as they did not oppose or challenge the government, they would be safe 
from harm and there could be other benefits. One of the confessed prisoners explained, 
“My children are supported by a government education fund. My eldest son is now in 
secondary school. Yet the government knows what I did…This is a forgiving merciful 
government.”262 A majority of accused, both confessed and non-confessed, seemed 
grateful just to be alive.  
‘Gratitude’ however did not translate into a trusting view of the government, 
particularly when most of the accused saw the government as discriminatory, unjust in 
                                                 
262 Confessed prisoner, female, 42 years old; prison PCK 19 August 2004.  
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hiding its own record of crimes and capable of inflicting severe punishment. One of 
the confessed argued, “Reconciliation requires openness and sincerity…but they 
[RPF] are tricky…they do not accept their role. Yet they lie to us that we have 
reconciled so that they may eliminate us when we stupidly think we are safe…”263  In 
light of their narratives, I am surprised to find that there is a significant difference 
between the confessed and non-confessed when I ask them if the government wants 
reconciliation by means of reduced punishment (table 4.12).  
 
Table 4.12: Perceptions on government’s reconciliation initiatives 
 
Does the government want 
reconciliation by inviting Hutu 
refugees to return? 
Does the government desire 
reconciliation via reduced 
punishments? 
N=16 N=19 N=16 N=19 
TABLE 4.12 
C% NC% C% NC% 
Yes 68.75 52.63 81.25 60 
Perhaps 18.75 5.26 12.5 20 
No 12.5 31.58 0 20 
Don’t know 0 10.53 6.25 0 
T-test p = .14 p = .04 * 
* Significant at 10% level  
 
I am inclined to interpret this as a fervent desire on the part of the confessed to see 
this happen rather than a statement of belief that the government actually intends 
                                                 
263 Confessed prisoner, male, 63 years old; prison PCK. 23 August 2004.  
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reconciliation. In the words of a confessed prisoner, “The government did the 
impossible because it prefers reconciliation. It could have killed all of us who 
participated.” He continued, “But if the government really wanted reconciliation, it 
would be done. But it has no will. It is the government that prevents people from 
reconciling. We cannot reconcile when still in prison. If the government wanted 
(reconciliation), it would let us go to ask people for forgiveness…this is only possible 
if we are living with them.”264       Sometimes the explanations are more diffident and 
even ambiguous. Another confessed prisoner said, “Law comes from leaders. If this 
law is merciful, that is a sign that the government is merciful. I know that it teaches 
reconciliation….If the leadership favors reconciliation, it can be realized…There are 
no obstacles to reconciliation because the government is willing to make it 
possible.”265 If anything, their explanations indicate doubt that government incentives 
represent or measure up to a genuine reconciliation.266    
4.5.5   Information exposure  
“When you confess, you do the government’s work…they have treacherous plans…I 
would not make the mistake of confession…”267  If they did not trust the government 
and feared indiscriminate punishment, it would make sense for the accused to hold out 
from confessing as long as possible. The confessed certainly used phrases like “I gave 
in”, “it was no use” to describe how they reached a point where it did not seem like a 
good option to refrain from confessing. Is there evidence of holding out?   
                                                 
264 Confessed prisoner, male, 39 years old, prison PCK 16 August 2004  
265 Confessed prisoner, male, 47 years old, prison PCK, 8 September 2004  
266 Jean Hatzfeld interviewed prisoners who had confessed. They responded in similar ways when they 
spoke of a “left over pardon” in reference to the government’s offer of reduced punishments. See Jean 
Hatzfeld (2005), p202  
267 Non-confessed prisoner, prison K, male, 38 years old. 6 September 2004.   
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i. Of 18 prisoners who had confessed, one-third held out for 7-9 years each, 
one-third held out for 5 years each, and the remaining third held out for 1-4 
years each before confessing.  
ii. One respondent confessed in 2004 and he had already spent 9 years in 
prison. Of the 6 respondents who confessed in 2003, for instance, 1 person 
had spent 9 years in prison, 3 people had spent 8 years, 1 person had spent 
5 years and the remaining person spent 1 year before confessing. This 
suggests that the accused do tend to hold out as long as they possibly can.   
 
But at what point does it make sense for them to “give in”? One possible 
explanation was the amount of information available against the accused. The 
government required denunciations of all alleged accomplices by those who wanted 
their confessions legally validated. The accused sometimes named accomplices 
falsely268; at other times, they denounced others with a degree of satisfaction. “The 
ones I committed crimes with were at home and I wanted them to be brought in here 
(prison)…why should I suffer alone?”269  
This hypothesis on information exposure is compelling considering that social 
networks played an important part in genocide. People were able to mobilize family 
members, friends and neighbors as they joined groups that had already begun killing 
Tutsi. People tied to these networks now found themselves in the same prison. With 
the confession of each additional person within this network, more information was 
likely to be available on those who had not yet confessed.  Table 4.13 shows that the 
confessed in my sample did have higher numbers of network members in prison who 
                                                 
268 Please see chapters five and six on manipulations and false information generated in the gacaca 
courts  
269 Confessed prisoner, male, 39 years old, prison PCK 16 August 2004  
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had also confessed. The non-confessed had fewer numbers of network members in 
prison who had confessed. The difference between them is statistically significant [T 
test (p value= 0.01)]. 270 
 
Table 4.13: Information exposure and confessions 
TABLE 4.13 No. of C No. of NC 
No prison network reported 9 10 
Percentage of network members who have confessed 
(for those who reported a prison network) 
No. of C No. of NC 
0-30% 1 6 
30-70% 1 2 
80-100% 5 1 
Total N=7 N=9 
T-test  p = 0.01*  
* Significant at 10% level  
 
This is a scenario then where some accused ‘tip over’ and virtually ‘surrender’ their 
confession while there are others who hold out until they too decide to capitulate 
pressured by circumstances largely outside of their control (namely the amount of 
information against them produced via denunciations). Their knowledge of the law 
tells them that it would make sense to ‘tip over’ and confess in order to take advantage 
of reduced sentences. They know that the penalties for a possible guilty verdict for 
                                                 
270 Coding for prison network members who have confessed: 0-30%= 1; 30-70%=2; 80-100%= 3.  
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those who have not confessed are very heavy.  Seventy seven percent of those who 
had confessed mentioned reduced punishments as the main reason they had confessed.   
4.6 Allocating responsibility for the past: The consent-effect  
On the issue of responsibility for crimes perpetrated in the recent past and the historic 
problems handed down from the more distant past, the confessed and non-confessed 
diverged in their responses in a systematic way.  
Across all of the questions I asked on the allocation of responsibility, the variation 
was striking. The non-confessed systematically exonerated Hutu elites, primarily 
blaming the RPF for genocide and Tutsi regimes of the past for other historic 
problems; the confessed however systematically exonerated Tutsi elites, 
delegitimizing Hutu elites instead by holding them primarily responsible for their 
problems.     
On the issue of identifying those periods in history in which relations between the 
two groups had taken an important downturn (table 4.16), the non-confessed tended to 
point to periods of rule by Tutsi elites (C= 35.71%, NC=70%), while the confessed 
maintained that the problems of the past stemmed from the bad politics of Hutu 
regimes or the bad policies of the colonial government (C= 64.28%, NC= 25%).  
Asked specifically about genocide (table 4.14), the non-confessed exonerated Hutu 
elites arguing that the RPF was primarily responsible (C=28%, NC= 53%). In contrast, 
the confessed did not primarily blame the RPF, choosing instead to say that Hutu elites 
should be held primarily responsible (C=50%, NC=20%).   
To probe if the tendency of the non-confessed to exonerate Hutu elites was 
systematic, I asked respondents about the relative role of Hutu elites vis-à-vis ordinary 
Hutu in the genocide (table 4.15). Once again, the non-confessed refused to blame 
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Hutu elites across a series of questions, appearing willing to blame ordinary Hutu, that 
is, people like themselves. The confessed, however, tended to put the blame squarely 
on the role of Hutu elites.   
This is an important variation in their responses not only because it is systematic 
across all the questions on allocation of responsibility, but because it is also puzzling 
in light of the responses of the confessed to previous questions.  First, both confessed 
and non-confessed believed that the RPF regime was discriminatory, guilty of crimes 
and could not be trusted. They likened the RPF to previous periods of oppressive Tutsi 
rule. Yet when confronted with the question of allocating blame, the confessed refused 
to hold Tutsi elites accountable for the troubles in any given period in Rwandan 
history.    
Table 4.14 shows that the confessed hold the Hutu regime primarily responsible for 
genocide in contrast to the non-confessed who argued that genocide was the  
 Table 4.14:  Allocating primary responsibility for genocide                     
*Significant at 10% level  
C% NC% C% NC% TABLE 4.14:  
Primary responsibility N=18 N=15 
Primary responsibility 
summary N=18 N=15
Self-defense against RPF attack 16.67 33.33 
President’s death caused by RPF 11.1 20 
RPF responsibility 
27.77 
 
53.33 
Tutsi wanted domination over Hutu 5.56 6.67 
Tutsi had a genocide plan of their own 16.67 13.33 
Historic ethnic fear 
22.23 
 
20 
 
Hutu leaders in government 50 20 Hutu leaders in govt 50 20 
Don’t know 0 6.67 Don’t know 0 6.67 
T-test p = .09 * 
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culmination of a war fought in self-defense against the RPF invasion and the 
assassination of their President by the RPF. The p value shows that the difference is 
significant.271  
Table 4.15 shows that respondents differ on how they allocate responsibility for 
genocide between Hutu elites and ordinary Hutu. The majority of those who had 
confessed saw the role of top leaders as significant in contrast to the non-confessed 
who denied that top leaders had a role and insisted on the responsibility of ordinary 
Hutu. The p values show that the differences are highly significant. Interestingly, the 
confessed and non-confessed agree on the involvement of local leaders. This probably 
indicates that despite the significant difference in the emphasis on the role of elites or 
ordinary perpetrators, the confessed and non-confessed agree there was coercion and 
pressure involved at the local level.  
 
Table 4.15: Allocating responsibility for genocide on Hutu elites versus ordinary 
perpetrators 
 
Government 
orders 
Local leaders’ 
pressure 
Ordinary 
Hutus’ greed 
for property 
Divisionist  
ideology 
popularized 
by the govt 
Govt incited 
killings 
C% NC% C% NC% C% NC% C% NC% C% NC% 
TABLE 4.15: 
In your 
opinion, how 
important 
were the 
following in 
causing 
genocide? 
N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 N=16 N=20 
                                                 
271 Coding: RPF responsibility and historic ethnic fear=1; Hutu elites (government leaders)responsible= 
2 
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Table 4.15 continued 
 
 
Government 
orders 
Local leaders’ 
pressure 
Ordinary 
Hutus’ greed 
for property 
Divisionist  
ideology 
popularized 
by the govt 
Govt incited 
killings 
Important 75 15 87.5 75 45 80 68.75 25 68.75 30 
Not important 18.75 55 12.5 15 55 10 12.5 60 18.75 55 
Don’t know 6.25 30 0 10 0 10 18.75 15 12.5 15 
T-test p = 0.00 * p= .43 p= .06 * p= 0.00 * p = 0.00 * 
* Significant at 10% level  
 
In locating the historic time period that marked the origin of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict, 
the single largest opinion among the confessed pointed to the colonial period, shifting 
the primary responsibility for the oppression of Hutu onto the colonial powers, thereby 
exonerating Tutsi elites. Yet they have already indicated as they explained how Hutu-
Tutsi group identities had evolved, that the exploitation of Hutu had begun prior to the 
arrival of the colonialists.  In contrast, the non-confessed blamed Tutsi elites. They 
were divided almost equally between those who pointed to the pre-colonial Tutsi 
dominated monarchical regime and those who mentioned the initiation of the war by 
the RPF in 1990.   Here again, the difference is highly significant as shown by the p 
value below (table 4.16)272  
 
                                                 
272 Coding: Tutsi elites responsible (pre-colonial past or 1990-94 civil war)= 1; exonerate Tutsi elites 
(blame displaced onto colonial administration or the social revolution of Hutu)= 0   
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Table  4.16: Allocation of responsibility for the historic Hutu-Tutsi problem 
 
Origin of Hutu-Tutsi problem 
TABLE 4.16 
C%  (N=16) NC% (N=19) 
Pre-colonial period 
(ie. King’s elite Tutsi admin) 
21.43 35 
Colonial period 42.85 10 
1959 Social Revolution of Hutu 21.43 15 
1990-94- civil war 14.28 35 
Don’t know 0 5 
T-test p = .03 * 
* Significant at 10% level  
 
The confessed, like the non-confessed, said that they believed the RPF was Tutsi 
dominated, discriminatory and guilty of war crimes. Yet the confessed refused to hold 
Tutsi elites primarily accountable for any portion of Rwanda’s turbulent history. There 
is thus a perceptible difference in the politics of the confessed vis-à-vis the non-
confessed. When the accused talked about reconciliation, for instance, 66% of the 
confessed and 72% of the non-confessed mentioned that there was an important “role 
of government”. Their explanations indicated that they meant very different things by 
this.  The confessed hoped that the government would forgive them and release them 
from prison as promised. Some of them talked about the “good rule of this 
government.” In contrast, the non-confessed responded that the government should 
admit its crimes and be prepared to negotiate politically with its opponents in exile. 
They harbored hopes of regime change. “We need a roundtable to discuss the issue (of 
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reconciliation)…we need a dialog…otherwise there will be no peace”273; “The way 
out is power sharing…there should be a political solution”274; “Reconciliation can be 
done by a ceremony in which political leaders acknowledge their mistakes…without 
hypocrisy and dictatorship.”275  
In contrast the confessed said, “Hutu had their chance and ruled badly. It is now the 
Tutsi turn to rule as they are wiser…”276; “The obstacle to reconciliation is that there 
are extremists in exile… even though they are few and powerless, they try to obstruct 
the government.”277 A woman whose seven year old son was killed by RPF soldiers 
during its advance on Kigali in 1994 said, “The government that was there was 
replaced by a new one which has stopped the antagonism…it gave peace to everyone. 
Now we have no more problems. Even news from outside the prison tells me there is 
no problem any more…This government’s power lies in the trust we all have for it.”278   
I identify as a ‘consent-effect’ the willingness of the confessed to support the political 
status quo and their unwillingness to hold ruling elites accountable despite not 
believing in their moral authority to govern.  
 
4.7 Summary table of hypotheses and indicators  
Table 4.17 presents a summary of the hypotheses each of which is linked with the 
indicators used in the survey questions. This will help to evaluate the findings that are 
presented in the final section of this chapter.  
 
                                                 
273 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 49 years old, prison PCK 27 August 2004  
274 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 52 years old, prison K, 9 September 2004  
275 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 58 years old, prison PCK, 25 August 2004  
276 Confessed prisoner, male, 34 years old; prison PCK. 31 August 2004.  
277 Confessed prisoner, female, 42 years old, prison PCK, 19 August 2004  
278 Confessed prisoner, female, 48 years old, prison PCK 22 August 2004   
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4.8. Conclusion: Confessions and surrendering consent    
From the summary of findings (table 4.18) we can see that the confessed are 
significantly different from the non-confessed with respect to information exposure 
and the manner in which they allocate primary responsibility for the problems of the 
recent and more distant past.  On all other counts for which data is presented in this 
chapter, there is no statistically significant variation between the confessed and the 
non-confessed.  
 
Table 4.18: Summary table of findings 
 
TABLE 4.18 : Findings Confessed Non-confessed 
Moral authority 
Ruling elites lack moral authority- Responsible for 
crimes against Hutu that are unaccounted for 
 
Ideology 
Negative stereotypes about Tutsi elites 
 
Identity 
Historically conflictual 
 
History-earlier periods 
of Tutsi rule 
Oppressive and unjust 
 
Power and Intent 
Discriminatory and powerful 
 
Information exposure Higher likelihood  Lower likelihood 
Allocation of 
responsibility 
“Consent-effect” 
Exonerate Tutsi elites Exonerate Hutu elites 
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Given their beliefs about the discriminatory and oppressive rule by RPF elites in 
particular and Tutsi elites in general, it is not surprising that the accused talk about the 
“mistake” of confession. They fear the possibility of indiscriminate punishment and 
hold out as long as they can until they are so exposed by the accumulated 
denunciations against them that they do not expect to withstand scrutiny at trial. 
Alluding to their vulnerability, one confessed prisoner said, “[the RPF] holds all of us 
in its hands.”279  However, having been forced to “give in”, they attempt to hedge 
against the possibility that the government can respond with indiscriminate 
punishment now that they have effectively incriminated themselves. For these very 
vulnerable people, the ‘consent-effect’ is intended to work like an insurance policy. It 
produces a politics where people support the status quo in the hope that the flow of 
real and promised security guarantees will not be withdrawn.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
279 Confessed prisoner, male, 34 years old, prison PCK, 31 August 2004.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE SOURCES AND EFFECTS OF INFORMATION EXPOSURE  
 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter builds on the finding that information exposure is associated with 
confession. I found that those who had confessed in prison had higher numbers of 
network members who had also confessed. This suggests that mutual denunciations 
generated by way of confessions leads to the accumulation of information against 
individuals within a pre-existing network till a point is reached where confessing 
becomes a more reasonable option than holding out.  This chapter elaborates on the 
finding and draws on data from outside the prison. It has three main objectives: to 
show the various mechanisms by which information becomes available, to use 
evidence from the trials to show that information availability is indeed associated with 
confessions, and to explain how the evidentiary processes of the gacaca court work 
such that the accumulation of information against an accused individual increases the 
likelihood of conviction.       
Information becomes available through three main sources: betrayal confessions that 
involve mutual denunciations280 between two or more accused, manipulative 
denunciations that appear to be patently false and involve accusations against an 
individual who has hitherto not been accused, and witness testimony. Information on 
                                                 
280 A symposium on denunciation practices finds that denunciations can occur in all political contexts 
but they are more virulent in authoritarian states because denunciations are rewarded. Also, 
denunciations are always dependant on local struggles. The more denunciations emerge at local level, 
the less need for police control because people police each other and censor themselves. See Sheila 
Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately (1996), pp747-767. See also Sheila Fitzpatrick (1994). Thus, 
denunciations are in themselves a strategy of political control. In this chapter however, I focus on how 
denunciations breed on local manipulations and work through pre-existing networks of people known to 
one another. I show how the information generated through denunciations is associated with 
confessions, and how this information is processed by gacaca courts to arrive at a verdict.   
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the accused is generated as individuals denounce others. In the six trials I observed, 
the confessions of six defendants led to the denunciations of 51 people. This prompts 
those who have been denounced to respond to the ‘betrayal’ with counter-confessions 
and denunciations of their own. Research on the genocide in Rwanda has shown that 
perpetrators rarely acted alone. They usually moved around in groups of 11-30,281 
their members were neighbors, friends and even relatives. My research shows how 
confessions by one or more individuals in these groups prompt others to follow suit. 
The feeling of betrayal may push some to retaliate by means of a confession 
immediately; others choose to hold back and track how things evolve. But every 
additional confession by members within this network generates more information on 
an individual who is still holding out, till such time that it becomes a more realistic 
option to ‘tip over’ and confess because there is little chance that he will be able to 
defend himself successfully in the gacaca court given all the information that is 
already available. It is in his best interests to confess in hopes of a reduced sentence.  
Betrayal confessions are different from manipulative denunciations in that the latter 
appear to be result of ad hoc interest-based coalitions cobbled together to accuse 
someone.   In the absence of forensic, photographic or other kinds of evidence 
commonly submitted at criminal trials, the availability of information is critical to 
secure a conviction or determine the innocence of an accused individual.  
I show that evidentiary practices in gacaca courts work against those who confront 
the weight of accumulated denunciations. Judges have no other means of 
corroborating the “truth content” of accusations other than to assess how many people 
accuse someone and whether the narratives generally point in the same direction. This 
produces an environment of uncertainty in which manipulations are possible as people 
                                                 
281 Scott Straus (2004)  
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bandwagon to secure the release of some and implicate others and defendants try to 
maneuver if they can to secure the support of those who will back them at trial. The 
general atmosphere of uncertainty is compounded by the lack of access to defense 
counsel. In the prison interviews, there were some among the non-confessed who 
expressed deep uncertainties about facing a gacaca court: “Survivors tell lies”282; 
“Judges can be bribed easily”.283 Others believed that they stood a chance at proving 
their innocence. The responses were typically along the following lines: “I will be 
among people who can defend me”284; “evidence (in my defense) is readily available 
amidst people who know me”.285 However, data suggest that uncertainty about 
outcomes is reduced as information gradually begins to accumulate as more people 
back the same accusatory narratives. It then becomes more likely they will be unable 
to defend themselves eventually.   The confessed spoke from their own experience: 
“The whole truth will come out in gacaca… even those who have not confessed can be 
found guilty”286 ; “You will be in front of people who know what you did- the truth 
will come out and those who are guilty can be judged.”287  
It is important to note that the information that has accumulated against someone 
can be true or false even though certain accusations appear to be more patently false 
than others. Denunciations may sometimes be a complete fabrication. Then again, 
people may hold on to a piece of information they know to be true only to use it 
against someone when they need to. A confession may be used not only to retaliate 
against someone who has already confessed and denounce others who have not yet 
confessed but also to implicate the innocent. All this adds up to an environment that is 
                                                 
282 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 58 years old, prison PCK 25 August 2004  
283 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 52 years old, prison K, 9 September 2004  
284 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 49 years old, prison PCK 10 September 2004 
285 Non-confessed prisoner, male, 38 years old, prison PCK 18 August 2004  
286 Confessed prisoner, male, 30 years old, prison PCK 17 August 2004  
287 Confessed prisoner, male, 42 years old, prison K 7 September 2004  
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saturated with information- rumors, accusations and counter-accusations, both true and 
false- with no guarantee that the judges, who are generally neutral if they are not 
interested in the outcome of that case, will be able to accurately determine innocence 
or guilt. The odds are particularly stacked up against an accused when a large number 
of confessed have denounced him or a local coalition stands against him for reasons 
that have little to do with genocide and he is unable to put together a counter-coalition 
in his defense.  
Data for this chapter are drawn from ethnographic fieldwork, observation of the 
proceedings at six trials and trial transcripts based on 46 hours of testimony at the 
gacaca court in Masaka sector in 2005.  The denunciations, local level manipulations 
of witness testimony and allegations of false accusations are not atypical of what 
happens in gacaca courts around the country. During the pre-trial hearings that I 
observed in 2004, judges, survivors and witnesses reported similar cases in each of the 
four sectors that I visited in the north, west, south and central parts of the country. This 
is not surprising given that much of this is a response to the way that the gacaca 
process is structured: the over reliance on testimonies when the reality is that people 
often testify in ways that suit their best interests and a degree of autonomy at the local 
level that allows local power brokers to engage in their power struggles and 
manipulations around the work of the courts.288 I draw on data from Masaka sector 
because I spent the maximum time there. I lived in the community and observed the 
actual trials there as well.   
This chapter is organized into two main sections: First, I show how the rules of 
evidence work and why information availability matters. I use trial data to show that 
confessions are associated with information availability. In the second section, I show 
                                                 
288 This is the subject of the next chapter.  
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how judges rely on information availability to determine the veracity of defendants’ 
claims about innocence and guilt. When on balance, the information from 
manipulative denunciations, witness testimony and betrayal confessions are stacked up 
against those who are accused, it is hard for them to prove they are innocent. In 
contrast, when the information generated is stacked up in their favor, it is difficult for 
the charges against them to stick. 
 
5.2.1 Rules of evidence: information availability  
Judges at the trial court estimated that they would probably make an erroneous 
judgment in one of every twenty cases.289 They seemed confident that they would be 
able to distinguish between true and false testimony, parse out incomplete confessions 
from the false confessions and, in the case of the non-confessed, make an accurate 
determination of innocence or guilt.   
Yet there are few robust verification mechanisms at the disposal of the judges. 
Referring specifically to the problematic nature of treating confessions as the “gold 
standard for evidence”, a prominent human rights organization on the ground reports, 
“it is not unusual for inmates to make partial confessions, or confess to minor 
infractions, a lot less serious that those that they have actually committed. Some 
accused inmates, but also some who were released, try to present credible testimony 
(since it is required by law for the confession to be admissible) which in fact spares 
the true perpetrators. Thus, deceased or exiled individuals, or those with whom they 
have personal disputes are accused… Testimony provided by the accused themselves, 
especially for crimes as serious as crimes of genocide, are always a source of 
problematic information. As we have seen… they are often characterized by 
                                                 
289 Informal conversation at a bar with the judges of the trial court, Masaka sector, July 2005   
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omissions, half-truths or lies. As long as Gacaca or ordinary courts have not seriously 
verified the truthfulness of the confessions, they should not be taken as conclusive 
evidence. They would remain confessions “subject to” verification….The law makes 
provision for this verification, but the practice of checking the confessions seems at 
present to be insufficient, although we are well aware of the difficulty of this task in 
the particular situation of Rwanda after the genocide.”290    
I found that judges used methods of corroboration to verify information that 
emerged during trial proceedings. They tried to triangulate between sources of 
testimony. The witnesses they summoned included genocide survivors, Hutu relatives 
of Tutsi victims, Hutu in whose homes the victim was killed, the accused who had 
confessed as also the accused who had not confessed but were summoned to testify 
because they had been named as accessories or witnesses to the crime. Sometimes this 
method was not very helpful as the testimonies varied, contradicting one another on 
the details of the case. Nevertheless, it allowed the broad contours of the case to 
emerge. For instance, if all the witnesses recalled seeing the defendant leading the 
attack but differed in their recollections about what weapon he was carrying or 
whether he, not someone else, had delivered the death blow, judges appeared to be 
satisfied with the determination that the accused was indeed present at the attack in a 
leading role.     
Table 5.1 provides an example from trial #6. In column two, AC denounced his 
accomplices to the array of crimes he was charged with. Columns 3-8 show that six 
individuals testified to corroborate the truth-content of the confession provided by 
defendant AC. Note that AC himself is mentioned in all of their testimonies which 
makes it difficult for him to maintain he is innocent.     
                                                 
290 Penal Reform International (2004, May), pp12-13  
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Among the people who testified at the trial, three are individuals who are not 
accused but who witnessed one or more of the crimes AC confessed to committing; 
the other three are individuals co-accused with AC whom AC has denounced as part 
of this confession. Among the three individuals who are co-accused and who testified, 
two have confessed denouncing AC in turn while one still holds out despite being 
named by the others. The person who was holding out (see column 8) denounced a 
number of people, including those who had named him. The rows indicate that the 
people whose names have come up repeatedly have confessed. 
Three important points emerge from table 5.1: First, the information against AC was 
derived from varied sources: confessions and denunciations by co-accused as well as 
by those who witnessed the crime as onlookers. Second, in the absence of other kinds 
of evidence, information availability matters if judges are to determine innocence or 
guilt. After comparing the available information with AC’s account of his actions, the 
defendant was judged to have entered a full and complete confession and found 
eligible for a sentence reduction. If his account did not measure up to the information 
available against him that had been corroborated by varied sources, he would be 
treated as someone who had not confessed but found guilty and liable for severe 
penalties.    
The accused are very sensitive to the information available against them. The more 
information available out there, the more detailed the confessions become.  For 
instance, in reviewing his confession before the gacaca court, AC left out the fact that 
he had been carrying a machete with him on the day of the murder in which he was 
implicated. Leaving this piece of information out allowed him to claim that he had not 
been outdoors intending to join the killing but that he had been out that morning 
looking to purchase some goats when he encountered a large group of killers who
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pressured him into joining them.   Here is an excerpt from the trial that shows the 
defendant revising his confession when he was accused of carrying a weapon. 
Judge: Where did you find the victim? 
AC: I found him where we had been told he was hiding. He was in the cowshed. 
Judge: What did you have as a weapon at that time? 
AC: I had nothing at that time. 
Judge: What did you do after that? 
AC: We continued on our way up the hill until we reached the place where the 
attackers were waiting…After I had seen that I could not do anything for him (the 
victim) and I didn’t want to see his death because I knew him…I left immediately and 
went away. 
(The judges berate him for betraying a friend and follow up with numerous questions) 
Judge: Tell us if you went to other places to attack. 
AC: I did not participate in anything else. 
Judge: If there is evidence showing that there are other attacks in which you 
participated do you accept to lose the case? Your confession will be rejected. 
AC: If that evidence is there and I face the people who accuse me, you can punish me 
according to the laws of the court….No one accuses me of anything else. 
(Four witnesses testify none of whom raise any new issues for AC. The fifth witness 
has been accused in the same case by AC. He claimed that AC had been carrying a 
machete with which he had beaten his captive Tutsi friend)   
Judge: Where did you see AC? 
Witness 5: I saw him in the place called…near the cell… 
Judge: What were you doing there? 
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Witness 5: I was going to see a friend because I needed to return some money he had 
lent me to buy salt… 
Judge: Who did you meet at that place? 
Witness 5: I met an attack in which there was AC and ….. (he names four other 
people) 
Judge: What were they doing? 
Witness 5: They were guiding the victim who was telling AC “Even you who knows 
me and who did business with me... What did I do to you?” AC had a umupanga 
(machete) in hand and he beat him with the handle….They took him until they reached 
the ruins of X’s home…It was there that they killed him.  
(This not only raised the issue of the weapon that AC had denied he had been carrying 
but also implied that AC had been present at the killing which he had also denied)   
Judge: From other peoples’ testimony, we learnt that they (AC and accomplices) took 
the person and left him with you and others and then went away. 
Witness 5: That is a lie. These testimonies are different from what they said in the 
cell291 
Judge: If we find that the testimonies are the same, will you accept that you lied to the 
court? 
Witness 5: I ask you, the court, to pursue the person who accuses me and ask him to 
give tangible evidence that what he accuses me of is true. I saw them taking him 
(victim) away…My destination was in the opposite direction of the place they were 
taking him to.  
                                                 
291 Referring to the pre-trial testimonies in gacaca courts at cell level  
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(When the trial reconvened the next week, AC produced a letter in which he confessed 
to having a weapon) 
Judge: If you were with a weapon, then how likely is it that you were out on a search 
for farm animals when you met the group headed by…? 
AC: I have said that I own a cabaret (bar) so I needed a machete to kill the animals I 
purchased. 
Judge: But someone who goes to buy farm animals generally carries a stick, not a 
machete. 
AC: I took a machete because it was a time of war. …But I want to add that I left the 
person (victim) with the group and went away.  
Judge: Is there any evidence that you left the victim alive when you left? 
AC: The people who were with me at that time will testify to it.  
 
We can see that confessions are sensitive to information exposure. The final point 
from the table above is that it shows the close correlation between information 
exposure and confession. Those who have confessed have been exposed, most of them 
multiple times by people who testified. This accumulated information is used as 
evidence against an accused. NTW (column 8) remains the exception here. Despite 
being named several times in this trial and in other cases pending before the court, he 
refused to acknowledge that he had participated in any of the crimes he was charged 
with. His name came up repeatedly in denunciations by others who testified during the 
six trials that I observed. He was rebuked by the judges and mocked by sections of the 
audience present at this trial and others in which he was pulled up to testify. It was 
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widely believed that with all the information available against him, he would not 
survive his turn at trial by pleading innocence.     
Here is another example that makes the same point about confessions and 
information exposure but draws specifically on information generated via betrayal 
confessions. I use data from trial # 3 at Masaka sector. It corroborates my finding that 
the more people within a given network confess, the more likely it becomes that those 
who are still holding out feel the pressure to cave in. It becomes impossible after a 
point to insist on innocence when the weight of accumulated denunciations point in 
another direction and make the chances of a successful defense at gacaca increasingly 
remote.   
Table 5.2 summarizes the information generated by the confession of the defendant 
in trial #3. The defendant Felicien confessed to 8 incidents in which he was involved. 
These included 7 murders and at least 2 incidents of theft and extortion. For each 
incident (see columns), the defendant denounced those who were allegedly involved 
as accomplices. 
From this table, we can see that the same names keep coming up across different 
incidents of violence. These are also people known to one another from the same 
community. In fact, SN and GT are brothers; the defendant and SY are brothers; the 
others were friends before they denounced one another. Also, most of those people 
that the defendant has denounced multiple times have also confessed (see rows) and 
denounced him back in their testimonies at this trial.     
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5.2.2 Information availability- the difference between innocence and guilt   
The method of corroboration however is not foolproof. A particular narrative was 
taken to be true if there were a number of people backing the same story. The 
assumption was that one or two people could lie but not more. However, there is 
evidence to suggest that people collude with each other for a variety of reasons to 
implicate someone who may be innocent. Assuming that one or more judges are not 
vested in the outcome of a given case, relying on a strategy that assesses the veracity 
of testimony by the number of people supplying the same story is bound to be 
misleading. It creates a marketplace for buying and selling information. It is relatively 
easy to induce survivors to throw their weight behind false testimony. They may be 
bribed into doing so or they are so emotionally vulnerable that they tend to grasp at 
any piece of information that promises to identify the ‘real’ perpetrator. As long as 
multiple people corroborate the same story, it is taken as true but to determine if the 
story they supply is true or fabricated is difficult, perhaps even impossible. In the rush 
to process as many cases as quickly as possible (speed has been used as a yardstick to 
measure the success of gacaca courts292), it is nearly impossible to spend time 
conducting a thorough investigation into the testimonies provided.  
I use an example to show that people are aware that the numbers strategy works in 
gacaca courts and bandwagon with each other to achieve their desired goals. In this 
particular case, a woman’s name was added to the list of those accused of genocide 
crimes after some people came together in what appeared (to me) a case of 
manipulative denunciation. She failed to defend herself in the pre-trial hearings stage 
when confronted with this coalition against her and went to prison.    
                                                 
292 National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (2007), p7  
                                                                                                                        
 136
A large and wealthy Tutsi family that lived in one of the cells in Masaka sector was 
completely destroyed during the genocide. The head of the family, a very old man, 
was able to find refuge in the home of a Hutu friend. His body was found hanging 
from a tree at a time when genocide and war were coming to a close. People insisted 
he was consumed by grief at the death of his family and had committed suicide. 
However, a daughter who was married and lived elsewhere had survived and she 
began making her own inquiries. She had two arguments: She had been told that his 
hat was still on his head when the body was discovered. He had been too old to walk 
steadily, how could he have hanged himself? And how could his hat not have fallen 
off in the process? The name of a neighbor surfaced who had been spotted the evening 
prior to the hanging, carrying a length of rope identical to the one found on the old 
man.  
This man quickly put together a number of people to defend himself and accuse 
someone else instead. He claimed he had seen a woman, Beatrice, tip off a group of 
attackers about where the old man was hiding. The Hutu host who had protected the 
old man till the end supported this story for reasons that are unclear. He also testified 
in gacaca that he had seen Beatrice tip off the perpetrators but when I interviewed him, 
he said he had neither seen nor heard Beatrice do so. He had simply agreed to side 
with this young man. Perhaps he feared he would be accused as an accomplice and 
was eager to displace the blame. The old man’s daughter was eager to hold someone 
responsible and also supported this version of events. This group managed to get 
another young survivor on board. It is not clear if she was bribed but she later retracted 
her testimony publicly and apologized. Beatrice insisted that she had long standing 
property disputes with both of the men who had accused her. She was however 
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arrested, spent a few years in prison and was provisionally released on account of poor 
health.   
The accused can prove their innocence however if the numbers are in their favor. 
Here is an example from trial #1. The defendant John had confessed to participating in 
five separate incidents that involved two murders and numerous thefts. As the trial 
was coming to a close and the judges prepared to deliberate in private on the verdict 
and sentencing, a survivor Jeanne stood up and asked to be heard. She insisted that 
John had not confessed the whole truth. She argued that although he had confessed to 
being one among those who had extorted a cow from her husband Michel in exchange 
for sparing her life, he had remained silent about the fact that he had tipped off a death 
squad about her whereabouts and led them to her home. John’s confession was in 
danger of being treated as incomplete. This could render him ineligible for a reduced 
sentence. As per the law, he could be treated on par with someone found guilty 
without having confessed and thereby liable for heavy penalties. Although the judges 
were irritated at the prospect that the case would be prolonged because of this last 
minute accusation, they did not in good faith ignore the matter. As more witnesses 
were produced, no one supported the survivor’s claims. Some witnesses deflected the 
responsibility onto others, some said they had no idea, and one witness turned around 
to accuse the survivor’s husband of leading the attackers to her home. The judges 
determined that John was innocent of the latest charge; his confession was treated as 
complete and wholly truthful and he was rewarded with a reduced sentence.   
The following excerpt shows how the judges reasoned as the trial played out:   
Judge: We have spent many days on the case of John….John has confessed. Now a 
problem arises…Jeanne, have you not been aware that John was being judged?   
Jeanne: I was not present when he was giving his testimony 
                                                                                                                        
 138
Judge: But you had information on John. Why didn’t you testify in the gacaca court of 
the cell?293 
Jeanne: I thought he had given all the information 
Judge: Did you not attend the cell meetings? 
Jeanne: I attended them 
Judge: Did you not ask what John said? 
Jeanne: I didn’t ask but I heard that he testified. 
(Audience murmurs; people shake their head as if they are unhappy with her response) 
President of the concerned cell court (speaks up from the audience): The crime he 
(John) committed was to steal a cow. He has accepted that and he has paid for it. So, 
the matter has been finished.   
Judge: John, as a person who has confessed, why did you not testify on this matter? 
John (whose mother had died the previous day): Let me respond as I sit down. 
A member of the audience (in a show of support to the defendant): To me, it seems 
that it will be good to postpone his case because John is traumatized 
John: I did not say anything about it because what I did was only to steal the cow and 
I accepted that and I paid for it. 
Judge: Jeanne has asked who told the attackers there was an icyitso294 (accomplice) 
in her house. Can you answer? 
John: You can ask this question to others in the attack.  
                                                 
293 Referring to the pre-trial hearings that were conducted at cell level  
294 During the war and genocide, all Tutsi were referred to as accomplices of the RPF.   Pronounced: ee-
cheet-so  
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(Now the judges digressed from the question of the tip-off and pursued other questions 
around the incident of the extortion of the cow…Then the first witness was called and 
sworn in to tell the truth)  
Judge: G, tell us who told you that there was an icyitso in the home of Michel?  
G (accused of being one of the leaders of the attack):  A man whose name is Nyandwi 
(referring to Michel’s nickname) met us in the valley and told us: “Please help me. 
They have attacked my house saying that there is an icyitso. Now please protect my 
wife so that they do not kill her. I shall give you a cow. He (Michel) came up to the 
road where we always shared a drink. 
(This testimony stood the facts of the case on their head. Until now, John’s confession 
had revealed that the group had gone to Michel’s home threatening to kill his wife and 
were placated only when they were able to extort the cow. Now, according to G’s 
testimony, it appeared that not only had Michel had tipped them off about the 
whereabouts of his wife but that they had gone there to protect, not attack her. Some 
people in the audience suggested that Michel should be questioned because he had 
been present at the attack while Jeanne had been in hiding; therefore her accusation 
was based on hearsay. The judges decided to call other witnesses)   
Judge: You were one of the people who (later) ate a portion of the cow. Who said that 
there was icyitso in the home of Michel?  
P: (witness 2: accused of sharing in the spoils but not of participating in the attack):  I 
didn’t eat the cow and I didn’t hear who said there was icyitso. The person who led 
the attack to go and get the cow was K….I saw them going up with a cow. They were 
saying that if they did not find a cow, they would kill someone. When they were in 
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front of Michel’s house, they began to sharpen a machete to intimidate him so that 
they could be given a cow. 
(The questioning continued but it was dark by then and difficult for the secretaries of 
the court to record the testimonies. The session was adjourned for the next week…The 
next session opened with judges asking broad questions to each of the witnesses 
before asking them about the tip-off) 
Judge: Swear first that what you are going to say is true. … 
Tell us the persons who attacked the house of Michel in 1994 and tell us that they 
did…  
How did you see them? 
Who was the leader of the attack? 
Was Madam (Jeanne) there when you went?  
Do you know who mentioned about icyitso?  
S (witness 3): I was a neighbor. I reached there after the attack had arrived. I didn’t 
see who said icyitso.  
B: (witness 4): I saw the attack which came to Michel’s house. Many young people 
came with machetes and stones with the objective of killing the wife of Michel. I saw 
them wanting to go into the house by force, saying that if they were not given a cow 
they would kill him and his wife. …I saw them when they had arrived at the house. I 
didn’t know who mentioned there was icyitso. It is they who will explain that.   
SK: (witness 5: accused of sharing in the spoils but not of participating in the attack):    
I was standing outside my house. They asked me where Michel’s house was. I said “I 
don’t know”. They asked me where the cows were. I said “I don’t know”. Then they 
put a machete on my neck but I ran away somehow. I didn’t hear anyone mention 
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icyitso….I saw them going towards Michel’s house. I followed them…They took the 
cow and skinned it. They did not give me a share of the cow. I came back with nothing.  
Michel (Jeanne’s husband- witness 6): I was preparing food for my children when the 
attackers arrived. They told me “We heard there is icyitso in your house. Now, give 
her to us or you will be killed in her place….One of them sharpened his machete as he 
stood with the others…Some of them went inside the house to check…Now, I ask John 
as a person who has confessed to tell me who it was that said there was an icyitso in 
my house. That is, if he is in the way of reconciliation.  
Judge: Were you among the attackers? 
Michel: No. 
Judge: In 1994, every Tutsi was called icyitso. Can you give any evidence that there 
was in fact someone who had informed them?  
Michel: That is known by those who attacked me. 
(Judges speak to John)  
Judge: John, you have been asked by Michel who accuses you…He asks you as a 
person who has confessed and understands that he is in the way of reconciliation to 
tell who informed you that there was icyitso in his house? 
John: Nobody informed me that there was icyitso. I knew that woman (Jeanne) 
beforehand and I knew she was there.  
Judge: You say you knew she was there. Was it you who informed those who went 
with you in the attack that there was icyitso? 
John: No.  
Judge: If there is evidence showing that you know who informed about icyitso but you 
refused to say it, will you agree to lose the case?  
John: I agree to lose if there is anyone who testifies that it was me who gave 
information on icyitso.   
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 (At 3 o’clock in the afternoon the session was adjourned for the day. When the trial 
reconvened the next week, a prisoner who had confessed was brought in to testify)  
Judge: Tell us the truth that you know on John 
F (witness 7- co accused): The truth that I know on John is that he went to Michel’s 
house and ate a portion of the cow but he did not have any more of a role in that 
incident….There were a lot of people in that attack and I shall name them as I 
remember.  
Judge: Michel had not been on the road to meet you that day? 
F: No, he did not go on the road. We met him at his home.   
Judge: You did not hear anyone saying that Michel had gone to the road? 
F: He went nowhere. We met him at his home.  
Judge: We had a problem of knowing who informed about icyitso in Michel’s home. 
Icyitso was used commonly during the war….We conclude that John did not inform 
about icyitso.   
From the excerpts, it is clear that most witnesses confirmed that the visit to Michel’s 
house was indeed an attack, that Michel was a victim of extortion and intimidation, 
and that the question of who informed the attackers that there was an accomplice in 
the home of Michel could not be definitively answered. At the very least, the 
testimonies did not definitively point toward John. Based on this, the judges concluded 
that John could not be held for the tip-off; in fact, they seemed to dismiss the idea that 
there had been tip-off in the first place and dismissed an accusation against him that 
could have otherwise jeopardized his confession and plea bargain.     
On the whole therefore, information availability is crucial in the gacaca courts. 
When the balance of information is against the accused individual, it is difficult to 
avoid being placed on the list of the accused, avert arrest and ultimately to prove one’s 
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innocence. Even those who have confessed run the risk of their confessions being 
rejected if the confession does not match the entirety of what is known through the 
information already exposed. In the first phase of trials, for example, 1015 confessions 
were rejected for being incomplete while 3579 confessions were accepted as valid. Of 
those confessions that were accepted, 556 were reconsidered at trial (presumably after 
the accused realized how much information they were actually confronted with).295 
However, even if an accusation really has some basis in fact, so long as the balance of 
information points in a direction away from the accused or at a minimum does not 
directly implicate the accused person, it is hard for those charges to be 
consequential.296    
 
5.4  Conclusion   
The testimony of eye witnesses or survivors is as important in generating information 
on the accused as are denunciations by co-accused who have already confessed. None 
of this is to suggest that the information is necessarily true or false. The proposition 
advanced in this chapter is that the more information accumulates against the accused, 
the harder it becomes to escape unscathed. The trial data show that confessions are 
associated with information exposure and that the confessed are sensitive to the degree 
to which they have been exposed. Information exposure matters because it is often the 
only evidence available in the gacaca courts and as long as that information can be 
corroborated by multiple sources, it is taken to be true.  
The general population also fears entanglement with the activities of the court 
believing that people do not stand a chance at a reasonable defense if they are accused. 
                                                 
295 National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (2007), p4  
296 John had, after all, admitted that he knew where Jeanne lived. It is not inconceivable that he could 
have tipped off the group about her whereabouts.  
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During my stay in Masaka sector, district elites were compelled to address a growing 
local panic. There were 9 public meetings in 3 months in which the residents of 
Masaka sector were involved. Six of these meetings were held to address gacaca-
related problems. The biggest of these meetings was organized at the district. The 
weekly trial was postponed to permit people to attend the meeting instead. People 
were reminded that the accused are ‘innocent until proven guilty’.297 A survivor was 
berated publicly for allegedly making false accusations and people were urged to 
remain calm and monitor local affairs in the interest of the security of the community.  
The gacaca system is set up in such a way that it does not take much to prove 
someone guilty. When I asked a young man why he did not attend the trials on a 
regular basis, he feigned alarm and throwing his hands in the air, he exclaimed, 
“Gacaca is very dangerous!”298 He noted the activism of survivors who “know many 
things” and the proliferation of bribes and false accusations “out of jealousy” from 
which it was impossible to disentangle oneself. People know this and find it in their 
best interest to confess when they feel irrevocably exposed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
297 District meeting. June 2005. People from all the sectors in that district were invited to attend. The 
meeting was conducted by the Mayor at which the police chief of the district and SNJG officials also 
spoke.   
298 Informal conversation in a bar with a Hutu youth;. May 2005. Masaka sector  
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CHAPTER SIX 
JUDGES’ AUTONOMY: ITS SOURCES AND EFFECTS  
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter has four objectives. First, it explains the structural context within which 
the gacaca courts operate and argues that judges are not only key drivers of the trials 
process but also important actors in local government. In both these roles, judges 
enable regime maintenance by serving the interests of ruling elites. Their work allows 
the gacaca courts to function at local level. The gacaca process generates testimonies 
and produces information on those who are accused which, as I have shown in earlier 
chapters, plays an important role in pressuring people to confess. Confessions are an 
important instrument in the production of political quiescence. That judges are 
embedded within government structures of power at the grassroots also enables state 
elites at the center to project power into local communities. I show that ruling elites 
have historically struggled to extend their influence over the hinterland and that they 
have needed allies at the local level to implement their policies. This enables them to 
govern from the center. In the post-genocide period, the regime is dominated by Tutsi 
elites while the vast majority of the rural population is Hutu. I show that judges are 
mostly Hutu and many of the judges in important positions on the bench are also 
members of the RPF.  This suggests a process of co-optation at work in which these 
actors are tied into party structures as well as institutions of state such as gacaca courts 
and local government.299 This enables ruling elites to politically regulate and govern 
the population from the center.  
                                                 
299 The co-optation of local elites appears to be part of a larger strategy of rule by co-optation adopted 
by the regime. For an analysis of the co-optation by ruling elites of civil society actors and political 
parties that could potentially act as counterweights to the perpetuation of its power, see report by 
USAID (2002, November). The RPF government has emphasized that civil society organizations and 
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Second, this chapter argues that because of the dependence of ruling elites on local 
allies for everyday governance, continuation of the trials process and political 
regulation, ruling elites ‘tolerate’ spaces of relative autonomy at the local level. Judges 
also enjoy non-governmental sources of power such as important positions in various 
Churches and associations at the local level and have the influence to mold public 
opinion and mobilize the local population. Ruling elites have much to gain by 
ensuring the compliance of these actors with directives from above in lieu of which 
they cede spaces of relative autonomy that judges use to their own advantage. I show 
how judges are able to act as relatively autonomous actors within a state that is 
conventionally understood as top down and fully capable of controlling local affairs. 
Intervention from upper echelons of state are limited and usually delayed. As long as 
these actors comply in their capacity as gacaca judges and local elites, it is politically 
expedient for state elites at upper echelons to refrain from frequent and overt 
interference in local affairs.  
Third, this chapter traces the effects of relative local autonomy upon gacaca 
processes. I show how judges are able to manipulate local processes to serve their own 
interests. Judges’ ability to maneuver around the rules creates fundamental uncertainty 
about the outcomes of cases. They are able to secure the release of some people and 
have others added to the list of accused.300  
                                                                                                                                            
political parties should act as “partners” in the rehabilitation of Rwanda instead of acting primarily as a 
restraint on government or in opposition to its policies.  
300 Judges can authorize pre-trial detention, imprisonment for false testimony or for refusal to testify, 
preventive detention if they fear that the accused may attempt to flee, and can even order the seizure of 
property in certain cases. Concerned at the high number of arrests for refusal to testify and the frequent 
use of preventive detention permissible under gacaca law, international human rights organizations with 
a presence on the ground recommended that the government ask gacaca judges not to authorize arrests 
in the pre-judgment stages. Avocats Sans Frontieres, Danish Center for Human Rights, Penal Reform 
International and Reseau Citoyens Network (2005, October 17)  
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Finally, I show how judges use information strategically to secure the outcomes they 
want. This corroborates the findings of the earlier chapters that in the context of the 
gacaca courts, the more information accumulates against an individual (true or false), 
the less uncertain his fate becomes.    
 
6.2  Judges: voluntary participation of interested actors  
Rwanda has a history of state-driven popular mobilization- both routine 
(Umuganda301-development projects using peoples’ labor), and in response to specific 
events (civil patrols302 during insecure times, and most spectacularly, the genocide). 
Explanations for the state’s ability to mobilize huge numbers of people are often 
structural. They dwell on the importance of well-organized state structures from top to 
bottom, the effectiveness of which is compounded by the fact that communities are so 
densely populated that non-compliers can generally be identified and punished.303 
Other explanations also emphasize the repressive goals of state elites who have 
routinely crushed dissent.304 The models suggest that people participate because they 
are forced to comply or must make every effort to look as if they are complying.    
The general involvement of the community in the gacaca process allows the 
government to argue that its success is contingent on the willing and enthusiastic 
participation of the population at large. Observers noted the imposition of fines and 
                                                 
301 On the origins of umuganda and its institutionalization as policy, see a report from the Office of the 
President of the MRND (January 1990)   
 
302 Scott Straus (2006), chapter 8  
303 Scott Straus (2006), chapter 8  
304 Uvin argues that state elites have always preferred to get people to do something out of a threat of 
punishment rather than extending positive inducements and incentives. Peter Uvin (1998) , chapter 6  
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other coercive measures, for example, people may be punished with short prison terms 
for refusing to testify. They describe the process as state-driven and coerced. 305 
But the gacaca tribunals are distinctive in that 250,000 individuals306 stepped 
forward to serve as judges without remuneration, even as the population at large has to 
be coaxed or coerced into participating. Most judges are Hutu, and appear willing to 
sit in judgment over fellow Hutu, knowing well that this is an unpopular task.  
 I find that gacaca judges with important positions on the bench are comprised of 
Hutu who are rural elites and able to use these spaces of autonomy to serve their own 
interests at the local level. They are able to get themselves elected as judges. They use 
gacaca to engage in power struggles that consolidate their position at the expense of 
their opponents, to maneuver around the rules in order to secure the release of friends 
and family, or to leverage the position towards a bigger political prize at the local 
level. Deviations and maneuvers by judges are allowed to go unchecked to some 
extent. Intervention from above occurs when local struggles that have gone on for a 
while cannot be contained threatening to disrupt order at the local level and derail the 
gacaca process or when district elites are interested in the outcome of a particular case.  
Judges’ power to deliver verdicts and their room for maneuver creates a great deal 
of uncertainty about the outcomes of individual cases in a gacaca court. For an 
individual with few connections to those with influence at the local level, a trial is like 
plunging into the unknown.  “Only God can save me now” is a common refrain307 
                                                 
305 Lars Waldorf (2006a), pp. 422-432; Jennie E. Burnet (2007); Long time observers of Rwanda 
described it as a “state-directed system that is presently not an open forum” See Great Lakes Policy 
Forum (2003, January 9)  
306 These are the figures for judges in the first elections organized in 2001 in anticipation of setting up 
the tribunals.  Successive gacaca laws have reduced the number of judges per tribunal. In the judges’ 
elections organized in 2007, 169442 judges were elected. US Department of State (2008)   
307 Heard in the course of informal conversations while waiting for the trial to start or after the sessions 
were over; people would gather in groups and linger for a while before dispersing.  
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when someone is accused and called to testify. For the accused who have committed 
crimes in an area different from their place of origin, it is a truly troubling prospect to 
face a panel of judges who are completely unknown. In ordinary courts, the accused 
have confidence in the certainty of formal rules even though one may not know the 
judges and need not be familiar with the said legal procedures. In a gacaca court, 
however, the accused hope for the certainty of having familiar faces in the audience 
and on the panel because of their anxieties about the uncertainty of trial procedures 
and the relatively autonomous role of judges.308    
Observations of trial proceedings suggest that in cases where judges have no stake 
in the outcome, they make a fair attempt to gauge the veracity of testimonies and 
decide on a verdict.309 But despite their best intentions, judges can often be wrong, 
deciding cases on the basis of testimonies that cannot always be verified or arriving at 
a decision based on the number of witnesses for and against an individual. As long as 
the cases are processed without major disruption and judges are able to record 
testimonies and fill out the required paperwork, mistakes or deliberately contrived 
judgments often pass under the radar screen without being corrected.310 The lack of 
                                                 
308 People dreaded being called to testify by gacaca courts in general but they panicked when 
summoned by a gacaca court other than their own. A prominent resident of the area failed to show up at 
another court to testify despite being summoned three times. At the fourth summons, he finally dragged 
himself to the court where he was arrested for refusing to testify. Another person spent long hours in a 
bar, expressing his anxiety to all those who would listen, consulting his friends, acquaintances and even 
my interpreter and me before going to testify in the gacaca court of the adjacent sector.  The general 
feeling was that they could at least hope to be treated fairly by those who know them but there were no 
such guarantees outside their own community.  
309 In five out of the six trials I observed, the judges were remarkably perceptive, asking quick follow up 
questions, returning again and again to the specific points on which the defendant could not provide 
satisfactory answers and for the most part were able to pick up on the contradictions in testimonies.  In 
one trial, however, the president asked broad questions, did not push the defendant to clarify the fuzzier 
parts of his testimony and unless someone else (survivor or other witnesses) challenged the narrative 
(which no one did), they were willing to merely record what the defendant said. In this particular case, 
the defendant happened to be related (part of his extended family) to the president. I learnt this after the 
trial from a survivor and confirmed this information from another person who knew the family well.  
310 The accused do have the right to appeal under gacaca law. Of 7412 verdicts handed down by the trial 
courts in the pilot phase, 1354 were appealed by the defendants and 323 by the plaintiffs. The National 
Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (2007), p4. The appeals are heard by a gacaca court designated for this 
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adequate oversight by a state that is generally preoccupied with control of local 
processes is explained by the spaces of autonomy enjoyed by local elites.  
This chapter shows that structures of state are embedded in relations of power 
between the centre, the district and the cell. These relations explain how the centre 
‘broadcasts power’ into the hinterland311 and why it needs allies, not rivals, in local 
elites.312 It presents data on judges in 5 cells of Masaka sector to show that judges are 
mostly Hutu, members of the ruling party and that there is a large overlap between 
judges and local elites. I demonstrate how judges use the relatively autonomous space 
‘allowed’ to them to engage in power struggles and secure the release of friends and 
relatives.  
6.3 Rwanda: The strong but weak state  
The weakness of African states in projecting power from the center to the borderlands, 
or from the center to the local level has been much studied.313 The Rwandan state is no 
exception. As the central kingdom expanded north, east and westward through 
conquest in the nineteenth century, it confronted problems of control and taxation. In 
the peripheral kingdoms, the Tutsi king Rwabugiri’s tax collectors profited from 
taxation as much as the king did.314 Attempts to successfully transplant local 
institutions in these outlying areas took time.315 Not only was there a great deal of 
                                                                                                                                            
purpose. This does little to ameliorate the shortcomings inherent in the gacaca process. For a state that 
sees justice as a flagship project it is curious that it does not do more to ensure the manipulations can be 
kept to a minimum. In ordinary courts, the fairness of procedures generates confidence in the fairness of 
the outcomes. But because of the absence of procedural safeguards and the lack of explicit rights of the 
accused, some observers have argued that it would be desirable to have an appropriate mechanism for 
the judicial review of cases decided by the gacaca courts. See Kusi Hornberger (2007)   
 
311 Jeffrey Herbst (2000)  
312 Catherine Boone (2003).  
313 Jeffrey Herbst (2000); Catherine Boone (2003); Wim van Binsbergen, Filip Reyntjens, and Gerti 
Hesseling eds. (1986)  
314 Danielle de Lame, citing historian Alison Des Forges See Danielle de Lame (2005), p45  
315 Catharine Newbury (1978); David Newbury and Catharine Newbury (2000)   
                                                                                                                        
 151
heterogeneity of pre-colonial social and political institutions across regions, but also 
local traditions were so resistant to change imposed from afar that after independence 
and abolition of the kingdom, the old dominant land-clearing lineages returned to the 
fore in parts of the north.316  
After Rwabugiri’s death, the central court’s appointees in the outposts who had been 
poorly integrated in those areas returned to the centre and taxes ceased to be paid. 
During his successor King Musinga’s reign, a rebellion in the north defied the power 
of both the Tutsi king and the German colonial administration.317 It was under Belgian 
rule that the depth and reach of the state expanded. They reduced the power of elites at 
the central court and increased the authority of local chiefs.318    
Many scholars emphasize the capacity of the state to mobilize the population and 
enforce its decisions at local level but this overlooks the duality of the Rwandan state 
which is also weak in that it has historically been premised in patronage-based, 
personalistic rule and has lacked legitimacy at the local level.319  The rural population 
is withdrawn and secretive,320 peasant strategies for dealing with state power are 
atomized and defensive,321 and protest has often had its roots in small religious 
cults.322  
 
 
                                                 
316 Danielle de Lame (2005), p45; See also David Newbury (2001)  
317 Alison Des Forges (1986)  
318 Scott Straus (2006), chapter 8  
319 Peter Uvin (1998), chapter 6  
320 Lars Waldorf, citing anthropologist Danielle de Lame. See Waldorf (2006), fn 406  
 
321 Scott Straus (2006), chapter 8 ; A concurring analysis of strategies of the rural population within the 
context of pre-colonial and colonial state structures very similar to Rwanda’s, see Thomas Laely 
(1997), p14  
322 Danielle de Lame (2005), pp253-254; See also Alison Des Forges (1986); David L. Schoenbrun 
(2006)  
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6.3.1 Two pivots between central elites and the local population  
To understand how the state projects power into local areas, it is important to move 
beyond an undifferentiated notion of vertical state structures. Rwanda has 4 provinces 
in addition to the capital Kigali, with each of these units comprising between 3-7 
districts. Every district has between 5-9 sectors and every sector has a number of cells 
which is the lowest political-administrative unit. There 30 districts, 416 sectors and 
2148 cells.323  Each cell is informally divided into clusters of ten households with each 
cluster electing a leader known as the nyumbakumi. 
Schematic representations of the Rwandan state generally portray state structures as 
top-down324 in which each level breaks down into its constituent units, suggesting a 
matrix of power in which influence, directives, resources and sanctions flow from 
upper echelons of state to lower levels [See Figure 6.1]. A more nuanced appraisal of 
how the state works in Rwanda should emphasize that the political, administrative, 
and developmental roles are different for each level of state.   
As described in the earlier section, central elites have historically struggled to 
extend control over local populations. The district has emerged as a key pivot between 
the centre and the grassroots. The district is in physical proximity to the grassroots and 
more accessible from the center. The real distance between the capital Kigali and any 
given district may not be much but travel time is considerable. The tarmac road 
usually ends at district headquarters from where dirt tracks meander into the rural 
hinterland- the sectors and cells. The district also bridges the psychological distance 
                                                 
323 Immaculate Bugingo (2006, April 27) This is after the administrative reorganization in 2006. Prior to 
this, there were 11 provinces in addition to the capital Kigali, 160 districts, 1545 sectors and 9165 cells.  
324 Straus describes state structures as “hierarchical, centralized and extensive” Scott Straus (2006), 
chapter 8; Prunier writes, “Genocide happened because not because the state was weak, but on the 
contrary because it was so totalitarian and strong that it had the capacity to make its subjects obey 
absolutely any order, including one of mass slaughter.” See Gérard Prunier (1995), p354; Thomson 
argues that the policy of national unity is being implemented “top down in the guise of a policy of 
decentralization” See Susan Thompson (2007).  
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Figure 6.1: State structures in Rwanda 
Source: Adapted from Scott Straus (2006) 
 
between urban elites (les évolués) and the rural population. For the rural poor, Kigali 
is the center of power but a distant reality.  
Orders and directives emanate from district officials to whom the local population is 
usually accountable. The apparatus of power is directly visible and experienced in the 
most immediate ways at the district headquarters. The police post, district courts, and 
even the district bureau of the SNJG (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdiction) are 
usually adjacent to the district Mayor’s office.  In contrast, there is no police outpost at 
the sector. There may not even be a building that serves as sector office. In 
government planning documents, the district is visualized as a necessary intermediary 
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in decentralized development; its role is to implement policies decided at the centre.325 
That the President of the Republic would appoint district Mayors in the pre-genocide 
era attests to the importance of the district as a key pivot between centre and the 
grassroots.   
District elites however require the mediation of local elites at the sector and cells if 
they are to successfully regulate the grassroots population. The cell and sector are sites 
of primary identification for rural Rwandans.326 Local elites at cell and sector level are 
few and identifiable; elections at the sector and cells generally involve a turnover 
amongst these same people. The sector’s relationship with its constituent cells is more 
organic than the sector’s relationship to the district and the sector-cell leadership is 
closely nested within grassroots power structures.   
From the bottom up, the district is clearly perceived as an arm of the state. It is the 
place from where power flows into local communities. Ethnographic data show that in 
lived experience, the district is where people go to register complaints, request the 
intervention of the police or expect development directives but the district is not 
particularly embedded in the grassroots.  The local population has always wanted to 
preserve its own autonomy against incursions from above. When elections were first 
introduced at the local level (in the late 80s), it was used by local people to “reduce the 
district to impotence.”327 People elected the most ineffective candidate as the cell’s 
representative to the district; the most vigorous, energetic and sympathetic people 
were elected time and time again for cell committee positions.328 Local elites belonged 
                                                 
325 Draft presentation by the World Bank (2005, September 21)  
326 Scott Straus (2006), chapter 8 
327 Danielle de Lame (2005), p262 
328 Danielle de Lame (2005), p264  
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to extended families with social sources of power in terms of land, animals and 
connections to political and church authorities.329   
Since the RPF dominated transition, the district leadership has been dominated by 
Tutsi while grassroots leaders are predominantly Hutu.330 Given the starkly different 
experiences and interpretations of the war and genocide, the importance of having 
local elites on board for everyday governance and the continued operation of the 
gacaca courts cannot be underestimated.  
The need for allies instead of rivals in the grassroots leadership was demonstrated in 
the local elections organized in 2001 when the RPF attempted to identify local Hutu 
leaders whose loyalty could be counted upon by co-opting them into the party.331 The 
Second Hutu Republic under the MRND regime would appoint even sector and cell 
leaders.332 For the center and for the district, securing the cooperation of local elites 
has been crucial.    
6.3.2 The ‘pivot’ as a specific political relationship  
Power does not simply flow downwards from the centre to the grassroots population 
through intervening structures. Instead, at the two main “pivots” of state- the district 
and the sector-cell levels - there is space for autonomy too. This space is allowed to 
local powerbrokers in return for their loyalty and cooperation. At each “pivot”, local 
elites are able to leverage their position to secure for themselves a zone of relative 
autonomy.    
                                                 
329 Danielle de Lame (2005), p261  
330 In general, upper echelons of state are dominated by Tutsi who are in the ruling party, the RPF. In 
mid-2000, for eg., of Governors: 11 were RPF out of whom 9 were Tutsi. Of ambassadors, 8 were RPF 
out of which 7 were Tutsi. In Parliament, 61 were RPF out of whom 49 were Tutsi. In the army 
command structure, 8 were RPF out of whom all were Tutsi. See Filip  Reyntjens (2004)     
331 International Crisis Group (2001), p9  
332 USAID (2002) report submitted to the Ministry of Local Affairs, Government of Rwanda on 
decentralization assessment, p17  
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It is not simply an administrative decision to ‘tolerate’ spaces of local autonomy. 
Recent studies on decentralization focus on the interests of local elites and the local 
sources of power they are able to draw on resulting in relationships between lower and 
upper echelons of state that constitute a delicate balancing of the needs and interests of 
both sets of elites.333       
In fact, small deviations can be ignored so long as local elites routinely comply with 
directives from above. In Rwanda, sector and cell leaders are indispensable. It is 
difficult to organize mass meetings without their cooperation; access to intelligence in 
the rural hinterland cannot be had without their cooperation. Between the district and 
the center, there is also a very similar dynamic of relative autonomy versus control. 
On the one hand, there has been a move to make districts financially independent of 
transfers from the center. The national fiscal decentralization policy has been 
gradually implemented since 2002.334 District Mayors are also indirectly elected by 
the population instead of being appointed from above as in the previous regime. On 
the other hand, with fewer districts since 2006, it is easier for the center to manage and 
monitor district elites.  
6.3.3  Gacaca judges, local government and the SNJG   
The political relationship between district elites and local elites is directly relevant for 
an understanding of the context within which the gacaca process plays out. The SNJG 
has a functioning office at the district. A SNJG coordinator for the district is appointed 
by SNJG officials at the province level or in Kigali. Equipped with a motorcycle, the 
district coordinator for SNJG travels from his office at the district to the sectors and 
even further to the cells in order to monitor gacaca cell and sector courts. The district 
in which I spent the most time comprised 6 sectors in all. One of these, Masaka sector 
                                                 
333 See for example, Catherine Boone (2003)  
334 USAID/Rwanda (2004), p21,p 33.  
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(where I observed the gacaca trials) had 9 cells. Therefore, in any given week, a single 
SNJG official had to monitor approximately 54 cell courts335 and 6 sector courts.336 
This was impossible given that proceedings at a single site could take an entire day. 
Sometimes there was no money to pay for fuel.337 There is thus no SNJG oversight on 
a weekly basis either at the sector or at the cell courts.338      
The trial and appeals courts for category 2 crimes are located at sector level, usually 
at the sector government office. If there is no such building, court sessions are 
conducted in a field or a school. The pre-trial hearings are conducted at the cell courts. 
Dossiers prepared by cell courts are forwarded339 to the sector court where the trials of 
category 2 accused are held.  Dossiers in category 1 are forwarded from the cell courts 
to the Prosecution department at the province where they are tried by ordinary 
courts.340 Judges at the cells therefore enjoy considerable discretion in the preparation 
of the dossiers, which they have often used to their advantage by implicating some and 
securing the release of others.   
The courts are independent under gacaca law; therefore there is formally no 
mechanism for oversight by sector or cell government officials. The judges are 
accountable, directly and most regularly to the SNJG coordinator at the district who in 
                                                 
335 To try category 3 accused 
336 To try category 2 accused  
337 SNJG monthly reports, Northern Province April 2004  
338 At one of the trials in Masaka sector, the accused was handed a verdict of 26 years. He walked 
casually out of the sector office where the trial was being held and was last seen entering a bar. He used 
the back door to escape. There were no police or local defense personnel present on that day. Since that 
episode, there have been one or two members of the local defense force- LDF (civilian patrols who are 
given some army training) equipped with sticks. Intermittently, over the course of the trials that 
followed, one or two policemen would stop by. They never stayed for more than a few minutes. Masaka 
sector 2005.  
339 A step in between is the vetting of the dossiers prepared at cell level by the Parquet, before the 
dossiers are forwarded to sector gacaca, cell gacaca, or province-level ordinary court depending on how 
the dossier is categorized.  
 
340 The gacaca law revised in 2007 authorizes gacaca courts to try category 1 accused as well. 
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turn reports to a supervisor at the SNJG province office. It is at the province that SNJG 
officials interact extensively with the offices of the prosecution department and 
prisons. Problems originating at sector or cell courts are directed by the SNJG district 
coordinator to his bosses at the province, who in turn may consult the prosecutor, 
director of prisons, or SNJG directors in Kigali. Figure 6.2 maps the institutional 
linkages between cell-sector courts and the SNJG on the one hand, and the linkages 
between SNJG and government organs on the other.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Institutional linkages between gacaca courts and government organs 
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6.4 Judges as local elites  
The argument of this chapter is that judges’ maneuvers are ‘tolerated’ by political 
elites at the district because large numbers of them (particularly the five most 
important positions on the judges’ panel of nine:  president, two vice-presidents, and 
two secretaries) are also local elites with important positions on cell committees, 
nyumbakumi (leaders of ten households), sector councils, local associations and 
churches. Figure 6.3 below maps the intersection between judges and local elites and 
shows their relationship with organs of state.    
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Judges, local elites and relationship with district officials 
 
District elites 
  - Mayor 
     - Police 
SNJG district 
coordinator 
Grassroots population 
Local elites who are not judges 
 
Local elites who are also judges 
 
Judges who are not local elites 
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Without the cooperation of these individuals, it would be virtually impossible 
to continue with the trials or govern at the grassroots. Table 6.1 below shows that the 
most important positions on the bench are occupied by Hutu males who are members 
of the RPF.  They are important intermediaries between the state elites (Tutsi-
dominated and RPF) and the grassroots where Hutu are 85% of the population.     
 
Table 6.1: Judges’ Composition by sex, ethnic identity, age and political 
affiliation 
 
Cell Position Ethnic id sex pre-1994 political party present political party 
1 President H m PSD RPF 
 VP1 H m - RPF 
 VP2 H m MRND RPF 
 S1 H m - RPF 
 S2 H m MDR RPF 
 non-CC T m MRND RPF 
2 President H m PSD RPF 
 VP1 H m - - 
 VP2 H m - - 
 S1 H m - RPF 
 S2 H f MRND RPF 
 non-CC T f - RPF 
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Table 6.1 continued 
Cell Position Ethnic id sex pre-1994 political party present political party 
3 President H f PSD RPF 
 VP1     
 VP2 H m MDR RPF 
 S1 H m   
 S2 H m - RPF 
 non-CC T f - RPF 
4 President H m MDR RPF 
 VP1 H m MDR - 
 VP2 H f - RPF 
 S1 H f - - 
 S2 H m   
5 President H m - RPF 
 VP1 H m - RPF 
 VP2 H m - RPF 
 S1 H m  RPF 
 S2 H m - RPF 
 non-CC T f - RPF 
Note: Non-CC indicates a judge not on the coordinating committee of five. Also, (-) 
indicates no party identified by respondent. Blank cells indicate missing data. 
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Table 6.2 below shows how many judges on the coordinating committee of 
five hold or used to hold government power at the local level. They are local elites 
without whose cooperation the center has always had a problem governing the rural 
hinterland. We will see in the next section of this chapter that this gives local elites a 
certain leverage that they can use to their advantage.    
 
Table 6.2: Judges’ positions of power in grassroots governance 
 
Cell Position Current position(s) Past position(s) 
1 President sector council cell committee 
 VP1 - cell committee 
 VP2 nyumbakumi cell committee 
 S1 nyumbakumi  
 S2 cell committee nyumbakumi 
 non-CC - cell committee 
2 President RPF VP cell + 2 cell committees - 
 VP1 nyumbakumi - 
 VP2 - - 
 S1 cell committee - 
 S2 - - 
 non-CC sector council cell committee 
3 President sector council + district council - 
 VP1 - - 
 VP2 - nyumbakumi 
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Table 6.2 continued 
Cell Position Current position(s) Past position(s) 
 S1 - - 
 S2 cell committee - 
 non-CC - - 
4 President nyumbakumi cell committee 
 VP1 - district Mayor 
 VP2 - - 
 S1 sector council cell committee 
 S2 - - 
5 President cell committee - 
 VP1 cell committee - 
 VP2 cell committee - 
 S1 cell committee + nyumbakumi - 
 S2 
RPF President of cell + 
cell committee - 
 non-CC   
Note: Blank cells indicate missing data. (-) indicates no positions reported.  
 
Table 6.3 below shows how many judges on the coordinating committee hold 
important positions in churches and local associations.   
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This is a source of status and influence for these individuals that are independent of 
government. It gives them additional leverage vis-à-vis elites at the center in that the 
latter cannot afford to deprive itself of the cooperation of influential opinion leaders 
and powerbrokers at the grassroots. At a minimum, the government relies on local 
opinion leaders to advocate on their behalf the usefulness of gacaca, to mobilize and to 
continually sensitize the local population.341 During field research, I encountered some 
judges who reported that their services had been utilized during the Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections. They had been ordered by district officials to mobilize people 
and ensure that the local population voted for the RPF candidate.342  
It is not surprising that given their governmental and non-governmental 
sources of power, most judges are able to hold onto their positions at the gacaca court 
as we can see from Table 6.4.   
 
Table 6.4: Limited judges’ turnover at election 
 
Cell 
 
Position 
 
In same position since… 
(founding election =June02) 
New position after 2004 judges’ 
election 
 
1 President Jun-02 
new position: President of  appeals 
Court 
 VP1 Jun-02 remains VP1 
 VP2 Aug-02 remains VP2 
 
                                                 
341 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (n. d) “Nationwide grassroots consultations report: 
Unity and Reconciliation Initiatives in Rwanda” Kigali.  
342 They were threatened that they would be responsible if a certain number of votes were not delivered 
for the RPF from their community.  
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Table 6.4 continued 
 
Cell 
 
Position 
 
In same position since… 
(founding election =June02) 
New position after 2004 judges’ 
election 
 
 S1 Jun-02 
new position: President of cell 
court 
 S2 Mar-03 new position: S1 of cell court 
 non-CC Jun-02 resigned 
2 President Jun-02 replaced by district elites 
 VP1 Jun-02 
new position: President of cell 
court 
 VP2 Jun-02 replaced by district elites 
 S1 Jun-02 replaced by district elites 
 S2 Jun-03 new position: became S1 
 non-CC  new position: became VP2 
3 President Sep-02 remains President of cell court 
 VP1   
 VP2 Dec-02 remains VP2 
 S1 Jun-02 remains S1 
 S2 Aug-02 remains S2 
 non-CC Jun-02 remains non-CC judge 
4 President May-03 remains President cell court 
 VP1 Jun-02 not re-elected 
 VP2 Jun-02 new position: became non-CC 
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Table 6.4 continued 
 
 S1 Nov-02 remains S1 
 S2   
5 President Mar-03 remains President of cell court 
 VP1 Aug-02 remains VP1 
 VP2 Jun-03 remains VP2 
 S1 Jun-02 remains S1 
 S2 Jun-02 remains S2 
 non-CC Feb-03 remains non-CC permanent judge 
 
Note: Blank cells indicate missing data 
 
Over a two year period (2002-2004) the turnover among judges has been limited; 
elections tend to result in a reallocation of the positions among the same people.   
Judges then represent a class of important actors entrenched at the local level. The 
demand for their services (judicial, local governance, opinion leaders) based on their 
influence within their communities creates a situation where elites at the center cannot 
afford to alienate them and allows them relative autonomy in exchange of a broad and 
continued cooperation.   
6.5  Judges’ autonomy and arbitrariness  
Although the gacaca law formally protects judges from political interference and there 
is no formal mechanism for regular oversight except by the SNJG coordinator, district 
elites did intervene during my stay in Masaka sector. These were not only limited 
interventions; in most cases, these were delayed interventions as well.343  District 
                                                 
343 In 2006, the genocide survivors’ umbrella organization IBUKA complained that the government was 
not doing enough to ensure the safety of survivors. See US Department of State (2007). Also see 
Hirondelle New Agency (2007, January 31)    
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elites either had a stake in the outcome of a particular case or they were responding to 
the distinct possibility that struggles and maneuvers around gacaca that they had 
allowed so far had reached a dangerous peak and needed to be checked.  
The subterranean nature of maneuvers around gacaca and the considerable attempt 
to keep up appearances made it problematic to tap into and collect data on local power 
struggles. However, these dynamics often became very complicated drawing in 
multiple actors making it difficult to contain contentious activity. Disputes that broke 
through the surface provided ‘windows of opportunity’ allowing a glimpse beyond the 
carefully arranged façade. The data presented here draws on informal conversations 
and formal interviews with all the relevant actors as well as careful observation of the 
processes as they unfolded over several months. One or more active incidents were 
reported in seven out of nine cells in Masaka sector during my stay there. Maneuvers 
and local upheavals around gacaca were also reported in each of the three other sectors 
in different parts of the country that I visited during the pre-trial hearings stage in 
2004. Judges were involved in a majority of the cases reported.  
In one cell, for example, survivors had been complaining against the actions of the 
president of the cell court for well over a year but there was no action on the part of 
the SNJG coordinator of the district. At the re-election of judges the next year, 
survivors grouped together and raised the same accusation in an effort to prevent the 
re-election of the president. Things became very tense when the community split into 
groups, shouting and pushing one another. This brought the police down from the 
district and the president was eventually prevented from contesting the election. 
In another cell, the president was accused of having participated in events that led to 
the death of a child. The president together with his cronies on the bench suppressed 
that information allowing him to continue at the head of the cell gacaca court. The first 
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vice-president however was ambitious and aspired to the president’s post. He began to 
conduct his own investigations. He visited survivors’ homes and collected information 
on the case. The president had to step down when he raised the accusations anew and 
supplied the information he had at his disposal. The first vice-president took over as 
interim president until the judges’ elections could be held. It appears that at this time 
the ousted president who belonged to a prominent local family sought the help of his 
supporters on the bench to conspire against the interim president who was determined 
to pursue the case of the child’s death.   
At court hearings, the interim president discovered that his fellow judges were 
deliberately insolent and the community indifferent to his authority. He responded by 
insulting and threatening his colleagues and those who attended the hearings. There 
were serious problems such as missing documents and disrupted sessions. These 
issues were not dealt with for a whole year even though the SNJG coordinator as well 
as cell and sector officials were aware that these things were happening. Things took a 
disastrous turn during my stay. The house of the interim president was broken into and 
the dossier on the child’s death was removed along with other court papers. Whoever 
had entered the house did not enter through the door as the lock was intact. A small 
hole had been made in one of the walls. The interim president was accused of gross 
negligence by local officials and threatened with a possible prison term. Important 
members in cell government were related to the ousted president. They refused to 
believe that someone had broken into the house when the locked door remained intact.  
The interim president finally tried to commit suicide. It was after this incident that the 
Mayor and the district police became involved in the affairs of the cell gacaca court. 
The pattern was the same: despite being cognizant of manipulations by the judges, 
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district elites did not respond until events occurred that threatened an outbreak of 
violence.    
In a third cell, the erstwhile Mayor became involved in gacaca proceedings. He was 
a genocide survivor and wanted to pursue the cases of his friends who had died. The 
president of the cell court secured the release of a prisoner who had been accused of 
killing a friend of the Mayor. The bench had determined that the accusations against 
the prisoner were not credible because they believed that the accuser’s account was 
implausible. They dismissed the idea that the accuser (another survivor) could have 
spotted the alleged perpetrator from his hiding place up in the ceiling. They reasoned 
that the perpetrator had been searching the house for Tutsi who were hidden and must 
have searched the space above the ceiling as well. How could it be that the survivor 
spotted the alleged perpetrator from the ceiling but the latter did not spot him? The 
judges concluded that the survivor must not have been present at that time and that his 
testimony could not be an eye witness account. They signed the papers authorizing the 
accused person’s release. This did not create a furor until the prisoner returned to the 
community some months later. The ex-Mayor was a powerful man and although he 
did not live in that sector any longer, it was perhaps at his request that district officials 
got involved.  They summoned the president of the cell court to the district office to 
explain and pressured him to resign from his position. People huddled in bars that 
evening discussing what had transpired at the district office. Apparently, the president 
had written that he was resigning because he was felt threatened (the subtext was he 
felt threatened by district authorities) and could not be sure he was safe. The local 
interpretation of this was that the president had taken a great risk but had heroically 
resisted the interference of an unpopular government into local affairs. In this case, 
district elites became involved because they were interested in a particular outcome.    
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6.6 Judges and the uses and abuses of information  
In this section, I use an example from the trial court at sector level to show how 
judges’ manipulations create uncertainty. This contentious episode drew in survivors, 
judges and the accused, exposing patterns of collusion among them and the struggle to 
manipulate the legal outcome for a particular case. The accused in this case had 
already confessed, so one might presume that his verdict was certain. But judges are 
able to manipulate local processes throwing apparently foregone conclusions in doubt.   
The normally composed president of the trial court announced heatedly at the end of 
a court session that he had been accused by another judge (a survivor with a non-
permanent position on the trial court) of attempting to suppress the dossier of a certain 
individual who was coming up for trial in a couple of weeks. He said he wanted to 
make a public statement so that no one might impugn his motives. 
It transpired that the accused individual in question, James,344 had two dossiers 
compiled by two different cell-level gacaca courts. He had been accused of 
committing category 1 crimes in a cell and category 2 crimes in the other cell. Since 
category 1 crimes were tried by ordinary courts in 2005, one of his dossiers had been 
transmitted from the cell court directly to the Prosecutor’s Office at the province 
without the knowledge of the gacaca trial court. This meant that James could not be 
tried at the gacaca trial court any longer because an ordinary court would have 
jurisdiction over anyone charged with category 1 crimes.  
The president had a special interest in James’ trial because of extended family 
ties.345 He was concerned that he was now unlikely to be able to control the outcome 
of James’ case. Some judges at the trial court had a private meeting with the president 
                                                 
344 Names of people and places have been changed to ensure anonymity   
345 Conversation with survivor, Masaka sector, July 2005  
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of the cell court that had sent James’ dossier to the province.346 They berated and 
threatened him for this ‘mistake’ to which he replied that he was only following the 
rules. When Agnes, the judge who was a survivor, protested, there were sharp 
exchanges on all sides. Agnes later suggested to me that there were two factions: The 
first was dominated by the president and allied judges who wanted a way to retrieve 
the dossier from the Prosecutor’s Office and they needed a reason, probably an 
admission of error on the part of the cell court, to justify a request for reconsideration 
of the category 1 dossier. The second faction comprised Agnes and the first vice-
president, Cyprien, who were reluctant to have James tried at the sector court. 
While all this transpired behind the scenes, the trial court carried on with its work 
and there was no further mention of James’ case in public. Two weeks later, rumors 
began to circulate about the first vice-president. It was usually hard work collecting 
and putting together information when people were so secretive, but this time I was 
invited into a bar as I was passing by and given the latest update on the vice-president. 
James had accused him of refusing refuge to a child who was later killed. More stories 
about Cyprien began to circulate. Apparently, he had also possessed a gun during 
genocide and there had been a road block at the crossroads near his house where 
people were checked for their identity cards and Tutsi killed. 
The timing of the accusation against Cyprien was not accidental. The substance of 
the accusation, however, did not seem like it was entirely false. Two years earlier, 
Cyprien had been accused in the death of the child. As I spoke to judges in the cell 
where the accusation had surfaced, I was surprised to learn that Agnes had stood up to 
defend him at that time and the cell court had not ventured to register the accusation or 
create a dossier for Cyprien. A survivor’s accusation against someone or in defense of 
                                                 
346 Conversation with Agnes who was present at the meeting, July 2005   
                                                                                                                        
 174
someone was generally taken seriously. This had allowed him to stand for election as 
vice-president of the trial court. The alliance between Agnes and the vice-president 
seemed to go back a long way. What was at stake in this alliance? And why was the 
vice-president being accused anew? 
Having spent a few months there already, I had observed that survivors felt they 
needed a Hutu ‘patron’ who would lobby for them and generally look out for their 
interests. In Masaka sector, most survivors were Tutsi women. One of them had a 
Hutu husband who was a retired policeman but still enjoyed some amount of prestige 
within the community because of the official position he had once held. Survivors 
mentioned taking their worries to him in the hope that he would mediate on their 
behalf. Of late, however, they had begun to feel he was unreliable because they learnt 
he had been discussing with his friends and acquaintances things they told him in 
confidence.347 Was this part of that same pattern? As a judge with a non-permanent 
position on the panel, Agnes had little influence on the inner circle- the president, two 
vice presidents and two secretaries. As a woman, she would also be generally 
excluded from private conversations among her male colleagues at beer-drinking 
sessions in bars. Survivors often found themselves the target of a general resentment 
because they were responsible for accusations and arrests.348 There were ways in 
                                                 
347 This was reported in various conversations with survivors, April-July 2005  
348 People grumbled privately that survivors intended to see all Hutu put away in prison. Survivors who 
are well aware of these resentments cope in interesting ways. Agnes, the survivor on the bench, for 
instance, was a non-permanent judge and would fill in for a permanent judge every now and then. She 
would go to great lengths to simulate a lack of interest in the proceedings. At one trial, she had a gacaca 
manual with her and for the entire duration of the trial, refused to look up from it. Once or twice she 
would get up from the bench and go out for a few minutes only to immerse herself in reading again. She 
was listening intently however. When the defendant’s testimony was contradictory, she would look at 
him briefly, survey the reactions of those present in the audience and return to her book. At another 
trial, an elderly woman (survivor) stood up a little uncertainly to press fresh accusations against the 
defendant who had confessed. But when neither the judges nor the audience seemed inclined to believe 
her account, her female survivor friends laughed at her along with the crowd and pulled at her to sit 
down. From these and other similar observations, it appeared that survivors were anxious not to give the 
impression that they were over invested in pursuing the cases of those accused.   
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which conversations would shut down when a survivor arrived upon the scene, so 
Agnes would presumably be cut off from certain channels of information. 
It seemed rational for Agnes to locate in Cyprien a willing ally on the ‘inside’- 
someone who could pass on crucial information and be sympathetic to survivors’ 
interests during specific trials. Also, Agnes, it turned out, had been pursuing James’ 
case for a long time. He had led an attack on her home during the genocide, besides 
being accused of various other more serious crimes. She appeared determined that he 
would not have the benefit of a lenient sentence at the gacaca court. Cyprien was 
probably returning Agnes’ favor from two years ago, as he tried to obstruct the 
president and his coterie from successfully maneuvering to retrieve James’ dossier 
from the Prosecutor’s office. This not only explained the alliance between them but 
also indicated that the resurfacing of the old accusation against Cyprien was not 
accidental. 
The denunciation against Cyprien is revealing of the manner in which information is 
guarded and used in gacaca. The president and the other judges had been fully aware 
of the accusations against Cyprien,349 yet they had no reason to use it against him just 
so long as he worked with them. It seemed especially audacious to use James to bring 
up the old information and force him to resign from his position. Cyprien continued to 
attend the trials but he began to arrive late and looked visibly worried. He had been an 
assiduous note-taker during testimonies but he now sat quietly without bothering to 
write anything down. 
He was eventually removed but James’ case was not resolved while I was there. He 
had been provisionally released because he had confessed to category 2 crimes. He 
                                                 
349 Interview with president of trial court, Masaka sector, July 2005   
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was not re-arrested even though a second dossier charging him with more serious 
crimes had come to light.   
For Hutu who have no connections to powerful judges, the entire process appears 
fraught with uncertainty. Yet, the case of Cyprien indicates that uncertainty tends to 
diminish with the exposure of information. For Cyprien who could not this time 
around summon a coalition in his defense, the fresh accusations meant the certainty of 
removal from the bench and the addition of his name to the list of those accused of 
genocide crimes.  
6.7 Conclusion 
Judges are centrally involved in manipulations around gacaca at the local level. Their 
actions are self-interested: to secure the release of a friend or relative, to secure the 
removal of someone who obstructs their attempts to intervene in favor of someone, to 
eliminate old rivals and move up in the local hierarchy of power. While judges’ 
manipulations create an environment of uncertainty about trial processes and even 
outcomes, it is the accumulation of information against an accused that reduces the 
element of uncertainty making it more likely that the accused will not survive the 
process by simply insisting he is innocent.     
Judges are able to do this because gacaca courts operate within a larger political 
structure in which judges are ‘allowed’ to enjoy some autonomous space by a state 
that is otherwise excessively controlling with regard to local affairs. Judges are 
important actors at the local level. They are opinion leaders, hold influential positions 
in local associations and Churches and are mostly Hutu. Many of them occupy 
positions in government structures at the grassroots and are members of the RPF. 
Their co-optation and compliance is vital for ruling elites at the center who need to 
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project their power into the hinterland. This is especially crucial for a regime 
dominated by elites of the ethnic minority group who are confronted with the task of 
political regulation and governance of the majority of the population. As long as these 
actors comply with directives from above (for instance, with regard to running the 
gacaca courts or the implementation of specific policies), ruling elites at the center 
refrain from overt and excessive kinds of intervention in local affairs.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION  
 
7.1 Taking stock 
The findings of this dissertation present a bleak picture of politics, justice, truth and 
reconciliation in Rwanda more than a decade after genocide. The anger and 
resentment on the ground are palpable but well concealed behind a façade of quick 
affirmations of the benevolence and wisdom of the ruling elites.   
The reasons are twofold: First, the human cost of justice has been high. People live 
in fear of being denounced, livelihood earning members of families have been 
incarcerated for years in pre-trial detention, gacaca’s quick and rough justice can 
destroy those who are innocent but have no means of defending themselves except 
resort to manipulations of their own. Justice is experienced not so much as a 
reformatory process but as terror and persecution.350 Second, justice is also 
experienced as a disempowering and humiliating process.351 The trials have reduced 
citizens to a subject-like dependence on ruling elites. Arrests, releases, re-arrests, trials 
and sentence reductions are determined by the state depending on its political 
calculations. Ordinary Hutu are eager to comply if that means a continuous flow of 
benevolence from state authorities in the form of reduced punishment, provisional 
releases and fewer arrests. Any measure of reprieve is gratefully accepted and 
generates approval for ruling elites despite reservations about their moral authority to 
rule.   
                                                 
350 A few thousand Hutu fled the country in 2005-6 fearing persecution by gacaca courts. E. Ndikumana  
(2005, April 19)  
351 One of the accused who had confessed put it across in this way: “They treat me like I am not a 
human being any more” June 2005 Masaka sector   
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The central theme of this dissertation, “surrendering consent”, identifies this 
emergent relationship specifically between ruling elites and those who have confessed. 
It establishes a linkage between micro-processes and an institutional outcome,352 in 
this case, the emergence of a de facto contractual relationship in which compliance is 
rewarded by ruling elites and continued compliance is ensured because people fear 
that the rewards on which their survival depend may be withdrawn at the discretion of 
those in power. I argue that confessions produce political quiescence which ensures 
that they are unwilling to protest against or punish ruling elites. This has not produced 
a government constrained by its people. It has undermined a democratic transition and 
enabled regime consolidation over the course of the transition. In this chapter, I first 
summarize my main arguments. I conclude by discussing some theoretical and 
practical implications of this research project.  
7.2 Summary of main arguments 
 
7.2.1  Causes of confession   
The accused fear that those who confess will become easy targets for indiscriminate 
retribution by the state; therefore, they hold out from confessing as long as they can 
even though they are aware of the reduced sentences for those who step up to 
acknowledge their role in genocide. This fear of ruling elites stems from their 
perceptions about the discriminatory and oppressive nature of Tutsi rule in general and 
of RPF rule in particular.  
However, the more information accumulates against an accused individual over 
time, the more likely it becomes that he will be unable to defend himself in a gacaca 
court. Defendants do not have access to legal counsel under gacaca law. Moreover, 
                                                 
352 I refer to the positivist tradition of interpreting institutions as de facto rules that regulate political life 
regardless of whether the rules are written in formal legal texts.    
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gacaca court processes are embedded in local contexts rife with manipulations and 
power struggles in which judges are often implicated. All this creates fundamental 
uncertainty about the defendant’s prospects at trial that is offset by one factor: 
information availability. In the absence of other kinds of hard evidence commonly 
introduced in criminal trials, gacaca judges often have no other means of arriving at a 
decision other than to take into account the number of witnesses who back the same 
narrative. This means that the higher the number of people denouncing an accused 
individual, the more likely that this person will be unable to mount a successful 
defense.  
I identify two main mechanisms of information exposure- denunciations by those 
who have already confessed and witness testimony. These may be true or false but the 
accused individual who fears he has been irrevocably exposed and may be unable to 
mount a counter-coalition in his defense at trial is confronted with a decision at this 
point. If he does not confess and is determined guilty at trial, the penalties under the 
gacaca law are severe but if he confesses, he may be eligible for a reduced sentence. It 
is in the accused individual’s interest to confess if the weight of accumulated 
information works against him. Thus, information exposure and self-interest are key 
causal factors in the production of confessions. The number of confessions has 
steadily risen over the years as the trials process has continued. By 2006, the 
confessed comprised 1 in every 31 individuals in the adult Hutu population at the time 
of genocide.  
7.2.2.  Consequences of confession   
Having surrendered a confession after holding out for numerous years, the confessed 
continue to fear the possibility of indiscriminate punishment. Political quiescence is a 
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way to signal their loyalty in expectation of the promised sentence reductions and 
provisional release from prison.  
I find that the confessed are unwilling to hold ruling elites accountable; they are 
likely to support the political status-quo and are eager to appease those in power. They 
do this despite believing that ruling elites lack the moral authority to govern for failing 
to account for crimes they have perpetrated against Hutu.   
I find that the confessed are not particularly different from those who have not 
confessed in terms of their perceptions about the current ruling elites, their attitudes 
towards survivors and perceptions about historic legacies of conflict. Yet, as I show in 
chapter four, those who have not confessed demand regime change and talk of 
political negotiations at elite level between the government and its opponents in exile. 
In contrast, the confessed are likely to dissemble and praise the “good rule” of this 
government. When asked to locate responsibility for the country’s historical legacy of 
conflict or the violence of the recent past, the non-confessed systematically exonerate 
Hutu elites while the confessed exonerate Tutsi elites.  
I identify this as a ‘consent-effect’ simulated by the confessed in their self-interest 
because they fear that their promised benefits may otherwise be withdrawn. 
Confessions therefore produce compliance and engender a dependence on ruling elites 
in order to keep benefits such as reduced sentences flowing on which their security 
and freedom depends.  
7.2.3  Trials and regime consolidation  
Based on the finding that confessions produce compliance, I make two inferential 
claims: First, the ‘consent-effect’ is likely simulated by those proximate to the 
confessed such as their immediate family members who are concerned for the safety 
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of their relatives in prison and fear they might themselves be targeted for punishment. 
In the community-based part of field research, it was not unusual to hear from those 
who had family members in prison how concerned they felt about their own safety and 
how desperately they wanted their relatives to return home safely to contribute to the 
family income and help to raise the children. Those proximate to the confessed 
experience these anxieties, perhaps more so on account of the heightened vulnerability 
of those who have confessed. This diffusion of the ‘consent-effect’ would imply that a 
population larger than those who have confessed is likely to be compliant.   
Second, the confessed were disenfranchised during the crucial end-of transition 
elections in 2003. This effectively neutralized a portion of the Hutu vote. However, I 
surmise that for every Hutu who had confessed and was disenfranchised, there were 
individuals proximate to the confessed who surrendered consent by transacting their 
vote hoping to appease the RPF which had maneuvered to prevent the emergence of a 
viable opposition and looked like it would inevitably win.  Given the likely victory of 
the RPF and the prospect of continuation of the trials, transacting the vote would be a 
rational way of signaling their continued loyalty to ensure security guarantees in 
exchange. In chapter one, I use a rough calculation to show that 83% of the pro-
Kagame vote was the Hutu vote and I argue that this is too large a margin to be 
accounted for by election fraud alone. As the reports of external observers indicate, the 
scale of election fraud was not significantly unusual from other elections contested by 
an incumbent candidate. I make an inferential argument that disenfranchisement of the 
confessed and the transaction of the vote by those proximate to the confessed 
contributed to the victory of the RPF at the polls.  
This dissertation discusses two other ways that the trials have enabled the 
consolidation of a regime that is dominated by elites of the ethnic minority group. 
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First, the basic premise on which the trials were implemented, “genocide ideology” or 
the notion that Hutu were willing executioners socialized over decades into a culture 
that did not punish the killing of Tutsi, has not been critically re-examined since the 
beginning of the transition. Chapter two shows how the notion of “genocide ideology” 
has not been adequately defined by ruling elites. It has been used to target political 
opponents and has become the justification for developing repressive laws targeting 
freedoms of speech and expression, regulating the media and restricting human rights 
work. This has produced a repressive political climate in which the costs of opposition 
to the regime are significant. I argue that within this larger repressive environment in 
which ruling elites appear solidly entrenched in power and there is no viable 
opposition either at elite level or from organized civil society actors, the de-facto 
contractual relationship in which ruling elites can extract compliance from ordinary 
citizens in exchange of security guarantees tends to be stable and self-reinforcing.  
Second, the co-optation of local elites into institutions of state and into the ruling 
party allows RPF elites at the center to regulate and govern the vast rural hinterland 
where Hutu comprise a majority of the population. Chapter six shows that gacaca 
judges who occupy important positions on the bench are mostly Hutu. Many judges 
are members of the RPF and also occupy important positions in government structures 
at the grassroots. Judges are important “allies” of ruling elites at the local level. Their 
compliance allows ruling elites to keep the gacaca courts functioning, to project power 
into the hinterland and to influence public opinion.  During field research, it was also 
reported to me by some judges that they were ordered to mobilize the popular vote 
during the elections in 2003 and threatened with severe consequences if the desired 
results did not materialize. Judges are rewarded for their compliance by a measure of 
relative autonomy at the local level. Ironically, judges use this relative autonomy to 
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maneuver around the rules to secure the release of friends and relatives. Some use 
their position on the bench as a launching pad toward official positions at a higher 
level, for example, to contest elections as the coordinator of the sector or a post in 
district government. State elites refrain from intervening unless they are interested in 
the outcome of specific cases or if local manipulations cannot be contained further and 
threaten to erupt into violence. This has caused survivors to complain bitterly about 
the negligence of state authorities with regard to gacaca processes.   
7.3  Theoretical implications  
In a recent volume on transitional justice, Ruti Teitel raises a question that is not often 
asked “What, if any, is the relation between a state’s response to its repressive past and 
its prospects for a liberal order?”353 Teitel offers a historical and interpretive account 
of normative shifts between regimes that are enabled publicly and authoritatively by 
transitional legal processes. While this dissertation proposes an answer to the same 
question and concurs with Teitel’s emphasis on the independent and consequential 
role of transitional jurisprudence, it moves in a different direction. I use an agent-
based materialist framework in which both pre-existing beliefs and self-interest matter. 
My focus is on the micro-politics of individual responses to the incentives and 
sanctions of the law and its consequences for generating a new set of de facto rules 
that regulate the relationship between citizens and ruling elites. I conclude that trials 
implemented on a mass scale by ruling elites who are feared and widely perceived as 
lacking legitimacy hinder the prospects for a liberalizing transition.  
This project sets up a general framework for comparative inquiry. It makes a case 
for examining the sources and effects of the institutionalization of new political 
relationships between citizens and state during transitional periods in comparative 
                                                 
353 Ruti Teitel (2000), p3 
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contexts on the premise that the de facto bargains struck during this foundational stage 
have the potential to determine the trajectory of politics in years to come.  It raises a 
host of unanswered questions that are not dealt with in the growing literature on 
transitional justice.354 Could truth commissions or trials in ordinary courts have 
different effects? Does the scale of implementation matter in other contexts?  Do pre-
existing beliefs and political attitudes matter in the responses of participants in other 
transitional legal processes?  Are the introduction of trials or truth commissions 
associated with a rise or decline in political activism and claims-making on the state?  
This project thus opens up other interesting lines of inquiry for future research.  
This research specifically contributes towards a new understanding of the Rwandan 
transitional experience. Few scholars have conducted a detailed investigation of the 
gacaca courts and to my knowledge no one has focused on the micro-politics of the 
trials process, the politics of confession and its relationship to the political transition.  
Existing research deals with the potential of gacaca courts for deliberative discourse, 
inter-personal reconciliation, victim satisfaction and human rights praxis.355  The 
empirical data as well as the theoretical connections are original contributions of this 
dissertation.  
The findings of this research project are also timely in that specialized non-
governmental organizations, foundations and donor governments are searching for 
general models and sets of ‘best practices’ that may be applied in other contexts. It is 
                                                 
354 The bulk of this literature is concerned with explaining elite choices about particular mechanisms of 
transitional justice (eg. Trials versus truth commissions, amnesty, purges and reparation); the trade off 
between peace and justice in transitional polities; hybrid models of courts or truth commissions; the 
evolution of international and domestic jurisprudence in bringing perpetrators to account etc. See for 
instance, Naomi Roht-Arriaza (2005); Neil Kritz, ed. (1995); Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier 
Mariezcurrena, eds. (2006); Jon Elster ed. (2006); R. I. Rotberg and D. Thompson eds. (2000). 
355 See for example Ariel Meyerstein (2007) ;  Phil Clark (2005); William Schabas (2005); Lars 
Waldorf (2006); Alana Tiemessen (2004); Mark Drumbl (2002); Ervin Staub (2004) ; Peter Uvin and 
Charles Mironko (2003)  
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therefore important to assess at this time to what extent the Rwandan experience is 
distinctive, how far the ‘gacaca’ model may be replicable and to what extent it has 
achieved its stated goals and produced a range of other consequences.  A brief survey 
of the experiences with transitional justice in other countries that have suffered large 
scale violence shows that the Rwandan case is rather unique in at least three ways: 
first, in the emphasis of successor elites on trials, their repudiation of a truth 
commission and general neglect of a reparations policy; second, in the wide ranging 
goals that these trials are expected to achieve: a larger historical truth about the 
genocide, justice, national unity, interpersonal reconciliation, psychological healing 
and even development; third, in pursuing prosecutions not only of elites but also of 
ordinary perpetrators on a mass scale.  
In contrast, successor elites in transition countries have preferred to use a 
combination of mechanisms with each of those limited in scope and aimed at 
achieving a limited and specific set of goals. For instance, Sierra Leone has recently 
used a truth commission and pursued selective prosecutions simultaneously. Other 
countries chose to implement different accountability mechanisms in a sequential 
manner. In the 1980s, Argentina and Chile for example relied primarily on truth 
commissions to identify broad patterns of violations, locate responsibility for crimes 
committed by various parties, examine the sources of their countries’ troubled 
histories and recommend institutional reforms. Amnesty laws protecting former elites 
from prosecution, such as those in Chile, Argentina and post-Franco Spain in the late 
1970s are today considered a violation of international law.356   Only with the passage 
                                                 
356 See for example, UN Security Council (2004)  
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of time have ruling elites in Chile and Argentina undertaken selective prosecutions of 
those responsible for the repressive regimes of the past.357    
In post-apartheid South Africa, the truth and reconciliation commission investigated 
crimes perpetrated both by the former regime and African nationalists. The 
recommendations were used to pursue selective prosecutions of apartheid era officials 
at a later time. In the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe, lustration laws were 
passed aimed at purging various levels of officialdom associated with past repressive 
regimes. Some of these countries opened secret police files instead of instituting 
official truth commissions. In addition, selective prosecutions, such as the trials of 
East German border guards, were pursued in some cases.   
Post war Germany, probably the case closest to Rwanda in terms of having 
experienced genocide, also pursued a range of accountability measures. These 
included selective prosecutions at Nuremberg, a policy on reparations for the victims 
of the Holocaust and a decentralized vetting process known as de-Nazification that 
was implemented by local boards on a mass scale.  Given the millions of cases358 to be 
processed by local boards, the delays and maneuvers by board members and 
prosecutors (laymen from local communities) such as downgrading the majority of 
serious offenders such that they were free from sanctions other than a fine359, growing 
allegations of persecution from the German Right and the political need of the 
                                                 
357 In Spain, there has been, since the late 80s, a growing momentum on a reparations policy. See 
Paloma Aguilar (2007).  
358 Of 12,753,000 persons registered under de-Nazification procedures, almost three-fourths were found 
not chargeable under the various relaxation measures and limited amnesty provisions introduced by the 
US military government. At the end of April 1948, 3,209,000 cases had been processed of which 2, 
373,000 cases were granted amnesty without trial, and 836,000 cases had been tried of which more than 
one third were exonerated. John H. Herz (1948), p577  
359 By the end of November 1946, less than 20% of those the US Military Government had considered 
“non-employable” on account of being “major Nazis” had been had been placed in categories with 
employment prohibitions and the remainder had been classified as “followers” liable for lesser penalties 
or were exonerated.  John H. Herz (1948), p572  
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Occupation Government to have an ally in Germany in the context of a rapidly 
developing Cold War, de-Nazification processes barely lasted two and a half years and 
were called off by the summer of 1948.   
Clearly, holding hundreds of thousands of people accountable at the local level was 
not something that could be accomplished unless it was politically expedient to do so. 
In Germany’s case, continuation of the de-Nazification policy had become politically 
problematic. Relying on Germans who were embedded in their local communities to 
oversee the process inevitably ran the risk that there would be attempts to maneuver 
around the rules to secure local interests. In the Rwandan case, however, the local 
tribunals have been allowed to continue despite local manipulations and long delays 
because there is no domestic opposition and it has been politically expedient to do.   
The Rwandan government has sought to justify the gacaca courts in the name of 
Rwandan tradition but it is important to note that gacaca courts apply criminal law 
backed by the coercive apparatus of state without concomitantly guaranteeing 
defendants the legal rights they would have been entitled to in ordinary courts. This is 
different altogether from the softer, informal aspects of customary gacaca in Rwanda 
and even other indigenous mechanisms that are being used on an experimental basis in 
different transitional contexts. For example, in some local communities in Sierra 
Leone, a process called Kpaa Mende is used to elicit confessions.360 The victim (of a 
theft, for example) announces his intention to use a diviner to issue a curse upon the 
wrongdoer and his family unless the perpetrator steps up to acknowledge his guilt. The 
town crier publicly discusses the effectiveness of the curse which apparently has 
resulted in the deaths of people when used on earlier occasions. This creates a pressure 
on the family who may have knowledge of the crime. It also pushes the perpetrator 
                                                 
360 Joe Alie (2008).  
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who may not wish harm upon himself or his family to step up and confess. Cleansing 
rituals are used to relieve the perpetrator of the curse if he confessed after the diviner 
has already issued the curse in a public ceremony. USAID has been supporting 
customary local processes in Uganda (for reintegration of former rebels) and 
elsewhere that facilitate truth telling and inter-personal reconciliation. Although 
customary gacaca has been a more secular and community-based deliberative process, 
there are ways in which community pressure, shaming and other mechanisms could be 
used to elicit confessions, generate truth and produce reparations at local level without 
having to use criminal sanctions and the coercive apparatus of state.  
The gacaca courts’ criminal sanctions, their use on a mass scale, their neglect of fair 
trial guarantees and the politically calculated failure of ruling elites to address serious 
rights violations other than genocide suggest that justice is experienced as the 
persecution and criminalization of Hutu as a collective. The damaging consequences 
of these trials for political life and the transitional political regime have been identified 
and discussed in this dissertation. In the following section, I undertake a brief 
assessment of the extent to which these trials have met their formally stated objectives. 
I conclude by suggesting that the trials for genocide crimes need to be restricted in 
scope, limited to the prosecution of former elites as in most transitional countries and 
processed in ordinary courts. The gacaca tribunals may be modified to work as local 
truth commissions and decide on reparations to be made by perpetrators to survivors 
and other victims.  
7.4 Practical implications  
The trials are expected to generate truth, justice and reconciliation. They have 
achieved a measure of all three goals but the cost of that success in human and ethical 
terms has been considerable. For all those who are truly guilty and are determined as 
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such by the gacaca courts, there are also many who are likely to be innocent but will 
not stand a chance at trial because of the weight of false denunciations. Even if those 
who are really innocent and falsely accused are eventually acquitted at trial, it may 
take a few years to actually get to trial. This intervening period can be severely 
distressful. They may be arrested and detained. If they are not arrested immediately, 
they suffer loss of social status and are vulnerable to harassment by local foes. Apart 
from this human toll, the maneuvering and manipulations that are (inevitably) part of 
the gacaca process does not bode well in terms of fostering respect for the rule of law. 
If anything, people tend to learn by means of observing others and practicing the art of 
manipulation themselves that if they have access to influence and resources, there is a 
way to maneuver around the rules.  
Survivors too are in a difficult situation. They may not be able to parse out the truth 
from the tangle of confessions and testimonies that are often contradictory and 
sometimes contrived. They are often indifferent to confessions delivered mechanically 
in the courtroom. Only one defendant in the six trials I observed cared to seek out the 
plaintiff in the case and ask her directly for forgiveness. The tense atmosphere eased 
immediately as people nodded in approval and the defendant wept openly. Some 
survivors told me that there were a few defendants who were ashamed and afraid to 
display their emotions in the glare of public scrutiny in the gacaca court but that they 
had sought the survivors out in their fields or on the road when they were alone and 
asked for their forgiveness.  
The pressure to tell the truth by threatening severe penalties has some dangerous 
consequences. Secret groups with names like “ceceka” (be quiet) hold clandestine 
meetings to urge people not to testify or cooperate with the gacaca courts.361 
                                                 
361 Burnet, Jennie E. (2007). I heard similar rumors about secret meetings held in local bars where those 
who had gathered were urged not to cooperate with the courts.  
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Witnesses, survivors and even gacaca judges have been killed. One can interpret this 
either as evidence of a dangerous ideology at work (as the government is wont to 
do362) or as the actions of desperate people pushed to the brink who will do desperate 
things to avoid long prison terms and further sanctions. Finally, the resentment 
building up against survivors within communities undermines a substantive gain made 
by the gacaca courts. If ordinary Hutu had believed during genocide that all Tutsi were 
their enemy, they now seem to be acknowledging that their victims were innocent and 
vulnerable people. However, this distinction tends to collapse when they complain 
about the perceived nexus between survivors and the state; an alliance with the 
apparent objective of sending all Hutu to die in prison. These resentments reinforce 
pre-existing beliefs about the nature of Tutsi rule and the advantages that accrue to 
ordinary Tutsi therein.363   If there is potential for a genuine normative shift, it is 
undermined by the resentment of ordinary Hutu at the stream of accusations over the 
last decade, the bursting prisons, serious rights violations and the impact on their 
families left to fend for themselves in precarious circumstances.  
Based on the above observations, it seems like a practical solution to restrict trials to 
the pursuit of former elites (this would still allow Rwanda to live up to its legal and 
moral “duty to prosecute”364) and to use gacaca as local truth commissions rather than 
trial courts that enforce criminal law. The government acknowledges that ordinary 
                                                                                                                                            
  
362 See for example a report by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission on the causes of 
increasing violence after genocide. The report points to the role of genocide ideology and a culture of 
impunity. See National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (2008)   
363 An anonymous letter dropped off at a survivor’s home said the following: “Because of your deep 
maliciousness wanting to let all of us people …die in prison…you planned to eliminate all the men… 
because you are greedy and you don’t know who you are. But you will not achieve all this because we 
are vigilant…You will continue to let innocent people be imprisoned but be informed that people have 
had enough of being led by your dictatorship….” The letter ended with death threats and was signed “It 
is us, all the discontented people” Photocopied and published in The New Times (2005, March 9-10)  
(Translated into English by my interpreter)   
364 Diane Orentlicher (1991).  
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perpetrators were misled and coerced into participating in genocide. There is a need to 
re-think the assumptions that underpinned the argument for trials on a mass scale. 
Transitional justice strategies that rely on shaming, truth-telling, local deliberation and 
reparations without wielding the threat of punitive sanctions are likely to be more 
useful when dealing with ordinary perpetrators. This could have two significant 
benefits: First, there is already a degree of guilt and regret within communities and a 
desire to make amends for the past. Non-coercive informal mechanisms are probably 
best suited to beginning the long term task of social repair. This can be achieved 
without violating either the rights of the accused or the safety of survivors and 
witnesses. Survivors need the truth from perpetrators who are not continuously 
maneuvering to avoid the possibility of arbitrary punishment. Second, without a 
criminal trials process implemented on a massive scale, there is unlikely to be a large 
scale production of political quiescence of the kind suggested in this project. That 
should open up the prospect for a de facto renegotiation of the de facto rules of the 
political game between citizens and ruling elites.365   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
365 Peter Uvin cautions that “the problems of Rwanda are present in the non-state sphere as 
well…authoritarianism, clientelism, distrust, and social exclusion (including the ideology that allowed 
genocide to happen…they are not the sole preserve of government…” He continues, “It just makes the 
notion that somehow thwarting, or replacing, the current government is the solution a lot less realistic or 
promising… Such understanding on my part is not the same, however, as abandoning any vision of 
social and political change. It just means we need to understand where Rwanda comes from, to better 
reflect on how to move forwards with it…” See Peter Uvin (2003)  
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GLOSSARY 
 
1. CDR                                             Coalition for the Defense of the Republic: A 
radical Hutu party. Formed in 1992 after multi-
partyism was formally adopted in Rwanda 
under international and domestic pressures. 
The party was known for its extremist anti-
Tutsi rhetoric and its scathing critiques of the 
MRND for being too acquiescent to the RPF.  
Its youth wing contributed members to a 
dreaded militia known as the Impuzamugambi 
(those who have a single goal). The extremist 
press recruited prominent journalists from 
CDR political circles.     
 
2. Cell                                               The lowest administrative unit in Rwanda. Its 
leader, the cell coordinator (known as the 
responsable in the pre-RPF era), is supported 
by a cell executive committee, the cell 
committee on development, and the 
nyumbakumi who are the non-formal leaders 
for groups of ten households within every cell.  
 
3. Gacaca courts                               A traditional local dispute resolution 
mechanism that relied on the mediation of 
‘people of integrity’ to resolve petty disputes. 
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Under the gacaca law in post-genocide 
Rwanda, community members who did not 
participate in genocide are elected to serve as 
judges and given some training in the law. 
(pronounced: ga-cha-cha)  
 
4. Gacaca (categories of crimes)      Category 1 includes those in positions of 
authority at the time of genocide, those who 
financed, organized or incited genocide, as 
well as those accused of sexual crimes; 
Category 2 includes those who committed 
homicide and their accomplices; Category 3 
includes those who committed theft or arson.   
Until 2007, gacaca courts did not have 
jurisdiction to try category 1 cases.      
 
5.  Hutu social revolution                 1959. Led to the end of the Tutsi monarchy 
which had ruled Rwanda for four centuries. 
Mostly Tutsi elites but also hundreds of 
ordinary Tutsi were targeted for harassment 
and persecution and went into exile. The First 
Hutu Republic was inaugurated after 
independence in 1962.    
 
 
6. IBUKA                                        An umbrella genocide survivors’ organization.                             
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7. Icyitso                                           Accomplice. (plural: ibyitso) All Tutsi were 
called ibyitso as were Hutu who were opposed 
to genocide or sympathetic to the RPF.  
 
8. Ingando                                        “Solidarity camps” organized by the RPF for 
specific groups of people: those who have 
confessed and are on provisional release, 
students admitted to college, soldiers of the 
former government returning from exile etc. 
Organized for a couple of weeks ranging to a 
couple of months.  People are lectured on the 
RPF version of Rwandan history, ethnic 
relations, patriotism, civil education, unity and 
reconciliation. Group discussions and debate 
are encouraged.  
 
9. Inkotanyi                                      “Tireless warriors” or “those who do not rest 
till the goal is reached”. The name of an 
ancient regiment under the King, it was 
adopted by the RPF during the civil war and 
was retained over the transition period.  
 
10. Interahamwe                                 Originally conceived as the ‘youth movement’ 
of the MRND. It means “those who work 
together” or “those who attack together”. Later 
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became one of the most dreaded civilian militia 
in the genocide.   
   
11. Itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba   In the absence of the word “genocide” in the 
Kinyarwanda language, the term 
itsembabwoko was coined that meant literally 
the “elimination of an ethnie”. Killings of Hutu 
perpetrated by Hutu extremists are called 
“massacres”  (itsembatsemba)     
 
12. Jenoside                                        The Kinyarwanda mutation of the English 
word “genocide”. It has gradually come to 
replace, in law and common parlance, the other 
Kinyarwanda word “itsembabwoko” 
(elimination of an ethnie). The reference 
simply to “jenoside” overlooks the other set of 
victims, Hutu moderates who died because 
they stood in opposition to the extremists.   
 
13. Kinyarwanda                                The native language spoken by all Rwandans, 
particularly the rural masses. Elites speak 
French or English or both. All three are official 
languages in post-genocide Rwanda.  
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14. LDF                                              Local defense force. Civilians recruited and 
trained by the army for the security of their 
communities.  
 
15. MDR                                            Democratic Republican Movement. An earlier 
version of the party was called the MDR-
Parmehutu (party for the emancipation of the 
Hutu people). It was the main force behind the 
Hutu Revolution of 1959. It became the de 
facto single party of the First Republic and was 
associated with early rounds of anti-Tutsi 
violence. It was banned after Habyarimana’s 
coup and the establishment of the Second 
Republic in 1973. It resurfaced as an 
opposition party in 1991 and adopted a more 
restrained image by dropping the tag 
“Parmehutu”. Split into factions in 1993, the 
extremist MDR-Power faction joined the 
genocidal forces. After genocide, the party’s 
moderate members were co-opted into the 
transition government. It has faced accusations 
of ‘divisionism’ since then and in 2003 a 
Parliamentary Commission recommended its 
dissolution.   
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16. MRND                                         The ruling party of the Second Republic (1973-
1990) and the only party under the dictatorship 
of Juvénal Habyarimana. Every man, woman 
and child was a member of the MRND by 
default. Originally the National Revolutionary 
Movement for Development, it became the 
National Revolutionary Movement for 
Development and Democracy MRND (D) after 
the introduction of multi-partyism in 1991.   
 
17. Nyumbakumi                                Their position in local government is not 
formally codified. These are locally elected 
leaders for every ten households within a cell. 
They are responsible for managing a broad 
range of affairs in their constituency (security, 
health, immigrants into the area etc) and report 
to the cell coordinator (responsable) who 
reports to the sector coordinator (Konseye) who 
in turn reports to the Mayor at the district and 
so on.     
 
18. PSD                                              Social Democratic Party. Prominent in the 
opposition to Habyarimana in the early 1990s. 
Its main constituency comprised teachers, civil 
servants and professionals. It split into 
moderate and extremist factions and the latter 
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joined the genocidal project. Its moderate 
members were co-opted into the transition 
government after genocide.  
 
19. RPF                                              Rwandan Patriotic Front formed in 1988. 
Formerly the RANU an association of Tutsi 
refugees based in Kenya. Initiated a civil war 
from its base in Uganda in October 1990. Won 
the civil war and put an end to genocide in July 
1994. Dominated the ten year transition 
government and emerged as the ruling party in 
the first multi-party elections in 2003, the first 
such in the country’s history.   
 
20. Sector                                           Comprised of a number of cells. It is the 
administrative unit sandwiched between the 
district (above) and the cells (below). Its 
leader, the sector coordinator (or Konseye in 
the pre-RPF era) is elected by the leadership of 
the cells and supported by the sector executive 
and development committees.  Prominent 
members of the sector serve in consultative and 
other capacities at the district headquarters.   
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21. SNJG                                            National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions. 
Established as the sixth chamber of the 
Supreme Court to put in place, manage and 
oversee the gacaca courts. 
 
22. TIG                                               “Travaux d’Interêts Générales” or “Works in 
the Public Interest”. Known simply as 
“community service” in the context of the 
commuted sentences for those who have 
confessed. It involves serving a portion of the 
sentence outside of prison working on 
infrastructure and other projects designated by 
the state. TIG camps, along with Ingando, have 
emerged as sites for political indoctrination by 
the RPF.      
 
23. Ubuhake                                       A form of clientship in which the patron 
allowed the client use of his cows and extended 
protection in exchange of labor, agricultural 
gifts and military service.   
 
24. Ubukonde                                     A form of clientship in which the patron owned 
land and rented parts of it out in return of gifts, 
labor or both.   
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25. Umuganda                                    An obligatory contribution of labor towards 
projects designated by the state such as 
building roads, anti-erosion ditches, harvesting 
water etc. Institutionalized as a policy for 
national development during the Second 
Republic. Although legitimated in the name of 
peoples’ participation, umuganda has generally 
required that leaders impose fines and other 
coercive measures in order to have people 
show up on the designated day and participate.  
